Burk v. ReeseBurk v. Reese
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Weaver
John R. Heath died in Johnson County June 24, 1905, possessed of an estate of nearly or quite $100,000. On December 29, 1904, he executed a paper purporting to be his will, to which instrument was added a codicil February 3, 1905. By this writing he devised his entire estate to trustees, who were directed to pay the income to the daughter during her life, together with such other sums from the principal as might be necessary to secure her comfortable support. They were also directed to turn over to the daughter one-half of the principal estate in the event of her becoming a widow, and at her death all the rest and remainder thereof was to become the property of her child or children in their own right. This instrument being filed for probate, the daughter, plaintiff herein, who was the only child and heir of the testator, appeared and objected thereto on the ground of his alleged mental incapacity to make .a valid disposition •of his estate, and that the will as made was the product of an insane delusion on his part with respect to the plaintiff’s husband. The cause was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict sustaining the will. The abstracts are very voluminous, aggregating nearly five hundred printed pages of record. The issiies were hotly contested, and, as is not unusual in litigation of this nature, there is an irreconciliable conflict in the memory and opinion of witnesses having apparently equal opportunity to know whereof they speak. According to some the testator was so far gone in mental decay as to make quite certain the want of testamentary capacity, while others picture him as retaining his faculties in substantially normal vigor and fully capable of making a valid will. Under such circumstances we need not attempt a statement of the testimony. It is sufficient for present purposes that there was a conflict of evidence calling for its submission to the jury, and *498the verdict returned is to be accepted as final, unless there be found reversible error in the rulings of the trial court or instructions to the jury. Of the exceptions which have been argued in this respect we shall discuss only those we deem decisive of the appeal.
(17) There have also been introduced in evidence opinions of physicians or experts in mental diseases based upon hypothetical questions or an assumed state of facts. Such opinions must be < considered and weighed by you in view of the facts upon which they are based as stated in the hypothetical question to which- answer is given, which facts are assumed to be true by the witnesses in formulating their answers. Should such assumed facts not be supported by the evidence, or should it turn out that such hypothetical questions are in important particulars incorrect, unfair, partial and untrue, no weight whatever can be given to the opinion founded thereon.
We are constrained to hold that, under the settled rule of our own cases, this instruction can not be upheld. It leaves the jury to say for itself what facts embodied in the hypothetical question are of so little importance that a failure to establish them by the evidence may be disregarded and the answer still be allowed weight-- in reaching a verdict. This we have frequently held to be reversible error. Hall v. Rankin, 87 Iowa, 264; Kirsher v. Kirsher, 120 Iowa, 342; Stutsman v. Sharpless, 125 Iowa, 341; Madden v. Coal Co., 133 Iowa, 704; Ball v. Skinner, 134 Iowa, 298. In the last-cited case we said: “A hypothetical question embracing a series of assumed facts is one complete structure, and the court and jury *499are required to assume that every component part or element therein is copsidered by the expert in reaching the opinion he gives in answer thereto. It is not for the court or jury to say that any one of the assumed facts was disregarded or ignored by the witness in forming his opinion, and therefore if in deliberating upon its verdict, the jury finds that one or more of the assumptions indulged in by counsel in framing the question have not been established, the testimony based thereon should be wholly discarded.” This quotation fairly summarizes our prior holdings, and as we are not prepared to overrule them, and the instruction under consideration bears directly upon the most vital proposition in the case, we see no way to avoid the conclusion that it requires the granting of a new trial.
III. Of the questions argued involving the competency of witnesses and other matters likely to arise upon a second trial, we may say the rulings of the trial court appear to be without substantial error. We think, however, it is proper to remark that we are less reluctant to order a new trial because of the conviction forced upon us by a reading of the record that the extraordinary bitterness and wrangling attendant upon the trial may well have clouded the minds of the jurors and interfered with that fairness and fullness of consideration which are essential to the integrity of verdicts. The trial court appears to have presided with marked impartiality and to have exerted itself to the utmost to keep the proceedings within proper limits. Counsel upon both sides are veterans in the practice and of such well-earned eminence as men and lawyers as forbids any suspicion of the integrity of their intentions or motives, and we can only account for the conditions here presented on the theory that the trial happened to occur in a period of prevailing east winds surcharging the local atmosphere with subtle influences tending to asperity of temper. It is unnecessary to particularize or to center the responsibility upon any individual, where neither appears to have tried the efficacy of Solomon’s prescription for turning away wrath. It is enough to say that there was an indulgence in reflections upon opposing counsel and upon the integrity’ of witnesses, statements of irrelevant facts, uncalled for remarks presumably having some local significance which might appeal to the minds of the jurors, and other similar manifestations which should not char*502acterize orderly proceedings in a court of justice. We have no doubt they will be carefully avoided upon the retrial of the case. In saying these things we are not to be understood as administering censure upon counsel. So long as lawyers remain men, and men remain human, the tendency to heat and excess in stubbornly contested jury trials can never be wholly eradicated.- In no class of litigation is this more true than in will contests, .but it is none the less important that in these, as in all other cases, the fighting qualities of the advocate do not escape the restraint of his judgment.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, the judgment of the district court is reversed.