164 Ga. 92 | Ga. | 1927
On the morning of October 25, 1926, a white woman by the name of Mollie Crosby was found in her home, in Glynn County, with her brains beaten out and -in an unconscious and dying condition. Blood was scattered all over the room, showing evidence of a struggle. In the room was found a claw-hammer and a shovel-handle, on both of which was blood. On the body of the deceased were found finger-prints, on her breast, thighs, etc., as appears from the evidence of J. D. Baldwin, the coroner of Glynn County, and the undertaker who prepared the body for burial. Also finger-prints were found on the calf of her leg, and arms. Mr. Baldwin also testified that evidently she had had a terrible scuffle with somebody. It is the theory of the State that this murder was brought about on account of either a criminal assault or an attempted criminal assault upon the person of the deceased. There were no eye-witnesses to the killing, but the verdict was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. The husband of the deceased testified that the accused on the morning of the killing went to his house about 6 :30 o’clock and gave as a reason for coming that he was looking for another negro by the name of Robert Bryant; that he made inquiry as to Mrs. Crosby, the deceased, and went into the house and talked with her. He then told Mr. Crosby, the husband of the deceased, that Mr. Jim Bell told him to tell Mr. Crosby to meet him at the log brow, at which place he would wait for him, as they wanted to take
The conviction in this ease was based solely upon circumstantial evidence. And in considering whether or not the verdict was authorized by the evidence, - we must keep in mind the rule contained in the statute relating to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. The rule there, briefly stated, is, “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts must not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” Penal Code, § 1010. The jury in this case were authorized to find, under the evidence, that certain tracks leading away from the house of Crosby, the-husband of the deceased, were made by the accused. But Crosby had himself testified that the negro was-at his house on the morning of the murder and left there the same time he did, though where he went to does not appear. It
The assignment of error upon the court’s charge upon the subject of alibi is not urged or referred to in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error, and is therefore treated as abandoned.
Judgment reversed.