delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Thе plaintiff-appellant, Sidney Burgess, brought a claim in the District Court for the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, аlleging violation of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, breach of contract, and requеsting enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate. Defendant, Lewis and Clark City-County Board of Hеalth, made a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on the theory that acts of county commissioners are immune under § 2-9-111, MCA. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and plaintiff appеals. We affirm.
The issues presented on appeal are:
1. May an employee of a local government entity bring an action under the Wrоngful Discharge from Employment Act, § 39-2-901, et seq., MCA, or is such an action prohibited by governmental immunity under § 2-9-111, MCA?
2. May an employee of a local government entity bring an action to enforce an arbitration agreement pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act, § 27-5-111, et seq., MCA?
Mr. Burgess was employed at Scratch Grаvel Sanitary Landfill in April 1988. The Scratch Gravel Landfill District was created by the Lewis and Clark County Board of County Commissioners pursuant to § 7-13-203, MCA. The Board of Directors of a landfill district has the power and duty, with the approval of the county commissioners, to employ personnel. Section 7-13-215, MCA.
On July 1, 1988, the defеndant, Lewis and Clark City-County Board of Health (Board) was designated by the Board of County Commissioners as thе Board of Directors of Scratch Gravel Sanitary Landfill District, pursuant to § 7-13-214, MCA.
On July 7,1988, the Board sent a lettеr to Mr. Burgess terminating his employment as a result of budget changes in the new budget approved by the Board. In addition the letter encouraged Mr. Burgess to apply for a vacant position as а landfill equipment operator. The Board hired a different applicant for the equipmеnt operator position. Alleging this violated the Board’s written personnel policies, Mr. Burgess brought a claim for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and requesting enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate. The Dis *277 trict Court held that the Board is immune from suit under § 2-9-111, MCA, and dismissed all three cоunts. Mr. Burgess appeals on the wrongful discharge and arbitration claims.
I.
May an employee оf a local government entity bring an action under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, § 39-2-901, et seq., MCA, оr is such an action prohibited by governmental immunity under § 2-9-111, MCA?
Section 2-9-111, MCA, provides:
“Immunity from suit for legislative acts and omissions.
“(1) As used in this section:
“(a) the term ‘governmental entity’ includes the state, counties, municipalities, and school districts;
“(b)...
“(2) A governmental entity is immune from suit for an act or omissiоn of its legislative body or a member, officer, or agent thereof.
“(3) Amember, officer, or agent of a legislative body is immune from suit for damages arising from the lawful discharge of an official duty associated with the introduction or consideration of legislation or action by the legislative body.”
Under this statute, acts of county commissioners are immune.
Bieber v. Broadwater County
(1988),
Mr. Burgess argues that the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, § 39-2-901, et seq., MCA, has limited the County’s immunity in the area of wrongful discharge, citing the principle that the 1987 Act was passed later than the 1977 immunity statute.
Careful analysis of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Aсt proves plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive. The purpose of the Act is to set limits on wrongful dischargе claims by defining relevant terms, listing the elements necessary to establish a claim, limiting remedies avаilable, and establishing a specific statute of limitations. Section *278 39-2-913, MCA, eliminates common-law rеmedies and provides that no claim is available except as outlined in the Act. In substance, the Act establishes various statutory limits for recovery upon claims for wrongful discharge. Nothing in the Aсt suggests a legislative intent to grant recovery where immunity statutes had previously denied recovery. Mr. Burgess has failed to present any logical support for his contention.
We hold that under § 2-9-111, MCA, the Board is immune from a wrongful discharge suit for terminating Mr. Burgess’ position at the Scratch Gravel Landfill.
II
May an еmployee of a local government entity bring an action to enforce an arbitratiоn agreement pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act, § 27-5-111, et seq., MCA?
Mr. Burgess contends that he has a right to arbitration of his termination under the Lewis and Clark City-County Health Department Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual. Mr. Burgess’ affidavit, with the Manual attached, shows Mr. Burgess would have a right to arbitration only if he hаd completed the six-month probationary period. He has not done so and is therefore prohibited from seeking arbitration.
The District Court’s order granting dismissal on both counts is affirmed.