SWAYNE, District Judge,
after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is a familiar and well-established doctrine of equity that, where a suit has been instituted and carried on for the benefit of many, all who come in to avail themselves of the benefits of the decree obtained under the litigation shall bear their proportion of the expense. The bill in this case was filed, not only in behalf of the complainant, but of all other creditors of the defendant corporation who might join in the suit and contribute to the expense thereof. The exceptors to (lie master’s report intervened in this case, and were admitted upon that condition, and therefore must pay their proportionate share of the expense of the litigation. One jointly interested with others in a common fund, who in good faith maintains the necessary litigation to save it from waste, and secures its proper application, is entitled in equity to the reimbursement of his costs, as between the solicitor and *812the client, either out of the fund itself, or by proportionate contributions from those who received the benefits of the litigation. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1882-05-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/trustees-v-greenough-90604?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="90604">105 U. S. 527; Railroad Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1885-01-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/central-railroad--banking-co-of-ga-v-pettus-91266?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="91266">113 U. S. 116, 5 Sup. Ct. 387; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1886-04-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/hobbs-v-mclean-91639?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="91639">117 U. S. 567, 6 Sup. Ct. 870; Harrison v. Perea, 168 U. S. 325, 18 Sup. Ct. 129; Trust Co. v. Green, 24 C.C.A. 506" court="5th Cir." date_filed="1897-02-25" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/farmers-loan--trust-co-v-green-8857951?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8857951">24 C. C. A. 506, 79 Fed. 224. From the brief filed by the appellees, and from their oral argument at bar, the court understands their contention to be that it was the duty of the receiver to litigate these questions; and inasmuch as an allowance had been made to his counsel for services, out of the fund, therefore, complainant’s solicitors should not receive anything after the appointment of the receiver. But it was the duty of the complainant to act in behalf of all creditors standing in a similar position, to see that their rights were protected in the final decree, and to prosecute the suit to a final distribution, and to defend and otherwise protect the fund. Having initiated the litigation on behalf of the creditors, it is his duty to prosecute it in the common interest to a termination, and to protect the fund, as far as he can, against unfounded claims for preference. He is made a party to the interventions. It has not been questioned that the complainant’s solicitors conducted the litigation in this case from the filing of the bill to the final decree, and its solicitors appeared before the master, and contested all claims of the interveners, so far as they appeared to be without merit, and when they sought priority not thought to be sanctioned by law. One most important intervention, for a claim of about $26,000, was successfully defeated, partly through their efforts, the benefits of which went largely to the exceptors herein. It certainly must be admitted that the complainant had control of the litigation from the beginning to the end, and was not displaced by the appointment of the receiver, and that the receiver is only the hand of the court, to take and hold, for the purpose of its administration, the assets brought into court through process of the comx>lainant, without right to have any voice in the conduct of the litigation. We think that the master was correct when he found that the services of complainant’s solicitors rendered subsequently to the appointment of the receiver were for the benefit of the creditors, and to the interest of the fund brought into court, and therefore he should be paid out of /the fund, and that the court, in* sustaining the exceptions to the award of $5,000, as recommended by the master, was in error, and the decree should be reversed. It is therefore ordered that so much of the decree as awards the sum of $1,500 to complainant’s solicitors, Grant and Rouse, for services up to and including the appointment of the receiver, is affirmed, and so much of said decree as overrules the allowance to them for said services after the appointment of the receiver is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to allow, after hearing the parties, such additional compensation for complainant’s solicitors as may be proper and just for services rendered after the appointment of the receiver, in accordance with the above opinion.