23 Ga. 536 | Ga. | 1857
Lead Opinion
The Court not being unanimous, delivered their opinions seriatim.
delivering the opinion of the Court.
This is the fourth time that the will before us has been presented to this Court, for the determination of some matter connected with it. Change of circumstances since it was made, as well as facts unknown to the testator at the time it was written, have given rise to much doubt in regard to the rights of parties claiming under it, and perplexity to those charged with the execution of it. It is more than forty years since the will was written; his widow, to whom the testator lent the whole of his property during her natural life, survived the date of the will more than thirty-eight years, and all but one of those whom he desired and expected to be his legatees at her death, departed this life before the determination of the life estate, and that one has not been heard of, for nearly fifty years, and she is probably dead. The complainants are surviving children of Bejamin Burch, one of the brothers of the testator, whom he no doubt expected to survive his widow, but who died before her. Under the allegations of the bill of complainants, and a demurrer filed thereto, the following points are made, to-wit:
2d. Does their mother share it with them ?
3d. Is the administrator of their deceased father entitled to it?
4th. Does the administrator of their deceased brothers, who departed this life after the death of their father, but before the death of the tenant for life, have a right to any part of it?
5th. Are the children of those deceased brothers entitled to share it with them ?
6th. If the complainants are entitled to recover can they have an account of that part of said property, claimed to have been bequeathed to Jenny Divine ?
7th. Can they have an account of the part of the estate claimed to have been bequeathed to Sarah Kesee?
8th. Are they entitled to any part of that third of the property, bequeathed to Betty Cook after the death of the tenant for life.
At the Term of this Court held, at Athens, in November of last year, 1857, it was decided that, upon aproper consideration and construction of the clauses in this will, relating to legacies to the testator’s brothers and sisters, the children of any brother or sister, dead at the time of the death of the tenant for.life, should take the interest which their deceased parent would have taken, if he or she had been in life at that time, but that they would not take through the parent as his or her heirs at law, but as objects of the testator’s bounty, and that such was the manifest intention of the testator. The bill in that case was filed by the children of Cheadlc Burch, who was dead when the will was made, claiming by right of representation as his heirs at law, the part of the estate, which, they insisted, had vested in him under the .will. We held that they were entitled, but not in the manner claimed, but as being themselves the objects of the testa
The defendant in error, in this case, contend that these complainants, take as heirs at law of their deceased father, who died after the testator, but before the tenant for life, and that the portion of the estate intended for him, at the death of the tenant for life, vested in him. They draw a distinction between this case and the case of Cheadle Burch’s children, because, they say, that Cheadle Burch was dead at the date of the will, and Benjamin Burch survived the testator. That does not vary the case in the slightest degree. The testator lent the whole of his estate, both real and personal to his wife during her natural life, or widowhood. He appoint ted his wife executrix, and John Upshaw, Jr., and William Woods his executors. If his wife chose to marry, the whole of his estate was “ to be taken out of her hands by his executors, and equally divided, by appraisement into three equal shares.” One share he lent to his wife, after her marriage, during her natural life, which share was to be under the control and direction of his executors as long as his wife lived. Hence, it appears, that during the whole of the tenancy for life, the executors were entrusted with certain duties, which they might have been called onto perform; for it could not be possible, during the continuance of the life of the wife, to determine that the first contingency on which the estate was to be divided would not happen. That contingency not having happened, the estate was not divided, and no claim has been presented or can be presented which depended on its happening. It is useless to consider the will in reference thereto, therefore, further than it may be explanatory of other parts of the will.
The testator proceeds to declare what shall be done with his property in case his wife should not marry. ¿It her death, he does not give his projierty, but directs it to be sold. The moneys arising from the sale he gives to his legatees. One-third part of the moneys arising from the sale of his
It was urged in argument, that the brothers and sisters of the testator named in the will, took an estate in remainder, which vested on the death of the testator. I have shown, that at that time no estate vested in them. The property, for necessary purposes, was in the executors, and was not given to the brothers and sisters, but a part of the money proceeding from the sale of the entire estate was bequeathed to them, if they should be living at the death of testator’s wife. But if the property itself had been given in remainder, it could not have vested in the brothers and sisters at
I hold, that the proceeds of the estate of William S. Burch, were given at the death of the widow. Expunge from the will all that the testator said as to the disposition of his estate in the event of his widow’s marriage, except as it is made a part of his bequests and devises, on her death, and the testamentary intention is most clear. At the death of his wife, his estate was to be sold. The produce of the sale made at her death was to be divided into three equal parts, and those parts were to be disposed of as he directed. The gift here was either at the death of the widow or at the period of distribution, but take either point of time, and the property could not have vested in Benjamin Burch, who died during the life of the widow. The testator fixes no time at which the sale must be made, and if the dictum of Lord Thurlow, in the case of Hutchison vs. Manington, 1 Vesey, Jr., 366, may be regarded as authority, that where there is a trust, that is always considered as done, which is ordered to be done, we might consider the sale as made, and the money ready for distribution on the day of the death of the tenant for life, and that the legacy vested at the death, although the sale may have been postponed. I think, therefore, that the legacies, except the life estate, did not take effect or vest in right or possession, until the death of the widow. It follows that the widow of Benjamin Burch is not entitled, as one of the distributees of his estate, to a part of the legacy. If it did not vest in him, his administrator cannot claim it.
Whether the complainant can claim the entire legacy to which Benjamin Burch would have been entitled, or whether his grand-children, whose parents were dead at the death
Jenny Divine, as far as is known, was the last of the brothers and sisters. She survived them all, unless Mrs. Kesee is still living or survived her. But assuming that she survived them all, what'becomes of her share of the mo
It is not yet known whether Sarah Kesee was dead or living at the death of the tenant for life, or if dead, whether she left a child or children. We think with the Court below, that an enquiry should be made for her and her children, and that a share of the money, equal to the amount she would
The death of Betty Cook, during the Life of the widow, so that she could derive no benefit from the loan to her for life, after the death of the widow, of one-third of the moneys, the produce of the sale of the estate, certainly cannot destroy the gift over of the same money. Her surviving the tenant for life, was no condition express or implied of the gift over to the brothers and sisters. The gift stands, and her death only removes an obstacle to their enjoyment of the legacy, immediately on the death of the tenant for life of the property, from the proceeds of the sale of which the legacy was given.
The legatees are entitled to an account then, for their share, being the amount to which their deceased father would have taken had he survived the widow of the testator, of two-thirds of the moneys arising from the sale of the estate, counting Mrs. Kesee at present, as a legatee, and postponing the distribution of the amount to which she or her children would be entitled, if living, at the death of the widow, until due enquiry can be made for her and her children.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The complainants in the bill are Benj. S. Burch’s sons and daughters, and the husbands of the daughters. He was a brother of the testator.
The complainants claimed, by their bill, "that they were entitled to the share of Wm. S. Burch’s estate which would come to their father, the said Benjamin, were he alive, which share, they say, is one-seventh of two-thirds of the estate.”
The executor demurred to their bill, and the Court overruled the demurrer. Thus the Court sustained the complainants in this their claim.
The question, therefore, is, were the complainants entitled to "one-seventh of two-thirds of the estate ?”
This, (as we shall see,) will be determined by determining what their father, Benj. S. Burch, would be entitled to if he were alive. Let us, then, enquire, what he would be entitled to, if alive.
To find this, we must find what interest he took by the will.
There is this provision in the will: "If my wife, Elizabeth, should marry, then, and in that case, my will is, that the other share, or one-third part of my estate, divided by appraisement as aforesaid, be sold, and the money arising from said sale, be equally divided betwixt my brothers and sisters, to-wit: Thomas Burch, Benjamin Burch, Maza Burch, John Burch, Cheadle Burch, Polly Johnston, Jenny Divine, Hannah C. Perkins, and Sarah Eesee, and is to them my said brothers and sisters, share and share alike, forever. But if either of said brothers or sisters should decease, leaving no child or children, then, and in that case, my will is, that their part of said legacy be equally divided between the whole of my brothers and sisters above named, and is to each of them forever.”
This provision was preceded by dispositions to the effect that if the widow married, the testator “lent” one of the other two-thirds of his property to her, for her life, with remainder
And the provision was followed by certain dispositions intended to meet the case of the widow’s not marrying, a case in which, what she was to have, was the whole of the property for her life.
Three of these dispositions were as follows: “One other share or third part of the moneys arising from the sale of the whole of my estate, I lend to my sister Betty Cook, during her natural life” etc.
“The other share, or the one-third part of the moneys so-arising from the sale of my estate, I give and bequeath, to be equally divided betwixt the whole of my above named brothers and sisters, in manner as above mentioned, and is to each of them forever.”
“At the death of my sister, Betty Cook, my will is, that the share or one-third part of the moneys arising from the sale of my estate so lent to her,” “I give and bequeath to be equally divided betwixt the whole of my above named, brothers and sisters, in manner above mentioned, and is to each of them forever.”
Benjamin S. Burch was one of the brothers.
There were nine of the brothers and sisters.
The widow of the testator, never married. She took, therefore, an estate for her life, in the whole of the property.
She survived Betty Cook. The estate, therefore, which Betty Cook took in a third of the property, for her life, to commence at the death of the widow, came to nothing. And the only effect which Betty Cook’s dying before the widow, had on the subsequent estates, was merely to accelerate the time at which their enjoyment was to commence. Fearne Rem. 237, 508; 1 Jarm. Wills, 513, 735.
What then, did the nine brothers and sisters, respectively take?
First, let us assume, that all of the nine survived the testator.
Of what kind was this remainder? vested or contingent? for life or longer?
Vested, I say.
This was my opinion in Burch et al. vs. Burch, 19 Ga. R. 187, when this will was first brought before the Court; and in that case, I made the opinion the ground of a dissent.
I have not seen, or heard, any thing since, to make me change that opinion. I will merely add to it, a reference to Askew vs. Noland, a case decided since the opinion was expressed; viz: at Milledgeville, Nov. 1857; and to the cases that will be cited hereafter, in this opinion.
Assuming, then, that this remainder was vested, the next question is, was it an estate for life, or was it some greater estate, than one for life, as, what we may call a qualified fee?
It was greater than an estate for life, I say.
The first words used by the testator, in creating the estate, were these: “And is to them, my said brothers and sisters, share and share alike, forever.” These words taken by themselves, it is plain, conveyed the whole estate absolutely.
But the testator used additional words. Were these sufficient to cut down the estate conveyed by the others, to a life estate ?
I think not, and I think that in this opinion I am supported by both principle and precedent.
First, it may be assumed as a leading principle of construction, that words are counteracted by subsequent words, to the extent to which, the subsequent words are in conflict with them, and to that extent only.
Now these words are in conflict with the former, in so far as the former make the estates which they convey, absolute estates; and in so far only. They, therefore, can, according to the rule of construction aforesaid, counteract the effect of those words so far as to cut down the estate, conveyed by those words, from absolute into conditional estates; and so far only.
And such conditional estates as these, correspond to leases or qualified fees, in land. We may, therefore, with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes, say, that the absolute estates conveyed by the first words were reduced, by the added words, to qualified fees. That is, we may say, taking both, sets of words together, that each brother and sister took a fee subject to be divested on his or her dying without leaving child or children, and vested in certain persons.
This, then, is the result at which we arrive, if we make this leading principle of construction, our guide.
If we make precedent our guide we shall, I think, arrive at the same result.
“In Harrison vs. Foreman,the testator gave to trustees £40 a year, part of £566 annuities, in trust to pay the dividends to Mrs. Barnes for life for her separate use; and after her death, upon trust to transfer the annuity, or the security upon which it was invested, to Peter and Susannah, equally; and in case of the death of either of them before Mrs. Barnes, he gave the whole to the survivor living at her decease.” Both the legatees died during the life of Mrs. Barnes. The question was whether their legal personal representatives, or
Lord ALvanly said, “ where there are clear words of gift creating a vested interest, the Court will never permit the absolute gift to be defeated, unless it be perfectly clear that the very case has happened, in which it is declared that the interest shall not arise; that it must be determined upon the words of the will, there was a vested interest, which was to be divested only upon a given contingency. And the single question was, whether the contingency had happened ?” Id. Ibid.
The first words in this cited case are, “ upon trust to transfer the annuity” “to Peter and Susannah Stallard.”
In the case in hand, the first words are, “ to be equally divided between my brothers and sisters,” “ and is to them” afor everP
If those words are sufficient to convey the fee, much more, it must be manifest, are these.
And in the case cited, the superadded or additional words, are, “ and in case of the death of either of them before Mrs. Barnes, he gave the whole to the survivor living at her deceaseP
In the case in hand, the superadded or additional words are, “ but if either of said brothers or sisters should decease, leaving no child or children, then their part of said legacy be equally divided betwixt the whole of my brothers and sisters.”
If the former words are insufficient to reduce the fee to
To the same effect are many other cases. See Smither vs. Willcock, 9 Ves. 233; Wall vs. Thompson, 16 Ves. 413; Browne vs. Lord Kenyon, 3 Madd. 410; Sturgess vs. Pearson, 4 do. 411; Keates vs. Burton, 14 Ves. 434; Maberly vs Strode, 3 Ves. 450; Bell vs. Phyn, 7 Ves. 454, cited and commented on in 1 Rop. Leg. 412, et seq.; See too 1 Jarm. on wills, 750, 751, 500; Weakly vs. Rugg, 7 D. & E. 322; Doed. vs. Wetton, 2 Bos. and Pul. 324.
I conclude then, that what the nine brothers and sisters took respectively was a qualified fee in two-thirds ; viz: a fee subject, in the case of any one of the nine, to be divested, on his or her dying childless, and vested in certain persons.
I confess, that I once entertained a different opinion» When the case of Cheadle Burch’s children — a case growing out of this will — was before this Court, I thought that the true import of the words which have been under consideration, was such, as to give to the brothers and sisters respectively but a life estate, and the remainder, to their respective child or children by implication, if they died leaving child; or children. But in that case, the question what, or how much, the brothers and sisters, or their children, took, was very little, if at all discussed. In that case, the question made and debated, was, whether, as Cheadle Burch, (one of the brothers,) was dead when the will was written, the legacy to him was not void.
The executor’s counsel insisted, that the legacy was void, and that, therefore, the executor was entitled to it, as undisposed of property. They, as far as I remember, did not deny, that if the' legacy was not void, it went to Cheadle Burch’s children. If it did not go to the executor, the counsel were indifferent to whom it went.
Again, according to the opinion which I now entertain, it
I am now satisfied that the children did not take any thing by implication. And I have shown that they did not, if I have succeeded in showing, as I think I have, that every brother and sister of the testator, took an estate in fee, subject to be divested on his or her dying and leaving no child or children, and vested in certain persons. This must be manifest.
Assuming my present opinion to be true, then, the next question for me, is, who are those certain persons to whom the share of a brother or sister was to go over, on his or her dying childless?
The words, it will be remembered, are, that in that event, •t! their part of said legacy be equally divided between the whole of my brothers and sisters above named, and is to each of them forever.”
Those certain persons then, are the “ whole” of the named brothers and sisters — are “eac/i” of the named brothers and ■sisters ; not the surviving brother and sister.
This is the plain, the necessary, import of the words used.
And there is nothing absurd, or even surprising, in the fact, if fact it be, that such is the import. It was natural that
My conclusion then* is, that the persons Avho Avere to take the share of any one of the nine brothers and sisters, onthat one’s dying childless, were those same nine brothers and sisters; and that they Avere, each, to take one-ninth of the share.
Supposing, that I am right in this, the next question is, Avhat was the interest which each brother and sister thus took in the share of every other?
And it Avill be admitted by all, I dare say, that this interest was a contingent remainder. Every brother and sister took a remainder in the share of any brother and sister, contingent on that brother or sister’s dying childless.
Was this such an interest as Avas transmissible to personal representatives ?
I think it was.
“ A contingent remainder of inheritance, is transmissible to the heirs of the person to Avhorn it is limited, if such person chance to die before the contingency, except the existence of the devisee of the contingent interest at some particular time, may by implication enter and make part of the contingency itself, upon Avhich such interest is intended to take effect.” jFearne Con. Rem. note (e.J
This proposition is, I think, Avell supported by authority. See Pinbury vs. Elkin, 1 Peere Wms. 563; Fearne Cont. Rem. 509; 1 Rop. Leg. 401, ch. 10, sec.4; Note to 2 Wins’ Saund. 388, k; Jarm, on Wills, 777.
Assuming this proposition tobo true, the remainder of any brother or sister, in any share, was transmissible to his or her
This remainder which every brother and sister acquired,, In the share of every brother and sister, was a remainder in fee. Therefore it was subject to distribution under the law, and not under the will. In other words the “accruing shares” to the brothers and sisters, made a part of their estates, when they died, and were not subject, like the original shares, to be divested on their dying childless. Paine vs. Benson, 3 Atk. 80; 2 Jarm. Wills, 620; 2 Rop. Leg. ch. 8, sec. 4, 336.
To sum up, let us suppose two-thirds of the estate divided into nine equal parts. Then, if I am right in what I have said, what the nine brothers and sisters took may be thus stated: each brother and sister took one of the shares in fee, subject to be divested on his or her dying childless, and vested in the whole of the nine brothers and sisters, whereby, the whole nine took each a contingent fee in that share — a fee contingent on the holder of that share dying childless j which contingent fee was transmissible to personal representatives, and subject to the statute of distributions.
To apply:
Seven of the brothers and sisters, including Benj. S. Burch, died leaving children. Their shares, therefore, were never divested from them. Each of the seven then was entitled absolutely to one share. But each being dead, his executor or administrator has become entitled to the share in his place.
This disposes of seven of the nine shares.
Two of the brothers and sisters, Sarah Kesee, and Jenny Divine, died childless.
These nine parts when thus retained, or received, would be retained or received absolutely, and therefore, would be subject to be disposed of under the statute of distributions, and not under the will.
This disposes of the remaining two of the nine shares.
It follows that the suit in the present case ought to have been brought by the executor or administrator of Benj. S. Burch, and not, as it was, by his children; and consequently, it follows that the demurrer should have been sustained.
Hitherto, I have been going upou the assumption, that all of the nine brothers and sisters survived the testator. But that assumption I was not authorized to make; two of the nine, Sarah Kesec, and Cheadle Burch, died before the will was written.
Does this fact aifect the conclusion to which I have come?
This depends on whether the legacies to this brother and sister were void or not.
The question whether the legacy to the brother, Cheadle Burch, was void or not, has already been before this Court. That was the question in Burch vs. Burch, 20 Ga. Rep., 835. And this Court held that the legacy was not void. But, it is true, that it was not without much difficulty, that the Court could come to that conclusion. Still, I must say, that I continue to acquiesce in the conclusion.
There can be no doubt, that it was in the power of this testator to prevent these two legacies from being void, if he wished to do so. The only question, therefore, that can exist, is, did he wish to do so ?
But perhaps, the state of the authorities does not justify us, in relying upon the general scheme of disposition, by itself, to establish an intention, that these two legacies were not to be void even though the legatees might be dead at the testator’s death. See Elliott vs. Davenport, 1 P. Wms., 83; Sibley vs. Cook, 3 Atk. 572; and Rop. Leg. 320, ch. 8, sec. 4 et seq.
Is there any particular disposition coming in aid of the general scheme ? I think so.
The testator, after directing a division among his brothers and sisters by name says: “ But if either of said brothers or sisters should decease, leaving no child or children, then and in that case, my will is, that their part of said legacy shall be equally divided betwixt the whole of my brothers and sisters above named, and is to each of them forever.”
The division is to be among the whole of the named brothers and sisters. The one dying leaving no children, i. e., the dead one, would be one of this “'whole.” Therefore, he was one who was to share in this division.
That the testator knew that he would be dead at the time of the division is beyond question, for the testator makes his dying childless, the event on which the division is to take place.
Here then, I think, is strong evidence to show, that the testator intended, that the death of any legatee at any time,
And, I think, that the evidence derived from this source, added to that derived from the general scheme of the will, is sufficient to show, that the testator’s intention was, that legacies to a brother or sister were not to be void, although the brother or sister might be dead at the making of the will.
So, my general conclusion, as to the proper disposition to be made of the property in dispute, is not affected by the fact that two sisters were dead when the will was made.
The result is, that I think that the decision of the Court below, overruling the demurrer, was wrong.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
Being prevented, by sickness, from writing out, at the proper time, a separate opinion in this case, and unwilling to withhold it from the press, I have read the opinion of my brother McDonald, and concur in the main, in the reasons assigned by him, to sustain the judgment of the Court.