87 N.J.L. 36 | N.J. | 1915
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The petitioner was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and the trial court found that in addition to temporary disability
Yot withstanding these permanent injuries, the judge allowed recovery only for temporary disability, because he found that petitioner was able to resume his usual calling, and that, in fact, he had resumed it at no reduction in wages.
The refusal to award for permanent disability was erroneous. Upon the same theory as that adopted by the trial judge, if petitioner had suffered amputation of a finger, or a phalanx of one finger, but could earn and was earning the same wages as before the accident, his recovery would be limited to temporary disability to work. But the legislature lias not so enacted the law. The trial judge did not have before him our decision in De Zeng Standard Co. v. Pressey, 86 N. J. L. 469, decided after the judgment herein, but the reasoning of that decision is applicable to this case. Effect, must be given to the clause of the act which provides that “in all other cases, in this class (c), the compensation shall bear such relation to the amount stated in the schedule as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries claimed in the schedule.” Pamph. L. 1911, p. 138, ¶ 11 (c). This was the statute in force at the time of the employment in 1912. The next year (Pamph. L. 1913, p. 304) it was amended to read, “In other cases in this class, or where the usefulness of a member or any physical function is permanently impaired, the compensation shall bear such relation,” &c. For the purposes of the present ease there is no substantial difference; for the class is class (c) and embraces every kind of physical “disability partial in character and permanent in quality” and for this “the compensation shall be based upon the extent of such disability.”
Let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to make a proper award for permanent disability based on the extent thereof, with regard to the maximum and minimum clauses applicable.