50 Barb. 639 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1867
By the Court,
The title to the premises in question was proved on the trial to he in the plaintiff in fee. The defendant was in possession, and had been for some time prior to the commencement of the suit, and he claimed title under a comptroller’s deed, given in the year 1845, to a prior grantor of the defendant, upon a sale for unpaid taxes on certain lands, including the premises in controversy in this suit. The plaintiff then proved that the notice of redemption by
It cannot be claimed successfully that the comptroller’s deed was conclusive evidence of the defendant’s title. Even under the act of 1829, which declared that the comptroller’s deed was conclusive evidence of the regularity of the sale, it was held that it was so simply as to the sale itself, and not in respect to the proceedings prior and preliminary thereto ; and that such proceedings must be proved, in order to confer upon the comptroller power to make the sale. In Varick v. Tallman, (2 Barb. 113,) and in Beekman v. Bigham, (1 Seld. 366,) it was held that the recitals in the comptroller’s deed were not even prima facie evidence of the existence of the facts which give that officer power to make the sale for unpaid taxes. To remedy this, the act of 1850 was passed,
It is not important to determine which rule is properly applicable to the comptroller’s deed in this case. If conclusive evidence of regularity, we have seen that it is only so as to the sale itself, and not as to the prior proceedings, and • ffill less can it be in respect to those steps which are subsequent to the sale and on which it is claimed that its validity depends. If it is only presumptive evidence of regularity, then that presumption may be overcome, and the only effect of the statute is to shift the burden of proof from the party claiming under the deed, to the other party who seeks to overthrow it. And this is what the plaintiff claims to have done in this case. At the time of the sale in this case and for several years subsequently, the provisions "of the Itevised Statutes in reference to redemption by the owner of lands sold for taxes were in force, and by the 76th section (1 JR. 8. 409,) it was enacted that the comptroller should, at least six months before the expiration of the two years allowed for such redemption, cause to be published at least once a week for six weeks successively in all the public newspapers printed in the state, and in such form as he should deem best calculated for that purpose, a notice that unless the lands should be redeemed by a certain day, they would be conveyed to the purchaser. This notice, as we have seen, was not published in compliance with this provision, in at least one such paper, and perhaps not some two or three others, and this omission it is claimed renders the conveyance void.
It is so, upon the principle declared by Chief Justice Marshall in Thatcher v. Powell, (6 Wheat. 119,) that no individual or public officer can sell and convey a good title to the land of another, unless authorised to do so by express law, and the person invested with such power must pursue
The counsel, for the defendant argues that the provision of the law requiring the publication of the notice of the time of redemption, is directory only, and not peremptory. We'cannot accede to this interpretation of the statute. It would render the provision, for all practical purposes, entirely useless and nugatory. It was clearly intended to be a necessary preliminary to the right to execute a conveyance, and the statute has been twice amended since its original enactment, thus indicating its importance in the system of tax sales and redemptions, and the solicitude of the legislature to make it both imperative and effective. It is no more directory than any other advertisment .or notice required in the whole course of those proceedings which regulate and prescribe the power and authority of the comptroller over tax sales, from their inception to their final, consummation in the conveyance of a title to the purchaser ; and. if one may be safely omitted all may be with equal impunity. The cáse of Jackson v. Esty, (7 Wend. 148,) is a decisive authority on . this point. There the comptroller’s deed was held invalid fop the reason that no notice had been served upon the occupant of the land, of the sale and amount required to redeem, pursuant to the act of -1829. The court said the purchaser took a contingent title dependent upon a condition subsequent, and that to perfect the title, it was as necessary to prove the service of a notice, and the omission to redeem as it was to prove the sale itself. Both are necessary links in ■the' purchaser’s title, and both must be proved.
I qjn of opinion that the referee was right in his concluT sions, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Bacon, Morgan, Foster and MuUin, Justices.]