46 Mo. 327 | Mo. | 1870
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case was before the court at the January term, 1869; and is reported in 43 Mo. 266, and the law or the case upon the additional facts now developed was substantially declared in the opinion there given.
It appears that Mrs. Beck, as guardian for her three children, had received an advance from the estate of Preston Beck, Jr., of: $10,000 for each child, which amount had been distributed, with the knowledge of James P. Beck, to each of the other heirs as well. But to meet any contingencies that might arise, they or their guardians gave their notes to the administrator, and after the Probate Court had decided that the will of Preston Beck, Jr., could operate only upon one-third of his estate, and that James P. Beck, as executor, devisee and legatee of Preston Beck, Sr., was entitled to two-thirds of the vdiole as well as one-ninth of the remainder, Bunce, as administrator, deemed it necessary to call in these notes, and accordingly had commenced suit upon the one for $30,000 given by Mrs. Beck, and on the one for $10,000 given by Silver. They had appealed from the allowance of two-thirds of the estate to James P. Beck, and he was resisting a demand of $21,000 allowed to Mrs. Beck against the estate. She visited him in St. Louis for the purpose of adjusting their differences, and especially to obtain a discontinuance of the suit against her upon the note. A written agreement was entered into which embraced only the disputed claim of two-thirds and the allowance of the $21,000, and so far all wrould seem to be plain that there was no arrangement or understanding about anything else. But Mrs. Beck was not satisfied. She desired and expected the suit against her to be dismissed and her note to be
A new trial has been had, and the attention of the witnesses lias been called more distinctly to the time in relation to the delivery of the letter, and to the character of the directions sent by the defendant to the plaintiff; and from that testimony it plainly appears that defendant Beck not only told Mrs. Beck
If there were any doubt as to the kind of message - sent by Mr. Beck and the way he intended it to be understood, that doubt would be removed by what occurred between him and Mr. Limerick after his return to St. Louis. Upon this, Mr. L. testifies as follows: “I returned to St. Louis from Boon-ville. .1 met Mr. Beck on Fourth street as I was returning from the railroad depot; he asked me what success Mrs. Beck had in Boonville. I told him that Mr. Bunce had delivered to Mrs. Juliet A. Beck an order on Ryland & Son to dismiss the suit against her and to deliver up to her her note. He appeared very much gratified, and said it had turned out as he had told me it would. Mr. Beck requested me to hunt up Mr. David Silver and try and prevail upon him to make the same arrangements with him that he had made with Mrs. Juliet A. Beck,” etc., etc. After the settlement with Silver had been effected, Mr. Beck seems to have become dissatisfied with Mr. Bunce for giving up the notes, and inquired why he did it; and on Mr. Bunce asking why he sent him such messages by Mrs. Beck and Limerick, he replied that nothing else would satisfy them, plainly admitting that some messages were sent besides the letter.
Finding such directions to be clearly proved, we have only to apply’the principle of law announced when the case was last before us. Mr. Beck is clearly estopped from denying the right of Mr. Bunce to do what was done under his direction. It is of no manner of consequence what interest in the estate Mr. Beck is entitled to, or what were his secret motives in sending the message —whether he thought his words would not bind him, or whether he intended to look to the New Mexican estate for his compensation ; in a word, whether he acted fraudulently or honestly, the effect is the same. Judge Napton, in Taylor et al. v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482, quoting Darrell v. Odell, 8 Hill, 219, says that “in order to constitute an estoppel in pais, there must be, first, an admission inconsistent with the evidence proposed to be given or the claim offered to be set up; second, an action by the other
With regard to the Silver note the testimony is not so clear, but, taken in connection with the other, no doubt can be entertained that the action of Bunco was warranted by the acts of Beck. It was as necessary to settle with him as with Mrs. Bock. That this appeal against Mr. Beck should be dismissed was of the highest importance to him, for until then his claim to two-thirds of the estate, in opposition to the will and in addition to his share under it, could never be considered safe. He could but realize the possibility, at least, that our courts would give effect to our own laws in regard to distribution and the power of disposition by will, and the possibility of failure in so establishing those of a distant territory, and of domicile under them, as to make good his claim. Accordingly we find him very anxious to effect the settlement with Mr. Silver as well, and that he sought the aid of Mr. Limerick in the matter. In regard to that, Mr. Limerick further testifies that “ Mr. Beck manifested the greatest anxiety that I should find Mr. Silver that night (the night he reported Mrs. Beck’s success in getting up her note), as late as it was, it being near eleven o’clock, and make the arrangement Avith him, as he, Beck, expected to leave the city next morning and AYanted the matter fixed up that night before he left.' Beck went Avith me to different places to find Mr. Silver, and at last Ave found him at the Planters’ hotel. I told Mr. Silver Avliat had been done, etc., and that I thought he could make the same arrangement with Mr. Beck,” etc. He agreed to meet them next morning, and the same papers Avere drawn up as AAÚth Mrs. Beck, Mr. Beck insisting that under the letter he Avould be entitled to, and Avould get, his note. Silver and Mr. Beck were not on speaking terms, and Limerick acted someAyhat as a go-betAveen,
It is true, in regard to this general transaction there is some adverse testimony, especially that of Mr. Bulger, clerk of Mr. Beck, and it is also true that, in our view of the facts, we are compelled to consider the acts of Mr. Beck as somewhat crooked. But in- view of motives and probabilities, we are compelled to regard the facts found by the Circuit Court, as warranted by the evidence as a whole, and the action of the District Court in affirming its judgment is affirmed.