*1 42 refusal 666) that trial court’s
(314 (1984), I hold the SE2d would establishes on accident appellants’ requested instruction give the a ground for new trial. Deen, Judge Judge Presiding that am authorized to state Beasley in this dissent.
Sognier Judge join July 14, 1987 Decided July Rehearing 31, 1987 denied Osborne, appellants. R. for James Jr., Pennebaker, Howe, appellee.
George B. for Donald v. CORNETT. 74330. BULLOCH ACADEMY (360 SE2d Judge.
Carley, appellee-employee An hearing administrative officer found that “with- with voluntarily resigned position appellant-employer had was, therefore, unem- disqualified receiving from good out cause” Tanner, 172 (1); Moore v. 34-8-158 ployment benefits. See OCGA § administrative Appellee’s SE2d court, However, superior the appeal to the peals were unsuccessful. superior court finding appellee’s disqualification was reversed. that, resign, evidence, merely held under the had been offer had then before it he withdrawn to hold felt “constrained Accordingly, superior the court appellant. [appellee’s] writ- support finding there was a that that no evidence to parties.” of the ten contract modified a mutual consent “nothing in superior there was the court further that meeting of [appellee] [appellant] ... to show ever came to a Thus, par- . . . minds regarding the terms of [appellant were left subse- ties with their written contract which for Appellant applied to this court quently] elected to terminate.” holding that discretionary superior from court appeal the order voluntarily been terminated resigned but had appeal this employment. Appellant’s application granted results. a deci-
In to authorize reviewing sufficiency of the evidence court, as this superior as well agency, sion of administrative Brewing Co. v. court, Miller “any See evidence” rule. bound Tanner, 200) (1982); Carlson, Moore there was sole is whether supra. Accordingly, the issue resolution “any support administrative evidence” voluntarily good “without cause.” appellee, personal evidence, reasons, Under the confronted operate longer ef- her felt he could no informed that he fectively opinion employment. Being “it in his was best get fired,” [he] rather than informed it. It that he if she would a letter *2 appellee “resigna- the rather than his who first used word appellee’s acknowledged resignation tion” and it was that his intent “immediately.” superior agreed resig- was a to take effect His to express began appellee and, direction, nation then to re- letter at her Appellee personal belongings place. move all of his from the work subsequently resignation. the of He did not re- refused to letter resign immediately. longer fuse to do so because he no He wished to only disagreement did so amount a because of with his over the compensation paid past for
of
that he would be
his
services to
resignation. Appellee
signing
the date of his
left
the res-
work without
ignation
day,
appellee reported
letter. When
for
the
he was
work
next
employment
appellant
told that his
with
been terminated.
had
parties
necessary
always
Mutual consent of the
is not
to effect a
resignation.
resignation may
“[A]
. . . ac-
become effective without
ceptance
[by higher authority],
impliedly,
a
even
as
abandon-
Young
Minton,
ment of
[Cits.]”
all duties
work.
case
authorize a
evidence
this
finding
appellee
resign
that
had made his own unilateral decision to
employment,
resignation
from his
which
was
be
to
unconditional
immediately upon
conveyance
effective
the verbal
of his unilateral
superior.
finding
decision
his
to
a
evidence would not demand
pronouncements
that
to
oral
were mere
“offer”
his
tentative
resign
only upon
subsequent
and that it
his
was
submission of a
resignation
appellant’s acceptance
formal letter of
thereof that a
resignation
employment
accomplished. Although ap-
of his
would be
pellee apparently
employment,
had written
a
contract of
there is no
provisions,
right
that,
evidence
under its
he did
have the
to effect
voluntary
resignation
appellant
his own
and unilateral oral
or that
did
right
having
not have the
to consider
as
unless
until it had
a written letter sub-
Lankford,
mitted
him. Allen v.
170 (1984)
authority
proposition
resigna-
is not
for the
an
that
immediate
accomplished by
employee’s
conveyance
tion
cannot
oral
of his
requires
accept-
unilateral decision to
so
do
but
a formal offer and
facts,
ance. On its
that case
involved neither an
nor a unilateral
resignation.
only
employee’s resignation in
evidence of the
Allen
in was
form
of her
of a
letter
was to
submission
formal
which
resign”
apparently
spe-
gave
effect
“wish[ed]
that she
to
but
no
which
doing
cific date
her
so. Under those
circumstances and because
employee
public
teacher,
that such a
it
a
school
was tenured
prior
any
resignation
time
to
written letter of
could be withdrawn
acceptance by
its
the school board.
formal
finding
assuming
a
Moreover,
did demand
even
that the evidence
resign,
merely
to
the evidence
made an oral offer
that
would nevertheless authorize
appellee’s supervisor
finding
and immedi
unconditional
construed that offer as one
accepted.
immediately
resignation,
Her
then
ate
she had
offer
response
appellee’s pronouncement
to
direct
to
premises
personal belongings
him
forth
all of
to remove
resigna
sign a
letter of
with rather than to
until he could
formal
wait
finding
tion. The evidence would also authorize
acquiesced in
as
this
of his offer
one for
uncondi
construction
complied
superior’s
di
tional and immediate
He
with
belongings
insisting
by beginning
rection
than
to remove his
rather
writing.
waiting
formalized in
Ac
until his
could be
any
subjective
cordingly, notwithstanding
pressed
of a
and unex
offering
part
he
intent on the
only upon
appellant agreed
condition that
compensation
receipt
him
would entitle
for
accrued
additional
date,
authorize a
that a
his services
the evidence would
*3
appellant’s acceptance
ap
contract
pellee’s original
nevertheless resulted from
resigna
his
immediate
offer of
unconditional and
generally
Freightways Corp. Williams,
tion. See
Consolidated
v.
“
(1a) (228
230) (1976).
App. 302,
‘[T]he
intention of
parties may
among
meaning
themselves;
the
placed
by
differ
such cases the
party
by
to
on the contract
one
and known
be thus understood
”
party
meaning.’
true
Reeves
other
shall be
as the
(2) (85
Daniel,
act of him that his was terminated would be immaterial. The evidence would authorize a pellant appellee only acknowledge had so after he advised refused already Any attempt employ- resigned. that he had ment to terminate the already resigned superfluous. who
of one has hearing following concluded, an evi- administrative officer dentiary hearing, appellee voluntarily resigned from his em- ployment good affirmed on adminis- without cause. That decision was appeal. supported by and, in trative the absence of was some evidence decision accept superior
fraud, it. court was bound to (b). Accordingly, court § OCGA 34-8-176 the order must be reversed.
Judgment Birdsong, McMurray, Banke, J., J., C. P. reversed. Beasley, Sognier, Pope J., J., Deen, J., P. and Ben- concur. P. ham, JJ., dissent. Judge, dissenting.
Benham, appel- agree majority’s Because cannot with the conclusion voluntarily resigned position good lee without cause and is there- disqualified receiving unemployment benefits, fore I must re- spectfully dissent. dispute involving appellee’s teaching
This case arose out of a con- Appellee application unemployment tract. filed an benefits. The application granted, appellee benefits, was Bulloch awarded Academy appeal. hearing appeal, filed an At the on that the adminis- hearing trative officer rendered a decision favor of Bulloch Acad- emy. appeal by appellee, Department On the Board of Review of the of Labor affirmed the administrative officer’s decision with one dis- Appellee appeal Superior sent. filed an from that decision to the County, Court of Bulloch which reversed the decision of the board of stating support review, findings. that it could find no evidence to the board’s appeal brought ruling.
This from that necessary put A brief recitation of the facts is the issues in proper perspective. During disagreement appellee between and the appellee headmistress over assistant, the dismissal of his resignation. if the headmistress would a letter of prepare headmistress offered to the letter and ordered to re- personal premises. compliance move his appellee therewith, effects from the In premises. disagreement removed his effects from the A later ensued between pay and the headmistress over the amount of contract, due on the remainder of his premises did the letter of He left the to resolve dispute the contract work the next with the headmistress’ but returned to *4 day, at which time he was informed the headmis- discharged. tress that he had been majority appellee effectively resigned by concludes
making resign a unilateral decision to which was unconditional and immediately verbally conveyed superior. effective when it was to his holding Young (176 That Minton, is v. based 545 662) (1934), may resignation “[A] which states: become effective acceptance impliedly, without such and even as abandonment of all duties and work.”
46 particular facts be limited to its
Young case and should is a 1934 during the It was decided in it was decided. and to the era which very few employees had a time when depression throes of the Security decision, however, Employment Young rights. Since the The facts of this passed. have been public Law and other welfare laws these policies behind light purposes must in case be viewed carry out the Security passed Law was Employment new laws. The employees. security displaced public policy providing economic employee ef- is 1. The first issue to be decided here whether effective, must be A to be fectively resigned position. resignation, accompanied office relinquishing made with the intention of 123, 141 Miller, v. Ga. SE2d relinquishment. the act of Patten 190 resignation, To it must be unconditional constitute a immediately Poland operate as such. be made with the intent York) (1953). Glover, (W. 111 D. New FSupp. 675 case, of this By stated above to the facts application of the rules position. it can seen never therefore, future; Appellee merely at sometime resign offered to relinquish- his actions did not constitute a formal renouncement or position. pre- ment of here a condition resignation contained “if resign cedent: the headmistress would operate resignation.” resign letter of His offer to was not intended to immediately resignation but was to be effective when a letter of satisfied, typed signed. precedent Since not no the condition resignation place. took Lankford, Allen v.
Contrary majority’s to the assertion that 645) (1984), authority proposi- is not for the accomplished by an em- resignation tion that an immediate cannot be re- ployee’s conveyance decision to do so but unilateral quires acceptance, indistinguishable a formal I believe it is offer and controlling Lankford, Allen v. is a the issue this case. which, Law, Security case although involving Employment Allen, purposes pub- consistent with the principles law. teacher, read, lic school “I submitted a letter of resign my position,” wish to letter but later withdrew the before accepted board of education The court found that teacher it. “[a] having principal superinten- tendered a written to his or dent, may regard it as until it is ineffective and withdraw it by the majority board of education.” Id. at 606. The bases its distinc- Allen language resig- tion of the case on the contained in the letter of nation; however, this factor was not considered in the decision of that distinguishing case and is therefore not a valid factor. Since accepted by Bulloch Acad- withdrew his offer to before it was emy, place. can find no evidence that an effective took Finally,
2. must abandoned his du- we consider whether *5 “ employment. ties, ‘In which would terminate his order office, constitute an abandonment of an it must be total and under clearly relinquish- such circumstances as to indicate an absolute ” supra Miller, ment.’ Patten v. left with his 139. Whether superior’s permission dispute; however, inis it is uncontested that pellee dispute concerning left in resolve a order to contract report day. that he did to work as usual the next Under the circum- totally stances, relinquish acts are not evidence that he intended to position. By application of the above rule to the facts present case, I can find no evidence that acts consti- employment. tuted an abandonment of his place Since no effective took did not employ- abandon his duties in such a manner as to terminate his own unemployment compensation ment, is entitled to and the de- cision of the court should be affirmed. Judge Pope joins
I am authorized to state that in this dissent. July 15, Decided Rehearing July 31, denied appellant. Hall,
J. Michael Farrington, Attorney Fletcher Bowers, General, Michael J. An- Attorney, appellee. Cowart, nette M. Senior 74748. EARLY COUNTY v. FINCHER et al. Presiding Judge. Banke, appellees Early County personal injuries sued to recover for resulting and deaths from the collision of an automobile with an em- county bankment located at the termination of a dead-end road. The predicated allegations county negligent suit is ing on that in fail- signs, presence to install barricades or other devices to warn of the allegations resulting of the embankment that condition of roadway county alleged constituted a nuisance. The to have sovereign immunity waived the defense of $300,000 to the extent of a policy liability insurance which it effect at the time of the accident. county seeking prevent filed a motion limine the intro- policy seeking duction of the insurance into evidence at trial and also any tending
to exclude to establish that its failure to install signs, warning negligence. barricades or other devices constituted granted county’s application trial motion, court denied the and we