200 N.E. 173 | Ill. | 1936
On April 2, 1935, an election was held for the office of supervisor of the town of Kelly, in Warren county. J. Jay Bullman and Howard Cooper were respectively the candidates of the Republican and Democratic parties. The result of the canvas of the votes was that Cooper received 158 votes and Bullman 157. One ballot was declared defective and not counted. Cooper qualified and assumed the duties of the office. The appellants, Bullman and Harry Anderson, a qualified elector, filed a petition in the county court of Warren county to contest the election. The petition was amended and the appellee, Cooper, answered the amended petition. After hearing evidence and a re-count of the ballots, the court found that all should have been counted, including the one which had been rejected as defective; that the ballots objected to by Bullman and Anderson should be counted for Cooper and that those attacked by Cooper should be counted for Bullman; that 159 votes were cast for Cooper and 157 for Bullman, and that none were improperly marked or bore distinguishing marks; that of four persons alleged to have been disqualified voters three were qualified, and one not qualified; that the latter voted for Cooper and that his vote should not be counted. The court found that Cooper received 158 and Bullman 157 votes and the former was declared to be legally elected to the office of supervisor. Bullman and Anderson prosecute this appeal.
A preliminary question is presented which requires consideration. Appellee makes the contention, among others, that the ballots were not properly preserved and that, with the exception of the ballot marked for identification as exhibit AAA, should not have been received in evidence. Appellants maintain that this court is precluded from considering errors on the re-count alleged to be favorable to Bullman owing to the fact that the appellee did not file a notice of cross-appeal. If a party has not obtained all that *472
he deems himself entitled to, he may appeal, but not when he receives all that he claims. (Pelouze v. Slaughter,
The evidence discloses that Kelly township is a rural township in the northeast portion of Warren county; that the town clerk received the ballots after they were counted on election night at the town hall; that they were delivered to him in a closed canvas sack, strung on a string which had a button at one end and a sealed knot at the other. The clerk was a farmer, who lived two or three miles from the town hall, his family consisting of himself, his wife, a daughter and a son, aged twenty and eighteen years, respectively. He arrived home late in the evening of April 2 and left the sack containing the ballots on the dining room table until the next morning, when he placed it in a box in a room adjoining his bed-room. The town clerk's supplies were kept in this room, access to which could be had only through the bed-room. The ballots remained in the box in the store-room until they were delivered to the sheriff five days later. The clerk testified that they were in the same condition when produced in court as when he had received them and delivered them to the sheriff. From his testimony it also appears that he remained at home every night while the ballots were in his custody and that he had most, if not all, of his meals there. There was no evidence that the town clerk's house had been entered by a stranger *473 while the ballots were in the possession of that officer. Nor was there any evidence tending to show that the ballots had been tampered with at any time since the voters cast them.
To sustain the judgment the appellee insists, however, that the ballots had not been properly preserved and that, in consequence, the trial court erred in admitting them as evidence of the result of the election. The question of the probative force of the ballots in an election contest depends upon the care with which they have been preserved. If it clearly appears that the ballots are in the same condition when offered on the hearing as when they were counted by the judges of election, the re-count made by the court must prevail, and any discrepancies in the votes certified will be attributed to the errors of the election officers. (Bolton v. Whalen,
The appellants contend that three ballots counted for the appellee, namely, A-17, A-18 and A-26, bore distinguishing marks which invalidated them. It is established that any deliberate marking of a ballot by a voter that is not made in an attempt to indicate his choice of candidates, and which is also effective as a mark by which his ballot may be distinguished, should be considered as a distinguishing mark. (Stevenson v. Baker,
The appellants attack the qualifications of voters Bertha Simcox, Mildred Caulkins and Clarence House. Bertha Simcox and Mildred Caulkins, each twenty-one years of age, commenced teaching school in Kelly township, in September, 1934. Prior thereto they lived with their parents in Mercer and Knox counties, respectively. Miss Simcox, called as a witness by the appellants, testified that since November, 1934, she had resided at the house of Bert Yarde, in Kelly township, and that she spent many of her weekends with her parents. On cross-examination by the appellee she stated: "It is my intention to make my home at the place where I am staying while I am working." She testified further that from November, 1934, until school was dismissed the following May, she considered Yarde's residence her home and place of residence, and that she expected to continue to live there as she had obtained a new contract to teach in the same school for the school year beginning in the fall of 1935. The appellants also called Miss Caulkins as their witness. During the school year she lived at the house of Vivian Petrie, in Kelly township. She, too, had renewed her contract to teach the same school during the next school year. The witness testified that she intended to make Kelly township her permanent place of abode, with the exception of week-ends, and that she expected to reside at Petrie's house when she resumed her duties the following fall. The trial judge held both witnesses to be qualified voters and sustained them in their claims of personal privilege to refuse to disclose for whom they had voted. *476
Clarence House testified on behalf of the appellee. He lived with his father on a farm in Kelly township until he was fifteen years of age. He later served twenty-six months in the army and was discharged at the age of twenty-one, having been wounded and gassed in France. Thereafter, he appears to have travelled extensively in the West in efforts to improve his health. House testified that he voted for the first time in Kelly township in 1921; that he had voted there for fourteen years, and, in particular, at every election since 1930. The witness stated that he considered Kelly township his home, and that there were several places in Kelly township where he could stay, including the homes of two brothers-in-law. It also appears that he spent some time at the home of a sister in another township. The evidence discloses that he kept a room at the home of Elmer Bridges, one of his brothers-in-law. Bridges corroborated House's testimony.
Section 66 of the Election law provides that a permanent abode is necessary to constitute a residence. (Ill. State Bar Stat. 1935, p. 1462; Smith's Stat. 1935, p. 1449.) The terms "residence" and "permanent abode" as employed in the statute have been construed as synonymous. (Anderson v. Pifer,
Although a proceeding to contest an election is statutory, the finding of the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is palpably against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Baker v. Hinrichs,
Neither the claim of the appellants that votes were counted for the appellee which should not have been counted for him and should be deducted from his vote nor that votes were illegally cast can be sustained. Disposition of their contentions leaves the total votes for Cooper and Bullman unchanged.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. *478