15 Blatchf. 550 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern New York | 1879
This is a suit in equity for damages and an injunction by reason of an alleged infringement by the defendant of a copyright of the plaintiff. The bill avers, that, heretofore and before the 26th day of March, 1870, the plaintiff was the proprietor of a certain book, the title whereof was “Supplement to the Counting House Monitor;” that, in the year 1872, he published his book, revised and amended, under the title, “Monitor Post Office, Banking and Shippers’ Guide;” that, in 1873, he revised and amended and published his said book under the title, “The Monitor Post Office, Telegraph, Express and Shipping Guide for the United States and Canada;” and that, iij 1876, he revised and amended and published his said book, (designated, in this case, plaintiff’s Exhibit H,J under the title, “The Monitor Guide to Post, Office and Railroad Stations in the United States and Canada, with Shipping Directions by Express and Freight Lines. A Supplement to the Counting House Monitor.” These books the plaintiff asserts have a value by reason of certain peculiarities of structure and the mode of using arbitrary signs and figures, and he avers that the said plan, combination, arrangement and peculiarity of structure
To this report of the master various exceptions were taken, and the case was brought to a hearing upon such exceptions, and the pleadings and proofs, at the same time. Owing to the restricted form of the order of reference, the master’s report does not cover all the questions of fact necessary for a disposal of the case. As far as it goes, however, upon the evidence, it must be deemed conclusive of the facts stated therein. The other questions of fact, and the questions of law applicable thereto, are now to be determined by the court.
In regard to the exceptions, it is sufficient, therefore, to say, that I see no reason to differ with the master as to any of his conclusions of fact, and none of the exceptions appear to be well taken.
In disposing of the questions raised by the answer, it will be convenient to notice, first, the point made by the defendant, that the plaintiff’s work cannot be a subject of copyright, because not within the scope of the provision of the constitution which grants the power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Upon this point, it is sufficient to say, that I am unable to find a substantial distinction between the plaintiff’s works, and those works that in other cases have been adjudged to be within the scope of the constitution and the copyright laws, such for instance as maps, “The Advertiser’s and Collector’s Chart,” hereafter referred to, “The Ladies’ Chart for Cutting Dresses and Basques for Ladies.’.’ Drury v. Ewing [Case No. 4,095].
I next notice the point made, that the plaintiff has not produced proper evidence to show himself the author or proprietor of his works, within the meaning of the copyright laws. The argument here is, that no one but the plaintiff himself can legally establish the fact that the plan, arrangement and combination of his works originated in his brain. But, there is evidence showing that the plaintiff, by his own labor and that of persons employed by him, and working under his direction, gathered together from various original sources the material of his book; that the manuscript in which the matter was arranged was partly in his handwriting; and that from the manuscript the work was printed for him at his expense. It was not necessary that these acts of the plaintiff should be proved by the testimony of the plaintiff. The testimony of any person who saw them done is primary and direct evidence of their having been done, and, in the absence of any testimony to the contrary, established the fact that the plaintiff gathered together the information conveyed by his book, arranged that information as it appears in the book, and caused it to be printed in that form. The acts of the plaintiff thus proved to have been done in preparing his work are those of a compiler. A compiler is an author', within the meaning of the constitution and the copyright laws.
A more important question is raised by the i averment in the bill, that the defendant’s i book, Exhibit J, was copied from the books ! of the plaintiff. If this averment has been proved, the defendant has infringed upon the plaintiff’s copyright; for, it is not to be doubted, that the plaintiff acquired the right to prevent any person from appropriating the fruits of his labor, by making a transcript of his book, without any other skilled labor or expense than that involved in making and publishing the copy, and it is equally true, that a copy so made would infringe upon the plaintiff’s copyright, notwithstanding it might appear that colorable alterations had been introduced into the copy, i for the purpose of disguising the fact that the work was but a transcript. But, the evidence wholly fails to support the averment that the defendant’s book is copied from the ; plaintiff’s books. Notwithstanding the sim
In regard to the defendant’s use of reference numbers attached to a list of railroads, and set opposite the names of towns, in the list of towns, to indicate the railroad by which that town can be reached, I think it may properly be inferred, from the facts proved, that the use of this method in the plaintiff’s book, Exhibit H, suggested to the defendant its use in his book, Exhibit J. But it is not sufficient to show that it may have been suggested by the plaintiff’s work. Emerson v. Davies [Case No. 4,436]. It must also appear that it was new and original with the plaintiff. Here the contrary appears, for the same system is found in actual use, in connection with a list of railroads, in “The Travellers’ Official Guide,” published in 1871, defendant’s Exhibit 10.
Upon the evidence, therefore, it cannot be held that the defendant’s book is a copy of the plaintiff’s books, within the meaning of the copyright laws. In such cases, each new compilation, where it i,s the result of labor devoted to gathering from original sources, and to arranging in convenient form, facts open to be published by any one, is a new work. The one compiler is as much entitled to the fruit of his labor as the other to the fruit of his, and both are, by the copyright laws, protected in an equal degree against the appropriation of that labor by one who does not compile but only copies.
Works of this character appear to me to stand upon very much the same footing with maps, of which it is said, in Emerson v. Davies [supra], by Story, J.: “A man has a right to the copyright of a map of a state or county which he has surveyed, or caused to be compiled from existing materials at his own expense of skill or labor or money. Another man may publish another map of the same state or county, by using the like means or materials and the like skili, labor and expense. But, then, he has no right to publish a map taken substantially and designedly from the map of the other person, without any such exercise of skill or labor or expense.” What has been already said disposes of the charge in the bill that the defendant’s book is copied from the plaintiff’s books.
But, it is said that the plaintiff was the first to combine the methods employed by him to convey his information, and is, therefore, the author of a new combination of methods, to which he has the exclusive right. It is true, that, in no single prior publication is there to be found in use all the methods of conveying information employed by the plaintiff in his work, but each of those methods has been used before, and none are original with him. What he has done is to -aggregate various methods, which* when aggregated, stand now collected for the first time on a single page. This is not like the case of the arithmetic (Emerson v. Davies [supra]), where a plan of lessons, an arrangement of tables to illustrate those lessons, a gradation of examples to precede each table, in such manner as to form, with the table, a peculiar appearance of the page and an illustration of the lessons, by attaching to each example unit marks representing the numbers embraced in the example, were so combined as to constitute, in the aggregate, a new method of illustrating the subject of arithmetic. Here, there is no new combination of material, constituting a new and original work. There is a use, perhaps, a combination, of old methods, but it can scarcely be said that a new method of illustrating the subject has been produced. I say perhaps, because it may be doubtful whether there is any just analogy between the combination of methods made by the plaintiff and a patentable combination of elements in a machine. Besides, in regard to patentable combinations even, it is said, that “merely bringing old devices into juxtaposition and then allowing each to work out its own effect, without the production of something novel, is not invention.” Hailes v. Van Wormer, 20 Wall. [87 U. S.] 353.
Again, if the use of the old methods selected
My conclusion, therefore, is, that, for the reasons above stated, the plaintiff has failed to show any infringement upon his rights by the defendant, and his bill must, accordingly, be dismissed, with costs.
[See preceding case (No. 2,126).]