57 S.E. 862 | S.C. | 1907
Lead Opinion
The first of said grounds which will be considered is that which raises the question whether the statute is obnoxious to article III, section 34, subdivision III of the Constitution. That section is as follows: Section 34. "The General Assembly of this State shall not enact local or special laws concerning any of the following subjects or for any of the following purposes, to wit: * * * III. To incorporate cities, towns or villages, or change, amend or extend the charter thereof. * * * XI. In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted"
It will be observed that the act does not purport to change, amend or extend the charter of the city of Charleston, and the words "change," "amend or extend" might more appropriately be applied to the general law hereinbefore mentioned than to the charter of said city, in which case it would not be a local or special law, but the question would be whether it was a special provision in a general law, which is hereinafter considered.
The next question for consideration is whether the act was unconstitutional, on the ground that it was in violation of article III, section 34, subdivision XI of the Constitution, which provides, that where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted.
The views which the Court entertains upon this question are thus stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Gary, in the case of DeHay v. County Commissioners,
"Terre Haute v. Kolsem, 14 L.R.A. (Ind.), 566. The opinion in this case is entitled to great consideration, *271
because it was written by that eminent jurist and distinguished Chief Justice, Elliott. The Court says: `If the enactment of such a law as the one before us is forbidden, it must be by virtue of section 23, of article IV, of the Constitution, for the subject embraced in the act is not included in the enumeration found in the preceding section. But section 23, as has been again and again decided, does not prohibit the enactment of special laws, where general ones cannot be made applicable. It has also been repeatedly held that whether a general law can be made applicable to a particular subject, is exclusively a legislative question, and it necessarily results, that if the question is legislative, the whole matter, with all its incidents, must be determined by the legislature. If the question is legislative, then it is undisputably true that it is excluded absolutely and entirely from the domination of the judiciary. It is inconceivable that the question can be dissected into fragments, and one part assigned to one department of government and another part to a different department. Under our system of government, the departments are distinct and independent; there is no such thing as a power partly judicial and partly legislative. * * * As the question whether a general law can be made applicable is exclusively legislative, the incidents of the main question are necessarily and entirely legislative. Where the principal subject belongs, there the incidents belong. Means, methods and the like belong to the department that is invested with power over the general subject. It is for that department to make choice of modes and means, and as the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "It is master of its own discretion." The cases, however, which decide that this is a legislative question, nevertheless recognize and approve the doctrine that the question is judicial when the legislation concerns one of the prohibited subjects mentioned in the Constitution.' In the case of Carolina Grocery Co. v. Burnet,
We proceed next to consider the objection to the constitutionality of the act on the ground that it cannot operate as a special provision in the general law as provided in sections 2015-2019, Vol I., of the Code of Laws. The case of Grocery Co. v. Burnet,
The next question is whether the act was in violation of the requirements of Article III., Section 17, of the Constitution, which provides that "every act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." This case falls within the principle that an act is not subject to the objection interposed, when the body is germane to the subject expressed in the title thereof. Connor v. R.R.,
The objections urged in specifications "E" and "F" cannot be sustained, for the reason that they erroneously assume, that the act under which it is proposed to issue the bonds is invalid.
The objection stated in the eighth paragraph of the petition must be overruled, as such result is incidental to all exemptions of property from taxation. No case has been cited to show that such objection has ever rendered a statute unconstitutional.
It is the judgment of this Court, that the application be refused and the petition dismissed.
Addendum
I concur in the judgment. I agree in the view that the act in question, read in connection with the general statute, sections 2015-2019, covering the same subject, may fairly be construed as a special provision in a general law and, therefore, not obnoxious to Section 34, Article III, of the Constitution. Grocery Co. v. Burnet,
The exemption of the bonds from taxation as provided in Sec. 2 of the act is supported by the case of ChesterCounty v. White,
MR. JUSTICE WOODS. I concur in the result. It clearly appears from the opinions of Justices Gary and Jones, the validity of the statute now in question, authorizing the issue of bonds, does not depend on any right of the General Assembly to decide for itself what legislation is forbidden by the constitutional provision "Where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted." For this reason I reserve my opinion on this important point.