Defendants appeal as of right from a circuit court opinion and order granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10) in favor of plaintiff, finding that the item pricing *496 and deceptive advertising act, MCL 445.351 et seq.; MSA 19.853(11) et seq., was enacted in violation of the title-object clause of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, art 4, § 24. We reverse.
Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation licensed to do business in Michigan. As a merchandiser of consumer items, plaintiff is subject to the terms of the item pricing and deceptive advertising act. Defendant, the Weights and Measures Division of the Michigan Department of Agriculture, is empowered to implement and enforce the act, MCL 445.352; MSA 19.853(12). Plaintiff was informed of its noncompliance with the act on January 31, 1986. Defendant gave plaintiff forty-five days to achieve compliance. Although plaintiff originally agreed to the terms of compliance, on March 3, 1986, plaintiff sought injunctive relief from the same.
Both parties moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(1). After review of both motions and oral arguments, the trial court treated the motions as if they were brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10) and granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff. The trial court found that the act contains at least two objects and therefore violates the title-object clause of the 1963 Michigan Constitution.
It is well established that legislation challenged on a constitutional basis is clothed in a presumption of constitutionality.
Johnson v Harnischfeger Corp,
The title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution provides:
*497 No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title. [Const 1963, art 4, § 24.]
Our Supreme Court in
Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury,
This Court has long and consistently said that art 4, § 24, and similar "one object” provisions in earlier constitutions, are to be construed reasonably "and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation.” Ryerson v Utley (1868),16 Mich 269 , 277, citing People, ex rel Drake v Mahaney, (1865)13 Mich 481 , 494.
The purpose of the title-object clause is to prevent the Legislature from passing laws not fully understood and to avoid bringing into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary connection.
Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of
*498
Where the issue is the sufficiency of notice provided by the title, the title need not serve as an index of all the act’s provisions.
People v Milton,
As with codifications, an act providing for the functioning of a city covers many subjects which might have been dealt with in separate acts. The object of such an act is necessarily broad-ranging and comprehensive. "The home rule act and other acts providing for the incorporation of cities and other units of local government have been interpreted as having as their object anything germane to their functioning.” Detroit Board of Street Railway Commissioners v Wayne County,18 Mich App 614 , 623;171 NW2d 669 (1969). [Midland Twp, p 654.]
The title of the item pricing and deceptive advertising act states:
an act to regulate the pricing of consumer items and the advertising of consumer items, services, goods, merchandise, commodities, and real property; to prescribe the powers and duties of certain state and local officials in relation thereto; to provide remedies and penalties; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.
The act requires that all consumer items offered for retail sale be priced clearly and conspicuously, MCL 445.353(1); MSA 19.853(13X1), regulates ad
*499
vertisements of consumer items which are being offered for sale or at a special price, MCL 445.355; MSA 19.853(15), prohibits deceptive and misleading advertising, MCL 445.356; MSA 19.853(16), and prohibits discrimination in advertisement of real property, MCL 445.357; MSA 19.853(17). In passing this act, the Legislature repealed §§445.801 to 445.809 of the Compiled Laws of 1970. MCL 445.363; MSA 19.853(23). In 1976, the Legislature repealed the deceptive advertising act, MCL 445.801 to 445.809; MSA 19.853(1) to 19.853(9), and incorporated its provisions into the item pricing and deceptive advertising act, MCL 445.351 to 445.364; MSA 19.853(11) to 19.853(24). See
We do not believe the item pricing and deceptive advertising act violates the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. The purpose of title-object clause, namely notice, was satisfied. Although dissimilar, the act’s two objectives, regulation of pricing and advertising, are not so diverse in nature as to be at odds with the constitution. Further, the objects are consistent with the overall purpose, consumer protection. Since the title of the act need not be an index of its provisions, it is inconsequential that the act fails to mention consumer protection. A fair reading of the title demonstrates its purpose.
This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that although the act does not employ the word "code,” it appears to be an attempt by the Legislature to codify specific areas of the law under the banner of consumer protection. In passing the act, the Legislature repealed various sections of the law and unified them under one banner. As the title of the act provides adequate notice of its content, we find it does not violate the title-object clause of the constitution and, therefore, find the *500 trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff on this ground improper.
We decline to address plaintiffs remaining claims regarding the invalidity of the act as these claims were never decided by the trial court.
Joe Dwyer, Inc v Jaguar Cars, Inc,
Reversed.