delivered the Opinion of the Court.
*364 Clаimant Jean Ann Buhl was injured en route to her employment at Warm Springs State Hospital and filed a workers’ compensation claim for temporary disаbility pay for the several months of work she missed due to the injuries from the accident. Benefits were denied. The case was submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Court on an agreed set of facts. The parties agreed that the only issue to be determined was whether the claimant suffered injury in the coursе and scope of her employment. The Workers’ Compensation Court ruled that she did not. Claimant appeals.
We affirm.
The only issue on appeal is whether the Workers’ Compensation Court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that claimant’s conduct at the time of her injury was not within the coursе and scope of her employment and that it did not come under any exception to the “going and coming” rule.
On August 10, 1985, claimant was riding to work as a pаssenger in a car driven by co-employee Sue Graves down Highway 48 in Montana from their residence in Anaconda to their employment site at Warm Springs. They were scheduled to go on duty at 3:00 P.M. that afternoon. En route to Warm Springs, they saw a fellow employee, Gene Evans, with his car parked alongside the highway with the hood up. Claimant and the driver mutually agreed to stop their car to see if they could render assistance to their stranded co-worker. Claimant was sitting inside Graves’s parked car when the car was struck by another car. Claimant was injured in that collision.
Claimant argues first that it was the employmеnt relationship that motivated them to stop Graves’s car, and that secondly, by so aiding a fellow employee get to work on time, she was confеrring a benefit upon the employer. Both of these bring this conduct under an exception to the “going and coming” rule, according to claimant. We disаgree.
To be compensable an injury generally must occur within the course and scope of employment, § 39-71-407, MCA (1985), and travel to work and coming homе from work (“going and coming”) is not within the course and scope of employment,
Griffin v. Industrial Accident Board
(1940),
On facts very similar to these, this Court denied compensation to the claimant based on the “going and coming” rule.
Hagerman v. Galen State Hospital
(1977),
“Throughout the years this State has had workers’ compensation, this Court has considered a number of cases where injuries were sustained going to or coming from work and has found no recovery unless employee travel pay was covered under the employment contract or that travel allоwance was for travel for the special benefit of the employer. [Citations omitted.]
“Unless transportation is made a part of the employment contract or travel to and from work is recognized by legislative enactment or contract, any injuries suffered in such travel are outside the сourse and scope of the employment.”
Hagerman,
Claimant argues that her case fits the “special benefit” exception articulated in Hagerman because she conferred a reasonably immediate service to her employer. She argues that she was injured while attempting to help a fellow employee get to work on time, completing the work force for the benefit of the employer.
The Workers’ Compensation Court rejected that argument stating: “If merely securing the employee’s presence at work is in every case a ‘special benefit,’ the exception swallows up the rule.” Because of this, the court found that no exception to the general rule applied based on claimant’s conduct at the time of her injury. We agree.
As we stated in
Ogren v. Bitterroot Motors, Inc.
(Mont. 1986), [
Here, it should be noted that this case was submitted on an agreed set of facts which do not support claimant’s primary theory: that the purpose of the stop was to aid Evans in getting to work on time, although that might be inferred as one reason for stоpping from the context of all the facts taken together. The facts generally indicate that stopping was a voluntary choice by Graves, fоr humanitarian purposes, because a motorist was stranded. They do not indicate that claimant was concerned with Evans’ timely arrival at work, nor dо they indicate that Graves would have passed him by had he not been scheduled to work at 3:00 p.m.
However, the facts point out that the employer did nоt request, require, or know of claimant’s conduct, and that there is a total lack of employer participation in the activity causing injury.
Claimant nеxt argues that her injury is compensable because her conduct was of “mutual benefit” to the employer and herself and is thus another possible exсeption to the going and coming rule. We disagree.
The “mutual benefit” exception was recently discussed in
Lassabe v. Simmons Drilling, Inc.
(Mont. 1987), [
“. . . because when some advantage to the employer results from the employee’s conduct, his act cannot be regarded as purely personal and wholly unrelated to the employment.”
Citing,
Guarascio v. Industrial Accident Board
(1962),
However, this rule is inapplicable for the rеasons addressed above. Simply securing the employee’s presence at work cannot be a “special benefit” or an “advantage” to the employer. Under these facts, the work area is not a danger zone, such as a construction site; nor is it an entirely remote area, such as a drilling site. The employer in this case is wholly removed from transportation responsibilities and can reasonably expect that employees secure their own transportation to and from work. Such transportation is not within the course and scope of the employment. Absent any additiоnal factors, injuries occurring during transit are not compensable.
Because this case turns on claimant’s “travel status” at the time of injury, and becausе we have already affirmed that no exceptions can apply to her conduct, we decline discussion on claimant’s four remaining proposed exceptions.
*367 Claimant’s conduct is too far removed from any benefit or logical nexus to the employer to bring this case within an exception to the “going and coming” rule. Her injury is not compensable under our scheme of workers’ compensation. Benefits were properly denied.
Judgment affirmed.