364 Pa. 437 | Pa. | 1950
Opinion by
The sole question at issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of negligence on the part of defendant under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, as amended: 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 4.5 U. S. C. sec. 51, 45 U. S. C. A. 51 et seq., which provides: “Every common carrier by railroad while engaging (in interstate commerce) shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole or in part from the negligence ... of such carrier. ...”
Under section 56 of the Act, Congress empowered state courts to entertain suits: Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1. But the interpretation of the Act and its application to the facts of any particular case, in order to ascertain whether the plaintiff has been denied a right granted by Congress, is ruled by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294. Rights of recovery
From the testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it was established that plaintiff was employed by thé defendant, a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce. Although plaintiff was not a riveter, he was ordered to do riveting work on the day of the happening of the accident. Defendant’s employes Avere removing brakes on freight cars and substituting another type. As part of his work, it Avas necessary for plaintiff to crawl under a freight car and to operate in the confined area between the track bed and rails and the bottom of the freight car. Plaintiff was obliged to carry an air hammer Aveighing about ten pounds. In removing the old brakes, employes were required to burn off rivets and bolts, remove the old air containing cylinders, and install, the new brakes by riveting neAV brackets in place. Defendant Avould remove the larger pieces of scrap Avhich had fallen to the ground, but it permitted rivet heads, bolts and small pieces of pipe to accumulate on the tracks in and about the area where plaintiff was working. Such debris Avas removed only Avhen repair cmvs found time to do so betAveen jobs. On the day of the accident, rivet heads, bolts and other scrap Avere lying about the tracks and in the area Avhere plaintiff was Avorking underneath a gondola car. Before crawling out from under the car, he cradled the air hammer in his arms. While crawling out, it was necessary to prevent the air hammer from bumping against any other object otherAvise a dangerous steel plunger would shoot out of the hammer. Plaintiff testified: “When I Avas coming out I was trying to Avatch the gun, to keep it from coming out, trying to be careful, and I had it in my arm, using my knees, and I put one foot over the rail, and seemed to slip on some
Defendant contends that this evidence was insufficient to support a finding of negligence and the court should not have submitted the case to the jury. The Federal Employers’ Liability Act, supra, imposes liability only for negligence. Railroads are not absolute insurers against personal injuries suffered by their employes : Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 61. Where, however, there is a question whether such employer’s conduct measures up to reasonable standards in the circumstances, the issue of negligence must be submitted to the jury. It is immaterial that the law of this Commonwealth may be otherwise; as above stated, the Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbiter in cases under this Act. That Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of preserving for litigants their right to a jury trial. See: Wilkerson v. McCarthy, supra, p. 55. The testimony, thus presented by plaintiff, under the Federal Act, sufficiently supported the jury’s finding of negligence upon the ground that defendant failed to provide a reasonably safe place to work. In Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a complaint, in which plaintiff alleged he had been injured when he slipped on a large clinker lying alongside of tracks in a railroad yard while in the performance of his duties, was improperly dismissed by the Georgia courts in violation of plain tiff’s rights under the Act. In that case, the court noted that the allegations in the complaint charged the railroad with negligence in permitting clinkers and other debris to be left along the tracks “well knowing” that it was dangerous to workers. The Court,
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act, as amended, supra, bars assumption of risk as a defense (45 U. S. C. A. 54) and provides that contributory negligence is not a complete bar but may be considered in diminution of damages (45 U. S. C. A. 53). The defendant, in its argument that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligence said: “In any event, the defendant employer could not be expected to have a workman present to clean out these small particles before the plaintiff had finished his job in order that he might not fall upon same when he was leaving his place of work. If any employee could be expected to do this it was the plaintiff himself, and therefore if there was any negligence it was his own sole negligence which brought about his injury, and he should not be entitled to recovery.” Even if there was sufficient evidence to declare contributory negligence as matter of law, plaintiff would not be barred completely from recovery. Defendant seeks to exculpate itself from its failure to provide a reasonably safe place to work by the argument that if plaintiff “. . . thought the presence of the rivet heads and small pieces of pipe was creating a hazard, then all [plaintiff] had to do before beginning work was to brush it out.” Defendant argues: “If [plaintiff] did not think
For a list of cases under the Act where certiorari was allowed and refused see appendix to concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, supra, p. 71.
Judgment affirmed.