This wаs an action to quiet tbe title to certain real estate, and to subject tbe same to sale for tbe payment of tbe debts of tbe estate represented by tbe aрpellee. Tbe appellant, tbe widow of the decedent, William C. Buffington, was alleged to have entered, prior to her marriage with tbe de
“In witness whereof, the said William C. Buffing-ton and Martha J. Higbee have hereunto set their hands and seals on November 9, lS^. William C. Buffington (seal), Marthа J. Higbee (seal).”
The instrument was acknowledged, the date not appearing, by William C. and Martha J. Buffington. The effect of this contract upon any interest which the widow would otherwise hаve had in the real estate of the decedent, and upon her claim to the stat
The appellant’s learned counsel insist upon a strict and narrow construction of the contract, so as to limit it to the control of property during wedlock, and so that any concessions in this respect, made by the appellant, were upon the consideration of the executory promise of the decedent to thereafter relinquish аny interest in or control over her property for such period,, such executory promise never having been complied with.
It is the firmly-established rule in this State that antenuptial сontracts are not in such disfavor as to require rigid construction. On the contrary, they are favored by the law as promoting domestic happiness and adjusting property questiоns which would otherwise often be the source of fruitful litigation. No formality is required, and the rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. See Kennedy v. Kennedy,
As to the claim for the $500, allowed by statute, section 2424, Burns’ E. S. 1894, we need not dissent from the proposition that it is a special and preferred claim, analogous to dower, and payable from the personal and real estate of a deceased husband. The essential inquiries are, can it be waived by ante-nuptial contract, and was it so waived by the appellant? That it may be waived by the acceptance of testamentary provision inconsistent with its allowance has often been decided. Shafer v. Shafer,
It follows from these conclusions that the claim may be waived by stipulations which are valid, and in lieu of the legal interest of the prospective wife in the estatе of the husband. It only remains to be determined whether the contract in question is broad enough to comprehend this claim, and we do not hesitate to say that it is. The language is that “shе hereby releases any and all claims.” This is broad and comprehensive, and when read in the light of an intention to adjust rights following the death of the husband it precludes her.
The apрellant alleged that the instrument purporting to be an antenuptial contract was made and signed after the marriage; that the same was made to enable the parties to manage and control their separate estates respectively, during the marriage, and no longer; that he agreed to maintain her in a manner suitable to his means and station in life but failed to do so; that he failed to release all interest in her property and' estate as agreed; that she expended her separate means for the support of herself and the decedent, and she asks an accounting and the protection of her rights under the contract.
The denial of the execution of the contract is not broad enough to avail. It is conceded that parties contemplating marriage may orally agree as to the disposition of property, and may confirm such agreement in writing after marriage. Claypool v. Jaqua,
The stipulation as to support was not a condition upon which the validity of the contract was made to depend, and the allegation of a breach would not support a claim of forfeiture. Nor would the expenditure of money, for which she was not liable, even if it constituted an enforceable claim against the estate, be a .defense to the procеedings, or so far germane to the complaint as to supply the basis of a cross-complaint. The property of decedent is not subject to a life estate or to the statutory allowance in appellant’s favor, but passes, under the will, to the devisees therein named. There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.