128 A. 730 | Pa. | 1925
Argued February 10, 1925.
This is the second attempt to make a new disposition of the estate of William Buechley, deceased, valued at more than one hundred thousand dollars. His holograph will was first assailed as a forgery, then as being procured under undue influence. Having failed in these efforts (
The determining part of Buechley's will reads, "I William Buechley . . . . . ., do make this my last will and testament, hereby revoking any — and all wills heretofore made by me. . . . . . Item I give and bequeathe all the Remainder of my Estate to my — Son William Buechley Jr. whom I make constitute and appoint my Executor of this my last will and testament. Item I will all my Property real Estate to my Son William Buechley Jr." *109
It is the contention of testator's other children, appellants here, that the last clause clearly shows testator's intention to limit William's bequest to the real estate, which construction requires the personalty to pass without testamentary disposition. They argue that where a testator expressly declares his intention to give an entire class of objects to a legatee, and subsequently declares that he intends to give part of this class to the legatee, the latter expression must be given controlling effect by way of substitution for the former as indicating the changed intention in the testator's mind after he had written the preceding sentence, and the last expression must prevail. To sustain this conclusion not only must the will clearly indicate such construction, but it must do so in the face of certain legal principles promulgated to aid in ascertaining testator's intention and to effectuate it when discovered. These principles clarify what might otherwise be considered as a doubtful interpretation of a testator's will. Testator had an unquestioned right to distribute his entire property to and among beneficiaries of his own choosing, even if those of the same blood think they may be wronged thereby.
The will uses language indicative of an intention to make a complete disposition of all the property. To effect this intention a construction should be adopted that avoids intestacy: Biles v. Biles,
With these general principles in mind, we must decide whether testator intended to give William only the *110
real estate? In interpreting the will we shall confine ourselves to the meaning derived from the words used, rather than what he meant as derived through the circumstances attending the execution, though the latter may, if necessary, be considered: Crick's Est.,
The decree of the court below is therefore affirmed, at the cost of appellants.