23 Utah 515 | Utah | 1901
Tbe plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries wbicb be claims be received through tbe negligence of tbe defendant. He alleges in bis complaint, substantially, that on July 25, 1900, while be was traveling on one of defendant’s street cars as a passenger, on a certain street in Salt Lake City, tbe car on which be was riding collided with another through tbe negligent and careless management of the company’s servants; that by tbe collision be was thrown from bis seat, and struck with his back against tbe car, and was thereby bruised, wounded, and injured, so that be became sick and sore internally and disabled permanently; and that ever since be has been, and for a long
It is contended that the court erred in not setting aside the verdict of the jury as being excessive, and having been
In such a case, where, as here, there is evidence in support of the verdict, we are conclusively bound by the judgment of the trial court and jury on the question of damages, as well as on any other question of fact. It has been repeatedly so held by this court, and it is no longer an open question in this State. It is therefore useless to longer incumber the records with such questions in such cases. This court will not interfere with the verdict of a jury, unless there is no legitimate proof to support it. Mangum v. Mining Co., 15 Utah 534, 50 Pac. 834; Nelson v. Southern Pac. Co., 15 Utah 325, 49 Pac. 644; Anderson v. Mining Co., 15 Utah 22, 49 Pac. 126; Murray v. Railroad Co., 16 Utah 356, 52 Pac. 596; Harrington v. Mining Co., 17 Utah 300, 53 Pac. 737; Stoll v. Mining Co., 19 Utah 271, 57 Pac. 295; State v. Endsley, 19 Utah 478, 57 Pac. 430; Smith v. Droubay, 20 Utah 443, 58 Pac. 1112.
It is also insisted for the appellant that the court erred in permitting the witness Dr. Anderson to give his opinion as to what per cent, of the people afflicted, as the plaintiff is, with nervous prostration or neurasthenia, recover permanently. The objection to this testimony was based on the ground that the witness was not shown to be competent to •give such an opinion. As to whether or not a witness is com
After baving testified as to bis professional qualifications and experience, tbe witness was permitted to testify, without objection, as appears, respecting the plaintiff’s injuries, disease, and condition, and baving so testified, tbe court did not err in permitting him to give bis opinion as to what percentage of sucb patients ultimately recover their health, since tbis bad a direct bearing upon tbe permanency of tbe disease, which it was claimed resulted from tbe injuries. Cole v. Railway Co., 95 Mich. 77, 54 N. W. 638; McClain v. Railroad Co., 116 N. Y. 459, 22 N. E. 1062; Railroad Co. v. Crist, 116 Ind. 446, 19 N. E. 310, 2 L. R. A. 450, 9 Am. St. Rep. 865; Mangum v Mining Co., 15 Utah 534, 50 Pac. 834; Railway Co. v. Burnett, 80 Tex. 536, 16 S. W. 320; Railroad Co. v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 163, 21 N. E. 7; Hammond v. Woodman, 66 Am. Dec. 219, 234.
Nor did tbe court err in permitting tbe expert witness to testify as to bow long a person under similar conditions would probably suffer and be unable to work. It was clearly competent for tbe witness to so testify, baving already testified to tbe condition of tbe injured. Abbot v. Dwinnell, 74 Wis. 514, 43 N. W. 496; Hammond v. Woodman, 66 Am. Dec. 235. It is not deemed important to discuss any other question presented. We find no prejudicial error in tbe record. Tbe judgment is affirmed, with costs.