Budd v. New YorkBudd v. New York
Lead Opinion
after stating the cáse, delivered the opinion of the court.
The -main question involved in these cases is whether this court will adhere to its decision in Munn v. Illinois,
The Court of Appeals of New York, in People v. Budd,
It is claimed, on behalf of Budd, that the statute of the State of New York is unconstitutional, because contrary to the provisions of section 1 of the Fourteenth' Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in depriving the citizen of his property without due process of law; that it is unconstitutional in fixing the maximum charge for elevating, receiving, weighing and discharging grain by means of floating and stationary elevators and warehouses at five-eighths of one cent á bushel and in forbidding the citizen to make any profit upon the use of his property or labor; and that the police power of the State extends only to property or business which is devoted by its owner to the public, by a. grant to the public of the right to demand its use. It is claimed on behalf of Annan and Pinto that floating and stationary elevators in the port of New York are private property, not affected with any public interest, and not subject to the regulation of rates.
“Trimming” in the canal-boat,..spoken of in the statute, is shovelling the grain from one".place to another, and is done by longshoremen with scoops or shovels; and “trimming” the ship’s cargo when loading is stowing it and securing it for the voyage. Floating elevators are primarily boats. Some are scows, and have to be towedfrom place to place by steam tugs; but the majority are propellers. When the .floating elevator ’
. In the Budd and Pinto cases, the elevator was a stationary one on land; and in the Annan case, it was a floating elevator. i.In the Budd case, the Court of Appeals held that the words “ actual cost,” used in the statute, were intended to exclude any charge by the elevator beyond t}ie sum specified, for the use of its machinery in shovelling, and the ordinary expenses of operating it, and to confine the charge to • the actual cost of the outside labor required for trimming and bringing the grain to the leg of the elevator; and that the purpose of the statute could be easily evaded and defeated if the elevator owner were permitted to separate the services, and charge for the use of the steam shovel any sum which might be agreed upon between him and the shovellers’ union, and thereby, under color of charging for the use of his steam shovel, exact from the
The Court of Appeals, in its-opinion in the JBudd case, considered fully the question as to whether the legislature had power, under the constitution of the State of New York, to prescribe a maximum charge for elevating grain by stationary elevators, owned by individuals or corporations who had appropriated their property to that use and were engaged in that business; and it answered the inquiry in the affirmative. It also reviewed the case of Munn v. Illinois,
In regard to Munn v. Illinois, the Court of Appeals said that the question in that case was raised by an individual owning an elevator and warehouse in Chicago, erected for, and in connection with which he had carried on, the business of elevating and storing grain, many years prior to the passage of the act in question, and prior also to the adoption of the amendment to the constitution of Illinois, in 1870, declaring all elevators and warehouses, where grain or other property is stored for a compensation, to be public warehouses. The Court of Appeals then cited the cases of People ex rel. etc. v. B. & A. R. R. Co.,
The Court of Appeals further examined the question whether
The Court of Appeals said that, in view of the foregoing exceptional circumstances, the business of elevating 'grain was affected with a public interest, within the language of Lord Chief Justice Hale, in his treatise De Portibus Maris, (Harg. Law Tracts, 78;) that the case fell within the principle which permitted the legislature to regulate the business of common, carriers, ferrymen and hackmen, and interest on the use of money;, that the underlying principle .was, that business of certain kinds holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation ; and that the court-.rested the power of the legislature to control and regulate elevator changes upon the nature and extent of the business, the existence of a virtual monopoly, the benefit derived from the Erie Canal’s creating the business and making it possible, .the interest to trade • and commerce,
The opinion further said that the^criticism to- which the case of Munn v. Illinois had been subjected proceeded mainly upon a limited and strict construction and definition of the police power; that there was little reason, under our system • of government, for placing a close and narrow interpretation on the police power, or restricting its scope so as to hamper the legislative power ■ in dealing with the varying necessities of society knd the new circumstances as they arise calling for •legislative intervention in the .public interest; and that no serious invasion of constitutional guarantees by the legislature could withstand for a long time the searching'influence of public opinion,, which was sure to come sooner or later to the side of law, order and justice, however it might have been ■swáyed for a time by passion or prejudice, or whatever aberrations might have marked its course.
We regard these views which we have referred to as announced by the Court of Appeals of Hew York, so far as they 'support the validity of the statute in question, as sound • and just. •
In Munn v. Illinois, the constitution of Illinois, adopted in 1870, provided in article 13, section 1, as follows: “All elevators or storehouses, where grain, or other property is stored for a compensation, whether the property stored be kept separated or not, are declared to be public warehouses; ” and the act of the legislature of Illinois approved April 25, 1871, (Public Laws of Illinois, of 1871-72; p. 762,) divided public warehouses into three' classes, prescribed the taking of a license and the giving of'a bond, and fixed a maximum charge, for Warehouses belonging to class A, for storing and handling grain, including the cost of receiving and delivering, and .imposed .a fine on conviction for not taking the license or not giving the bend. Munn and Scott were indicted, convicted and fined, for not taking Out-the license and not giving the bond, and for charging - rates for storing and handling grain
This court, in Munn v. Illinois, the opinion being delivered by Chief Justice Waite, and there being a published dissent by only two justices, considered carefully the question of the repugnancy of the Illinois statute to the Fourteenth Amendment. It said, that under the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, “ the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good; ” and that, “.'in their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, inn-keepers, etc., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold.” It was added: “ To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some or all these subjects; and we think it has -never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property.” It announced as its conclusions that, down to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due
This court further held in Munn v. Illinois, that the business in question was one in which the whole public had a direct and positive interest; that the statute of Illinois simply extended the law so as to meet a new development of commercial progress ; that there was no attempt to compel the owners of the warehouses to grant the public an interest in their property, but to declare their obligations if they used it in that particular manner; that it mattered not that Munn and Scott had built their warehouses and established their business before the regulations complained of were adopted; that, the property being clothed’with a public interest, what was a reasonable compensation for its use was not a judicial, but a legislative question; that, in countries where the common law prevailed, it had been customary from time immemorial for-the legislature to declare what should be a reasonable compensation under such circumstances, or to fix a maximum beyond which any charge made would’be unreasonable; that the warehouses of Munn and Scott were situated in Illinois and their business was carried on exclusively in that State; that the warehouses were no more necessarily a part of commerce itself than the dray or the cart by which, but for them, grain would be transferred from one railroad station to another; that their regulation was a thing of domestic concern; that, until Congress acted in reference to their interstate relations, the State might exercise all the powers of. government over them, even though
In Sinking Fund Cases,
' In Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler,
In Wabash &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois,
In Dow v. Beidelman,
In Chicago &c. Railroad Co. v. Minnesota,
■ ■ It is thus apparent that this court has adhered to the decision in Munn v. Illinois and to the doctrines announced in the opinion of the court in that cáse; and those doctrines have since been repeatedly enforced in the decisions of the courts of the States.
In Railway v. Railway,
In State v. Gas Company,
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Ruggles v. People, 91 Illinois, 256, 262, in 1878, cited Munn v. People, 69 Illinois, 80, which was affirmed in Munn v. Illinois, as holding that it was competent for the general assembly to fix the maximum charges by individuals keeping public warehouses for storing, handling and shipping grain, and that, too, when such persons had derived no spefci&l privileges from the State, but were, as citizens of the State, exercising the business of storing and handling grain for individuals.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Mavis v. The State, 68 Alabama, 58, in 1880, held that a statute declaring it unlawful, -within certain counties, to transport or move, after sunset and before sunrise of the succeeding day, any 'cotton in the seed, but permitting the owner or purchaser to.remove it from the field to- a place of storage, was not unconstitutional. Against the argument that the statute -was such a despotic interference with the rights of private property as to be tantamount, in its practical effect, to a deprivation of ownership “ without due process of law,” the court said that the statute sought only to regulate and control the transportation of cotton in one particular condition of it, and was a mere police
In Baker v. The State, 54 Wisconsin, 368, 373, in 1882, Munn v. Illinois was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, as holding that the legislature of Illinois had power to regulate public warehouses., and the warehousing and inspection of grain within that State, and to enforce its regulations. by penalties, and that such legislation was not in conflict with any provision of the Federal Constitution.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in 1882, in Nash v. Page, 80 Kentucky, 539, 545, cited Munn v. Illinois, as applicable to the case of the proprietors of tobacco warehouses in the city of Louisville, and held that the character of the business of the tobacco warehousemen was that of a public employment, such as made them subject, in their charges and their mode of conducting business, to' legislative regulation and control, as having a practical monopoly of the sales of tobacco at auction.
In 1884, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Girard Storage Co. v. Southwark Co., 105 Penn. St. 248, 252, cited Munn v. Illinois as involving the rights of a private person, and said that the principle involved in the ruling of this court was, that where the owner of such property as a warehouse devoted it to a use in which the public had %an interest, he in effect granted to the public an interest in such use, and must, therefore, to the extent thereof, submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, as long as he maintained that use.
In Sawyer v. Paris,
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in 1885, in Brechbill v. Randall, 102 Indiana, 528, held that a statute was valid which required persons selling patent rights to file with the clerk of the county a copy of the patent, with an affidavit of genuineness and authority to sell, on the ground that the State had power to make police regulations for the protection of its citizens against fraud and imposition; and the court cited. Munn v. 1 llinois as authority.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in 1885, in Webster Telephone Case, 17 Nebraska, 126, held that when a corporation or person assumed and undertook to supply a public demand, made necessary by the requirements of the commerce of the country, .such as a public telephone, such dem'ánd must be supplied to all alike, without discrimination;- and Munn v. Illinois was cited by the prevailing party and by the court. The defendant was a corporation, and had assumed- to act in a capacity which was to a great extent public, and had undertaken to satisfy a public want or necessity, although it did not possess any special privileges by statute or any monopoly of business in a given territory; yet it was held that, from the very nature and character of its business, it had a monopoly of the business which it transacted. The court said that no statute had been deemed necessary to aid the courts in holding that where Ja person or company undertook to supply a public demand, which was “ affected with a public interest,” it mint supply all alike who occupied a like situation, and nob discriminate in favor of or against any.
In Stone v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. Co., 62 Mississippi, 607, 639, the Supreme Court of. Mississippi, in 1885, cited
In Hockett v. The State, 105 Indiana, 250, 258, in 1885, the . Supreme Court of Indiana held that a statute of the State which prescribed the maximum price which a telephone company should charge for the use of its telephones was constitutional, and that in legal contemplation all the instruments and appliances used, by a telephone company in the transaction of it's business were dévoted to a public use, and the property thus devoted became a legitimate subject of legislative regulation. It cited Munn v. Illinois as a leading case in support of that proposition, and said that although that case had been: the subject of comment and criticism, its authority as a precedent remained unshaken. This doctrine was confirmed in Central Union Telephone Co. v. Bradbury, 106 Indiana, 1, in the same year, and in Central Union Telephone Co. v. The State, 118 Indiana, 194, 207, in 1888, in which latter -case Munn v. Illinois was cited by the court.
In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Balto. & Ohio Telegraph Co.,
In the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, in 1889, in Delaware &c. Railroad Co. v. Central Stock Yard Co., 45 N. J. Eq. 50, 60, it was held that the legislature had power to declare what services warehousemen should render to the public, and to fix the compensation that might be demanded for such services; and the court cited Munn v. Illinois as properly holding that warehouses for the storage of grain must bé regarded as so far public in their nature as to be subject to legislative control, and that when a citizen devoted his property to a use in which the’ public had an interest, he in effect granted to the public an interest in that use, and rendered himself subject to control, in that use, by the body politic.
In Zanesville v. Gas-Light Company,
■ We must regard the principle maintained in Munn v. Illinois as firmly established; and we think it covers the present cases, in respect to the charge for elevating, receiving, weighing 'and discharging the grain, as well as in respect to the charge for trimming and shovelling to the leg of the elevator when loading, and trimming the cargo when loaded. If the shovellers or scoopers chose, they might do the shovelling by hand, or might use a steam-shovel. A steam-shovel is owned by the elevator owner, and the power for operating it is fur-
The answer to the suggestion that by the statute the elevator owner is forbidden to make any profit from the business of shovelling to the leg of the elevator is that made by the Court of Appeals of Yew York in the case of Budd, that the words “ actual cost,” used in the statute, were intended to exclude any charge by the elevator owner, beyond the sum specified for the use of his machinery in shovelling and the ordinary expenses of operating it, and to confine the charge to the actual cost. of the outside labor required for trimming and bringing the grain to the leg of the elevator ;-- and that the purpose of the statute could be easily evaded-and defeatéd if the elevator owner was permitted to separate the services, and to charge for the use of his steam-shovel any sum which might be agreed upon between himself and the shovellers’ union,and thereby, under color of. charging for the use of his steam-shovel, to exact of the 'carrier a sum for elevating beyond the rate fixed by the statute.
Ye are of opinion that the act of the legislature of Yew York is not contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and does not deprive the citizen of his property without due process of law; that the act, in fixing the maximum charges, which it specifies, is not unconstitutional, nor is it so in limiting the charge for shovelling to the actual cost thereof; and that it is a proper exerpise of the police power of the State.
On the testimony in the cases before us the business of elevating grain is a business .charged with a public interest, and those who carry it on occupy a relation to the community analogous to that, of common carriers. The elevator owner, in fact, retains the grain in his custody for an appreciable period of time, because he receives it into his custody, weighs it, and then discharges it, and his employment is thus analogous to that of a warehouseman. In the actual state of the business the passage of the grain to the city of Yew York and other places on the seaboard would, without the use of eleva
It is contended in the briefs for the plaintiffs in error in the Annan and Pinto cases that the business of the relators in handling grain was wholly private, and not subject to regulation by law; and that they had received from the State no charter, no privileges and nó immunity, and stood before the law on a footing with the'laborers they employed to shovel grain, and were no more subject to regulation ■ than any other individual in the community. But these same facts existed in Munn v. Illinois. In that case, the parties offending were private individuals, doing a private business, without any privilege or monopoly granted to .them by the State. Not only is the business of elevating grain affected with a public interest, but the records show that it is. an actual'monopoly, besides being incident to the business of transportation and to that of a common carrier, and thus of a quasi-public character. The act is also constitutional as an exercise of the police power of the State.
So far as the statute in question is a regulation of commerce, it is a regulation of commerce only on the waters of the St^te of New York. It operates only within the limits of that State, and is no-more obnoxious as a regulation of interstate commerce than was the statute of Illinois in respect to warehouses, in Munn v. Illinois. It is of the same character with navigation laws imrespect to navigation within the State, and laws regulating wharfage rates within the State, and other kindred laws.
It is'further contended that, under the decision of this court in Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Minnesota,
But this is a misapprehension of the decision of this court in the case referred fin In that case, the legislature of Minnesota had passed an act which established a railroad and Avare-house commission, and the Supreme Court of that State had interpreted the act as providing that the rates of charges for the transportation of property by railroads, recommended and published by the commission, should be final and conclusive as to what Avere equal and reasonable charges, and that there could be no judicial inquiry as to the reasonableness of such rates. A railroad company, in answer to an application for a mandamus, contended that such rates in regard to it were unreasonable, and, as it Avas not allowed by the State Court to put in testimony in support of its ansAver, on the question of the reasonableness of such rates, this court held that the statute was in conflict with the Constitution of .the United States, as depriving the company of its property without due process of law, and depriving it of the equal protection of the laAvs. That AAdts a very different case from one under the statute of ISTeAV York in question here, for in this instance the rate of charges is fixed directly by the legislature. See Spencer v. Merchant,
"What was Said in the opinion in 134 U. S., as to the question of the reasonableness of .the rate of charge being one for judicial investigation, had no reference to a case where the
But in Dow v. Beidelman, after citing Munn v. Illinois,
In the cases before us, the records do not show that the charges fixed by the statute are unreasonable, or that property has ’been taken without due process of law, or that there has been any denial of the equal protection of the laws; even if under any circumstances we could determine that the maximum rate fixed- by the legislature was unreasonable.
In Georgia Banking Co. v. Smith,
It is further contended for the plaintiffs in error that the statute in question violates the Fourteenth Amendment, because it takes from the elevator owners the equal protection of the laws, in that it applies only to places which have 130,-. 000 population or more, and does not apply to places which have less than .130,000 population, and thus operates against elevator owners in the larger cities of the State. The law operates equally on all elevator owners in places having 130,-000 population or more; and we'do not perceive how they are deprived of the equal protection of' the laws, within the meaning of the- Fourteenth Amendment.
Judgments affirmed. ■
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I' dissent' from the opinion and judgment in these cases. The main proposition upon which they rest is, in my judgment, radically unsound. It is' the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, 94
Surely the matters in which the public has the most interest, are the supplies of food and clothing; yet can it be that by reason of this interest the State may fix the price at which the butcher must sell his meat, or the vendor of boots and shoes his goods? Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; ” and to “ secure,” not grant or create, these rights governments are instituted. That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s ■injury, and that does not mean that he must use. it for his neighbor’s benefit; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and, third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.
It is suggested that there is a monopoly, and that that justifies legislative interference. There are two kinds of monopoly; one of law, the other of fact. The one exists when exclusive privileges áre granted. Such a monopoly, the law which creates alone can break-; and being the creation of law justifies legislative control. A monopolv of fact any one
The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The ■utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest'possible protection to him and his property, is both.the limitation and'duty of government. If it may regulate the price of one service, which is not a public service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property which is not' devoted to a public use, -'why may it not with equal reason regulate the price of all service, and the compensation to be paid for the use of all property? And -if so, “Looking Backward” is nearer than a dream.
• I .dissent especially in these cases, because- the statute in effect compels service without any compensation. * It provides that the parties seeking the service of the elevator “shall only be required to pay the actual cost of trimming or shov-elling to the leg of the elevator when unloading, and trimming cargo, when loading.” This work of. trimming or shovelling is fully explained in the briefs of counsel. ■ It is work performed by longshoremen with hand-scoops or shovels,. on the -vessel ' unloading or receiving the' grain. They are not in the regular employ1 of the ... elevator; but engaged in ah independent service, and yet one whose careful and skilful performance is essential to the successful transfer of grain into and through the elevator. The full service required of the elevator com
'Again, in the Pinto Case, it appears that Mr.-Pinto is the owner of a stationary elevator, built oh private grounds. It is not oh grounds devoted to a public use, like the right of way of a railroad company. There is nothing to indicate on his .part a purpose to dedicate his property to public uses. ' So far as it is possible to make the business of an elevator a purely private business, he has done-so. It will not do .to say that the transferring of grain through an elevator is one step in the process of transportation; and. that,, .therefore, they are quasi common carriers, ‘discharging a public duty, and subject to public control. They are not carriers in any proper sense of the term. They may. facilitate carriage; so does the boxing and packing of goods for transportation. The engineers, firemen, brakemen, and all the thousands of employés of a railroad company are helping the business of transportation; but are they all common carriers simply because their work , tends to facilitate the business of transportation; and may the legislature regulate their wages ?
But, as I said, I . do not care to enter into any extended discussion of the matter. I believe the time is not distant when-the evils resulting from this assumption of a power on the part of government to determine the compensation a mac may ré-cieve for the use of his property, or the performance of his per-, sonal services,' will become so apparent that the courts will hasten to declare that government can prescribe compensation only when it grants a special privilege, as in the creation of a corporation, of when the service which is rendered is a public service, or the property is in fact devoted to a public use.