Lead Opinion
Pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Borough Code § 1001, the Phoenixville Borough Council enacted an ordinance eliminating compensation for its councilmembers and mayors, effective immediately.
The trial court, relying on Baldwin v. City of Philadelphia,
We granted allocatur to indeed reexamine Baldwin, and determine whether Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 27 prohibits midterm compensation changes for elected municipal officers by means of a municipal ordinance. These are purely legal questions; thus, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. In re Milton Hershey School,
Baldwin is precedential, and Pennsylvania follows the doctrine of stare decisis, which “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
Appellant contends Baldwin utilized a strained, technical interpx'etation of the word “law.” He claims a “law” is a rule governing a community regardless of its source, and argues Article III, § 27 is a substantive restriction, limiting the subject matter of legislation enacted by any entity in the Comxnonwealth. Appellant notes this Court has applied other sections of Article III to xnunicipalities, and argues we should do the same with § 27. Appellant contends that as all municipalities derive their power from the Legislature, if the Legislarme does not have the power to diminish salaries mid-term, it cannot delegate power to do so to municipalities.
Appellee counters that Baldwin was correctly decided, as at the time there was a national consensus that limited the word “law” to legislative acts. See, e.g., State v. Lee,
Confining the term “law” in Article III, § 27 to enactments of the “supreme power,” the Legislature, comports with Blackstone and his commentaries on English Law; while a worthy source, a more appropriate and ordinarily understood definition of “law” is “[t]he regime that orders human activities and relations through systematic application of the force of politically organized society, or through social pressure, backed by force, in such society.” Black’s Law Dictionary 900 (8th ed. 2004). This definition recognizes that the law comes from various legitimate sources and is not limited to direct enactments of the Legislature. For example, Black’s describes an ordinance as “authoritative law or decree; esp. a municipal regulation .... [i]t is a legislative enactment, within its sphere, as much as an act of the state legislature.” Id., at 1132 (quoting 1 Judith O’Gallagher, Municipal Ordinances § 1A.01, at 3 (2d ed. 1998)).
Even at the time of Bcddivin, “law” was understood to include more than a legislature’s enactments. See 2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionai-y 12 (14th ed. Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1874) (definition of law includes “rules and methods by which society compels and restrains its members”). Municipal ordinances were understood even then to be laws. See id.,
Borough Code § 1001, which permits a borough to set compensation for its councilmembers, is a provision enacted by the Legislature. Furthermore, “municipal corporations are creatures of the State and ... the authority of the Legislature over their powers is supreme. Municipal corporations have no inherent powers and may do only those things which the Legislature has expressly or by necessary implication placed within their power to do.” Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale,
As appellant notes, this Court has applied other provisions of Article III to municipalities. In Lighton v. Abington Township,
We also applied the restriction set forth in Article III, § 29 (then § 18) to a municipality.
It would be strange, indeed, if the legislature by creating a body politic or corporate to exercise a legislative function could do indirectly what it may not do directly. It seems too plain for cavil that, if a mere creature of the legislature can do what the legislature itself is constitutionally prohibited from doing, the carefully designed [constitutional] prohibition ... could be rendered useless. Such a result is not to be sanctioned.
Id., at 913.
More recently, a borough council increased the pay of police officers who were subject to a collective bargaining agreement which did not provide for alteration of wages during the agreement’s duration.
These cases highlight Baldwin’s continuing untenability. Article III, § 27’s limitation is meaningless if the Legislature can circumvent it by authorizing municipalities to enact the mid-term compensation changes the Legislature itself may not enact. This would be incongruous, as “[t]he [Legislature, in turn, may delegate or grant only those powers which are constitutionally permitted.” Denbow, at 1118 (citing Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment of Tredyffrin Township,
It is well-settled the Legislature may not alter, midterm, the compensation of incumbent elected officials during their current terms. Bakes v. Snyder,
The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. Section § 1001 provides “councilmen may receive compensation to be fixed by ordinance at any time and from time to time...." 53 P.S. § 46001.
. Article III, § 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides “[n]o law shall extend the term of any public officer, or increase or diminish his salary or emoluments, after his election or appointment." Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 27.
. In Baldwin, Philadelphia enacted an ordinance reducing a city official's salary during his term. This Court upheld the ordinance, holding only legislative enactments were within the meaning of "law.” Baldwin, at 170-71. Relying on William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, the Court defined a law as "an emanation from the supreme power, [which] cannot originate elsewhere. It is a rule which every citizen of the state is bound to obey." Id., at 170. The Court found the Legislature was the supreme power in Pennsylvania; an ordinance was merely a local regulation, binding only people in its community. Id. The Court reasoned as Article III limited the powers of the Legislature, it should only apply to the Legislature. Id.
. Our courts have consistently followed Baldwin, as the constitutional language remains unchanged; however, we have not revisited the reasoning of the decision in the 128 years since its pronouncement. See, e.g., McKinley v. School District of Luzerne Township,
. At the time, Article III, § 20 provided: "The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal functions whatever.” Former Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 20.
. This section, at the time, provided: "No appropriations, except for pensions or gratuities for military services, shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, to any person or community, nor to any denomination or sectarian institution, corporation or association.” Former Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 18.
. This section provides:
No bill shall be passed giving any extra compensation to any public officer, servant, employe, agent or contractor, after services shall have been rendered or contract made, nor providing for the payment of any claim against the Commonwealth without previous authority of law....
Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 26.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
Initially, the majority opinion indicates that Pennsylvania courts have consistently followed Baldwin v. City of Philadelphia,
As ably advanced by Appellee, there have always been strong historical and contextual arguments to be made that the term “law,” as used in Article III, refers only to enactments by the General Assembly.
. Appellee validly notes that Baldwin mirrors the position taken by a number of other courts at or near the time of its issuance. See Brief for Appellee at 3-6 (citing State v. Lee,