15 F. 365 | E.D. Ark. | 1882
It is not alleged that the'plaintiff was guilty of any fraud, willful misrepresentation, or concealment, or that the parties made any other or different contract than that disclosed by the face of tlie deed. Nor is it alleged that the plaintiff had any other or better sources of information than the defendant, either as to the fact or the law relating to the question as to whether the stock mortgage was or not a lien on the lands. It remained on the public records unsatisfied. The defendant knew this. He knew all that could be learned about the facts of the transaction by consulting those cognizant of them, and he knew all about the law applicable to the matter that could be known by consulting learned and able counsel,
It is not alleged that the plaintiff expressed any opinion on the question based or claimed to be based on his personal knowledge, or that the expression of his belief founded on information, the sources of which were equally open to defendant, was the inducement to the purchase. He was a citizen of another state; he acquired the lands, not by a purchase from free choice at private sale as an investment, but at judicial sale, when he was compelled to purchase for better for worse to save a debt. He acquired the lands without warranty, and it is clear from the averments in the cross-bill that it was his purpose to convey them as they came to him; to sell whatever he acquired by his purchase at the marshal’s sale and no more; and to enter into no covenant that would render him liable beyond that. He seemed to realize the hazard of relying on the uncertain and fading recollections of men to overcome a solemn written record, and he knew that with the lapse of every year this hazard would be increased, and he probably also recognized the fact that the law is not one of the exact sciences, and that the most learned counsel, as well as courts, sometimes err; and, having no personal knowledge on the subject, he prudently declined to covenant against this incumbrance apparent upon the public records, although it was stale with age and was reported to be paid. The defendant, possessed of a more sanguine temperament and less caution, or having more faith in the memories of men and the advice of his counsel, chose to take the risk.
It is not alleged the stock mortgage is a lien upon the land. Indeed, it is in effect said that it is paid, but that, nevertheless, it is possible the state will have a decree, and that in that event the loss should fall on the plaintiff, because it would then be a case of mutual mistake. Mutual mistake about what ? Not about the terms of the contract, for that is in writing, and is conceded to express the agreement of the parties. Not about the existence of the stock mortgage, for that was well known to both parties. If the parties were mutually mistaken about anything, it was as to whether or not the state could enforce the stock mortgage. It was precisely because the plaintiff recognized that the information which he, in common with the defendant, possessed on that subject might be erroneous, that he declined to warrant against incumbrances. If it shall turn out that the parties were mutually mistaken on this point, it is a mutual mistake about a matter which in its very nature possessed
■ All the cases' cited by the learned counsel for the defendant have been examined. In all of them, where the facts are given, there was the -elerheht of misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of a material fact, or a mistake consisting in an unconsciousness, ignorance, or forgetfulness of a material fact. All of these elements are wanting in this case.
“It is wéll settled that to set aside a contract on the ground of misrepresentation it must be of something material constituting some motive to the contract, something in regard to which some reliance is placed by one party on the other, and by which he was actually misled; not a matter of opinion merely, equally open to the inquiry and examination of both parties.” Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26; Hill v. Bush, 19 Ark. 522.
In Raymond v. Raymond, 10 Cush. 134, the court say the grantee “took a deed with covenants of a very limited character, and having thus-taken certain express covenants of his vendor he must be restricted to them, and cannot ingraft upon them the more extended engagement found in a verbal promise made at the time of the execution of the'deed. A deed with a special warranty against all persons claiming by, through, or under the grantor cannot thus be extended to a general covenant of warranty against all persons.” - And the rule is that a party has no remedy on the ground of a mere failure of title, if he has taken no covenants to secure the title, and there; is mo fraud in the case. Chesterman v. Gardner, 5 Johns. Ch. 29; Gouveneur v. Elmendorf, Id. 79.
There is a plea of the statute of limitations to one of the notes given for the purchase money. More than five and less than seven years elapsed between the maturity of the note and the institution of this suit. The plea is not good in bar of a decree in rem for a sale of the lands. Hall v. Denkla, 28 Ark. 507; Birnie v. Main, 29 Ark. 591. But it is a bar to the recovery of a personal judgment against the defendant.
In the course of .the opinion in- Birme v. Main, supra, there is an expression from which it might be inferred that the court held the lawon-'the last,point to be otherwise. Such a doctrine is so obviously
The demurrer to the cross-bill and the exceptions to the answer, except so much thereof as pleads the statute of limitations in bar of a personal judgment on one note, are sustained.