Buckner v. StateBuckner v. State
Jаmes Buckner appeals his conviction of two counts of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by selling cocaine.
1. In his first enumeration of errоr, Buckner contends the trial court erred by refusing to grant a two-day continuance after the hearing on the State’s intent to introduce a certificate of drug analysis pursuant to
In the present case, Buckner was notified of the State’s intent to rely upon a certificate of drug analysis by notice dated February 24, 1995. Buckner оbjected to the use of the
Buckner’s counsel argued that regardless of the trial court’s decision, his client was entitled to a two-day continuance to meet the timing requirement for the hearing contained in
2. Buckner asserts the triаl court erred by allowing evidence of similar transactions including his prior guilty plea thereto. On appeal, Buckner argues that during the Rule 31.3 (B) hearing, the trial court failed to make the specific findings required by
Williams v. State,
Buckner additionally asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the State’s witness to testify as to his guilty pleas to the similar transactions. Buckner argues that the State is required to prove convictions by the introduction of a certified copy of the individual’s conviction. The trial transcript reveals that the State had a certified copy of the indictment and conviction, and a discussion was held regarding
redacting certain portions of it. The trial court determined that redaction of the document would not be possible without changing, the entire document, and the State was instructеd to tell the jury that Buckner had pled guilty to the similar transactions. Buckner did not object to this procedure; he objected at trial only when the State’s witness regаrding the similar transactions testified that Buckner pled guilty. Buckner has failed to show any harm in the State’s witness testifying as to his prior guilty pleas rather than the prosecutоr stating the facts in his place. To the extent that Buckner’s objection on appeal is different from that raised in the trial court, it is not properly beforе us.
Ellison v. State,
3. Buckner contends the trial court erred in its response to the jury’s question regarding entrapment. After jury deliberations began, the jury requested instructions regarding entrapment. They asked: “We, the jury, do not understand entrapment under the law and how you consider somebody as being entrapped into selling.” After a conference off the record, the trial court explained to the jury that entrapment was an affirmative defense which was not raised in this case and was not within the jury’s provinсe to decide. The trial court had not previously charged on entrapment and Buckner had not requested such a charge.
Although Buckner presented nо evidence at trial and failed to request a charge on entrapment, he contends the trial court’s instruction was an improper statement of the law because a defendant may rely upon the State’s evidence to establish an affirmative defense. However, our review of the record does nоt reveal any evidence of entrapment, and Buckner has not cited to any evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not err in precluding the jury from considering an entrapment defense. Cf.
Lawson v. State,
4. Buckner asserts the trial court erred in failing to give his requested charges regarding justification as a defense and affirmative defenses. The record does not contain evidence of justification or any affirmative defense; therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to give the requested charges. See id.
5. Buckner contends the trial court erred by allowing the evidence tags on the packages of cocaine to be admitted into evidence. Agent Collins with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation testified that on the day hе purchased the cocaine he placed it in an evidence bag and labeled it with “the date, time of the buy, the property receipt number, the county where the evidence was obtained, the defendant, the reason it was obtained, and what I suspect the property to be.” At trial, Buckner asserted that the writings should not go to the jury because “it just shouldn’t testify further.” To the extent that this objection is based upon a “continuing witness” theory, we find it without merit.
“In Georgia the continuing witness objection is based on the notion that written testimony is heard by the jury when read from the witness stand just as oral testimony is heard when givеn from the witness stand. But, it is unfair and places undue emphasis on written testimony for the writing to go out with the jury to be read again during deliberations, while oral testimony is receivеd but once. This continuing witness objection usually concerns testimonial documentary evidence, such as an affidavit and depositions [or] interrogatories. However, the objection has also been applied to unsworn, written dying declarations and written confessions or statements of criminal defendants, on the grоunds that such statements are the equivalent of depositions.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Parks v. State,
In the present case, the information contained on the evidence tag was necessary to establish the chain of custody of the contraband. See
Morgan v. State,
To the extent that Buckner raises arguments on appeal which were not presented to the trial court, we find that such assertions are not properly before us. See Ellison, supra.
Judgment affirmed.