(After stating the case as above.) Upon these facts the only question presented for our determination is: Had the commissioners the power at their October session to act in the premises and induct the plaintiff into the office to which he has been elected ?
It is obvious that no final disposition was intended to be made of the case at the time of the adjournment,' when further time was allowed the plaintiff to comply with the requirements of the law. As he could not know in advance whether the sureties pffered and deemed by himself sufficient would be satisfactory to the commissioners, it was reasonable and proper, when they were rejected,, that he should have some opportunity offered him to find and offer others in their place. A single day would have answered his purpose, but as the session could not be protracted owing to the necessary absence afterwards of two ,of the commissioners, he was permitted to prepare and offer his bond at their next regular session in October. The proviso attached to the resolution intimates or implies a doubt as to their right thus to defer further action,buttlie power is nevertheless exercised, and at that time and no other can the plaintiff comply with this prerequisite condition of admission to office. There was on his part no such delay as can work a forfeiture of office, and nothing but an absolute want of power can be permitted to produce that result.
Let us examine and see what are the statutory provisions
*124
on the subject: It is the duty of one elected or appointed clerk to deliver to the commissioners a bond with sufficient sureties to be approved by them at their
first meeting
after the election or appointment. Bat. Rev., ch. 17, § 137. If he
fail
to give bond and qualify as directed, the presiding officer of the board must immediately inform the judge of the judicial district in which the county lies, who shall thereupon declare a vacancy and fill it, and his appointee shall also give bond and qualify as before directed. Ibid., § 140. In the argument it was properly conceded that but for the peremptory words used in the section last referred to, commanding
immediate information of the failure
to be conveyed to the judge, the statute must be construed as directory only, and the delay in giving effect to its provisions not allowed to invalidate the plaintiff’s title to his office and thus practically reverse the result of the election. It may be conceded that the statute contemplates an early and prompt admission to office, and that but for the postponing action of the commissioners the plaintiff would be restricted in giving his bond and taking the oath to the first session of the board. Had a reasonable time been given after the rejection of the first bond for his preparing and tendering another, the commissioners would have been justified in declaring the failure and finally determining the application. Then upon certifying the fact to the judge it would have become his duty to make an appointment to supply the vacancy. This, however, was not done, and though the judge was informed that no bond had been given, he was also informed that the matter was still pending and further time had been allowed the plaintiff to execute another and sufficient bond. It is to be observed that
immediate
notice must be given of.
the failure
of the person elected or appointed to give the bond, and this
failure
must be ascertained and declared by the commissioners before it can be given. That fact had not been finally ascertained.
*125
The application for admission was pending, still under consideration when the adjournment took place, and further action suspended and deferred; and until the matter before the commissioners was finally disposed of, the contingency had not arrived which calls into exercise the appointing power of the judge. It is unnecessary to cite authorities bearing upon the question of materiality of time in the performance of statutory duties. They are cited and the subject discussed in Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, 368,
et seq.,
to which, in the argument, our attention was called. We will refer to a single case in our own reports as illustrative of the
poin
t Grady v.
Commissioners of Lenoir,
It may be observed further that no inconvenience to the public can arise from the delay in inducting the plaintiff into office, because the incumbent under a constitutional *126 provision holds over until his successor is qualified, and there is no interval during which there is no officer to discharge the duties. Const., Art. IV, § 25. We therefore declare that the commissioners were not at their second meeting juncti officio, but were competent to take and ought to have passed upon the bond then tendered.
The plaintiff’s counsel asks for a peremptory mandamus commanding the defendants to receive the bond tendered and induct the plaintiff into office. To this form of the writ he is not entitled. Upon the comm ssioners alone devolves the obligation, and upon them rests the responsibility of deciding upon the sufficiency of the bond, under the penalty of incurring a personal liability as surety for taking a bond known or believed to be insufficient. We can compel them to proceed and act, but we cannot control or inter* fere with the honest exercise of their judgment and discretion. It is needless to cite authorities upon the point. They may be found in Moses on Mandamus, 28; High on Ex. Leg. Rem., §§284, 257; Tapping on Mandamus, 14.
But aside from this, in the case before us it is expressly agreed if in the opinion of the court the defendants have power to act in the premises, the judgment shall be that the defendants “proceed to consider the bond at once.” There is no error. This will be certified, to the end that the writ of mandamus issue as declared in the opinion of this court, and such further proceedings be had thereon as are agree* able to law.
No error. Affirmed.