This appeal arises out of a workers’ compensation claim for temporary total disability benefits. The claimant sustained a compensable accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The issue we must decide is whether the claimant is entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits as a result of the accidental injury he suffered while working for one employer, which rendered him unable to perform that job, but allowed him to continue to work at his second job. We shall hold that under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Maryland Code (1991 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.) Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article, 1 an employee cannot recover temporary total disability benefits when the employee maintains the non-injury employment while injured.
On February 3, 1994, Appellant, Clifford P. Buckler, sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Appellee, Willett Construction Company, when he fell and injured his left hand. At the time of the injury, Buckler was also employed as a night guard for E.L. Gardner, Inc. The injury rendered Buckler unable to perform his work for Willett Construction Company, but did not affect his ability to work for E.L. Gardner. 2
*353 Willett Construction paid Buckler’s medical bills and temporary total disability benefits from February 3, 1994, to March 17, 1994. Willett Construction discontinued the benefits when it discovered that Buckler had been continually employed as a night guard.
Buckler filed a claim for continued temporary total disability benefits with the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). The Commission held a hearing on September 26, 1994, on the issue of additional temporary total disability from March 18, 1994, and continuing. The employer alleged at the hearing that Buckler was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits from March 18, 1994 to the date that he reached maximum medical improvement because he was working at another job during this period of time. The Commission determined that Buckler’s average weekly wage was $339.00 and that he was entitled to temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $226.00 per week until March 17, 1994. The Commission denied his request for temporary total disability benefits beyond March 17,1994.
Buckler filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The circuit court granted Willett Construction’s Motion to Dismiss and affirmed the order of the Commission. The court held that Buckler was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits because he continued to work at E.L. Gardner and, therefore, he was not totally disabled. The circuit court remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. Buckler appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari on our own motion prior to consideration by that court.
Buckler contends that the trial court erred by granting Willett Construction’s Motion to Dismiss. He asserts that he is entitled to temporary total disability benefits to compensate him for his “loss of earning capacity” that resulted from the *354 injury. Buckler takes the position that prior to the injury his earning capacity was the combination of his salary at Willett Construction Company and at E.L. Gardner. Consequently, his inability to work at Willett Construction while injured decreased his earning capacity notwithstanding his continued employment with E.L. Gardner.
Willett Construction maintains that the trial court correctly dismissed Buckler’s claim. Because Buckler continued to work at E.L. Gardner while he was injured, he was not “totally disabled,” and, therefore, he was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits.
The Act recognizes four categories of disability: (1) temporary partial disability, § 9-614; (2) temporary total disability, § 9-618; (3) permanent partial disability, § 9-625; and (4) permanent total disability, § 9-635. The Act does not define the categories of disability, but rather sets out the formula for computing benefits in each category. The cornerstone of the benefits calculation is “average weekly wage.” The statute directs that average weekly wage consists of the full-time wages of the employee 3 as of the time of the injury. § 9-602(a). To calculate benefits for temporary total disability, the benefits Buckler seeks in this case, the Act provides, in pertinent part:
[I]f a covered employee is temporarily totally disabled due to’ an accidental personal injury or an occupational disease, the employer or its insurer shall pay the covered employee compensation that equals two-thirds of the average weekly wage of the covered employee....
§ 9-621(a). The Act calculates benefits differently for temporary partial disability.
[I]f the wage earning capacity of a covered employee is less while temporarily partially disabled, the employer or its insurer shall pay the covered employee compensation that equals 50% of the difference between:
*355 (i) the average weekly wage of the covered employee; and
(ii) the wage earning capacity of the covered employee in the same or other employment while temporarily partially disabled.
§ 9-615(a).
The statute does not define the terms “temporary total disability” and “temporary partial disability.” We are able to gain insight into the Legislature’s meaning, however, by construing the temporary total disability section, § 9-621, in the context of the temporary partial disability section, § 9-615.
See Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dept.,
At issue in this case is whether Buckler is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. In the absence of a statutory definition of total disability, it is useful to review how this Court has interpreted that term in the past. This Court has defined the period of temporary total disability as the “healing period, or the time during which the workman is wholly disabled and unable by reason of his injury to work.”
Gorman v. Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co.,
This Court considered the meaning of “total disability” under the terms of Article 101 of the Maryland Code, the precursor to Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article,
5
in
*357
Congoleum Nairn v. Brown,
If it should be, then ability which was merely reduced by the accident might be taken as totally lost, and a workman who still possessed a high degree of capacity might be entitled to compensation for total disability because no longer capable of performing the kind or grade of work he was previously capable of performing. Or, in this particular case, the claimant, although he may have been considered by the jury as able to perform the duties of some occupations as testified, was, under the instruction, to be compensated as totally disabled if the work for which he was previously qualified was of a higher grade or materially different in other respects. In the opinion of this Court that was not the purpose of the compensation statute.
*358
Id.
at 288,
This Court has more recently addressed the meaning of total disability in
Victor v. Proctor & Gamble,
In
Bowen,
this Court applied the reasoning of
Victor
to uphold an award of temporary total disability benefits to a claimant who became incarcerated after he was injured. The Court rejected the employer’s contention that it was not obligated to pay disability benefits because it was the employee’s incarceration, not his disability, that rendered him unable to work.
Bowen,
Victor
and
Bowen
reiterate and apply this Court’s longstanding interpretation of the term “total disability.” Total disability is synonymous with the inability to work. The ability to work at a job for which a reasonably stable market
*359
exists precludes any finding of total disability under the Act.
6
Cf. Captain v. Sonnier Timber Co.,
We hold that Buckler is ineligible for temporary total disability benefits because he was able to work while recovering from the injuries sustained at Willett Construction. During the time he was unable to work at Willett Construction due to the injury to his hand, he continued to do work for which a reasonable market exists,
Babcock & Wilcox, Inc. v. Steiner,
Buckler contends that depriving him of temporary total disability benefits under these circumstances renders the compensation system unfair because, in calculating his average weekly wage, only the wages from the job at which he was injured are considered.
Crowner v. Baltimore Butchers Ass’n,
This argument ignores the different functions of average weekly wage and temporary total disability determinations. Average weekly wage determines the amount an employer or its insurer must pay. In
Croumer,
this Court held that when determining the average weekly wage of a claimant with two jobs concurrently, only the wages at the injury-causing job shall be considered.
7
The Court reasoned that it would be unfair to impose additional financial obligations on the employer by calculating benefits based on a higher average weekly wage than the employee received.
See id.
at 613,
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
. The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act is codified at Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Code. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references hereinafter are to the Act. Md.Code (1991 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.) Labor and Employment Article.
. The parties dispute the exact number of hours Buckler worked at E.L. Gardner, Inc. Willett Construction contends that Appellant increased his hours from approximately 30 hours per week prior to the injury to *353 approximately 40 hours a week after the injury. Appellant, however, maintains that he worked only 30 hours a week after the injury. We have not been provided with the employment records from E.L. Gardner, Inc.
. The Act uses the term "covered employee." Section 9-202 sets out the criteria to determine which employees are "covered" by the Act.
. Whether Buckler is entitled to benefits for a temporary partial disability is not before this Court. He did not raise the issue before the circuit court nor the Workers' Compensation Commission. We intimate no *356 view on whether Buckler is entitled to temporary partial disability benefits.
. In 1991. Article 101 was recodified as Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article. See 1991 Maryland Laws ch. 8, at 248-50, ch. 21, at 1118-19. Section 9-621, which contains the formula for computing temporaty total disability benefits, derives from Article 101, § 36(2), which provided, inter alia, that "[i]n the case of temporary total disability, sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the average weekly *357 wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance thereof.” Section 9-621 is nearly identical to the former § 36(2).
. In those jurisdictions with comparable statutory language, our sister states have interpreted total disability similarly.
See Bailey v. Litwin Corp.,
. Several states have addressed the relationship between concurrent employment and average weekly wage by statute. See, e.g., Conn.Gen. Stat. § 31-310(a) (1994); MassAnn.Laws ch. 152, § 1(1) (1996); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 281-A:15(III) (1996); N.Y.WorkComp.Law § 14(6) (Consol. 1996); R.I.Gen.Laws § 28-33-20(a)(1) (1996); Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, § 650(a) (1996).