OPINION
Appellant Justin Lamont Buckingham appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Because we conclude that Buckingham’s claims are procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla,
I.
Our opinion in Buckingham’s direct appeal discusses more fully the facts underlying Buckingham’s convictions on various counts of murder. See State v. Buckingham,
On February 11, 2007, Buckingham and an acquaintance, Larry Hatcher, threatened the victim, Ricardo Walker, during an argument outside of Gabby’s Bar in northeast Minneapolis. Id. at 66-67. After the argument, Walker left in a minivan with two other people. Id. at 67. When Walker stopped at an intersection, Hatch-er and Buckingham pulled up alongside Walker’s minivan in a white SUV. Id. Someone inside the SUV fired five or six shots at the minivan, striking Walker in the head with one of the shots. Id. When police officers later rendered emergency assistance, Walker made a dying declaration that connected Hatcher and Buckingham to the shooting. Id. at 67-68.
On direct appeal, Buckingham argued: (1) his statements to police should have been suppressed because they were taken in violation of State v. Scales,
Buckingham subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that the district court admitted his statements to police in violation of his constitutional rights, his court-ordered psychological evaluation was incomplete, the district court gave the jury an erroneous accomplice liability instruction, and his trial counsel was ineffective. The postconviction court denied Buckingham’s petition for relief without a hearing, rejecting Buckingham’s claims on the merits and further holding that most of Buckingham’s claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla,
II.
We review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State,
The Knaffla rule provides that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred. White v. State,
Buckingham’s first claim for postconviction relief is that the district court improperly admitted testimony at trial regarding statements Buckingham made to police because: (1) his statements were not recorded as required by Scales; (2) the police knew he was represented by counsel, but nonetheless interrogated him in violation of the Sixth Amendment; (3) his statements were involuntary due to the absence of counsel; (4) investigators violated Buckingham’s Miranda rights by continuing to interrogate him after he invoked his right to counsel. The postcon-viction court held that “[Buckingham]’s argument[s] relating to his custodial interview are procedurally barred.” We agree.
Buckingham’s first two allegations of error are undoubtedly Knaffla-b&rred because we expressly considered and rejected identical arguments in Buckingham’s direct appeal. Buckingham,
Buckingham’s argument asserting a violation of his Miranda rights is also Knaff-ia-barred because it is premised upon the custodial nature of his interrogation and his purported invocation of his right to counsel, both of which are facts that were known or should have been known to him at the time of his direct appeal. Indeed, Buckingham’s Miranda argument bears a close relationship to the claim he asserted on direct appeal — that the police interrogated him in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Accordingly, Buckingham’s claims about the admission of testimony regarding his statements to police are Knaffla-barred.
B.
Buckingham’s second claim for postconviction relief alleges that the district court relied on an incomplete psychological evaluation in determining whether Buckingham was competent to stand trial. However, the district court ordered that Hennepin County Psychological Services complete Buckingham’s psychological evaluation in question by February 2008 — long before Buckingham’s direct appeal. Furthermore, Buckingham does not allege the existence of any facts outside the trial record that would require an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, Buckingham’s claim for postconviction relief on this basis is Knaffla-barred because Buckingham knew or should have known about any defects in the psychological evaluation at the time of his direct appeal.
C.
Buckingham’s third claim for post-conviction relief is that the district court erred in its instruction to the jury on accomplice liability. Buckingham contends that the instruction created a presumption that he intended to aid another in the commission of the crimes for which he was convicted, relieving the State of its burden to establish every element of each crime
D.
Buckingham’s fourth claim for postconviction relief is that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because: (1) counsel relied on state rather than federal law in arguing Buckingham’s custodial statements to police were inadmissible; (2) counsel was not present during Buckingham’s interrogation with police; and (3) due to counsel’s absence at the interview, Buckingham was not informed that unrecorded statements to police could be used against him at trial. The postconviction court summarily dismissed Buckingham’s arguments, finding that Buckingham could not “now claim ineffective assistance of counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel at the interview.”
Unlike claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are barred under Knajfla on postconviction review if “the claim is based solely on the trial record and the claim was known or should have been known on direct appeal.” Reed,
Here, however, Buckingham bases his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel entirely on the trial record available to the postconviction court. Buckingham has not alleged facts in his postconviction petition that would require an evidentiary hearing to supplement the trial record. Because the trial record provides the basis for his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, Buckingham either knew or should have known about this claim at the time of his direct appeal. Accordingly, Buckingham’s fourth claim for postconviction relief is also barred by Knajfla.
III.
Finally, Buckingham asserts that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it denied his request for an eviden-tiary hearing on his claims for postconviction relief. See Dobbins v. State,
In this case, Buckingham’s petition for postconviction relief did not allege any disputed facts that required an evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, Buckingham’s petition, files, and the record before the post-conviction court conclusively show that Buckingham is not entitled to relief because his claims are KnajfLa-baxred. Accordingly, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Buck
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it held that Buckingham’s claims are barred under the rule of State v. Knaffla,
Affirmed.
Notes
. To the extent we decided these claims on direct appeal, the postconviction relief statute provides an independent basis for their rejection. See Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2010) ("The court ... may summarily deny a petition when the issues raised in it have previously been decided by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in the same case.”).