9 Md. 324 | Md. | 1856
delivered the opinion of this court.
Nimrod Buckingham, the plaintiff below, on the 3rd day of December 1849, instituted in Carroll county court an action of trespass q. c. f., against the defendant, now appellee. The
The only question involved in the case grows out of the interpretation which the 22nd section of the 4th article of the constitution ought to receive. It provides that:
“No judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested, or where either of the parties may be connected with him by affinity, or consanguinity, within such degrees as may be prescribed by law, or where he shall have been of counsel in the case; and whenever any of the judges of the circuit courts, or of the courts of Baltimore city, shall be thus disqualified, or whenever, by reason of sickness, or any other cause, the said judges, or any of them, may be unable to sit in any cause, the parties may, by consent, appoint a proper person to try the said cause, or the judges, or any of them, shall do so when directed by law.”
It will be observed, that the first part of the section forbids a judge included in the specified category from sitting in úin case, whilst the latter part only provides for the appointment of another judge “to try the said cause.” These expressions, to be found in the same section, are not of the same signification, one being much more comprehensive in its interdiction than the other. To reconcile the whole section with all its parts, the two members of it to which we refer must be construed together.
In interpreting the constitution the first thing to be got at is, what was the purpose of its framers? Where this has not been clearly expressed, we must look to the necessity and nature of the thing provided for, or against, as the case may be. With this guide we can experience but slight, if any difficulty, in ascertaining the meaning of the language used in the section quoted.
Its primary, indeed its sole object, was to secure the impartial administration of justice, and, hence, it was held, that one who had been of counsel for either of the parties might be prejudiced in favor of his former client, and therefore, and for that reason, not above suspicion.
Judgment affirmed.