115 Ga. App. 534 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1967
Even assuming the existence of a binding loan commitment to the plaintiff on the part of the appellee, the amended petition, properly construed, shows that the alleged cancellation of such commitment was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged damages.
“When considered on general demurrer ... a petition must be construed most strongly against the pleader; in apply
Under Georgia law, the grantee-seller under power of sale in a security deed has a duty to sell the property at its fair market value. Langley v. Stone, 112 Ga. App. 237, 239 (2) (144 SE2d 627). In the absence of any allegation that the security deed under which the plaintiff’s property was sold contained a provision relieving the grantee-bank of this duty, it must be assumed that the duty was incumbent on it. Tire allegations that the fair market value of the property at the time of its sale was $2,415,000, that the total amount of outstanding loans thereon was $1,300,000 and that the plaintiff’s equity therein was $815,000, for which it sues, can be construed to mean only that the property was sold for at least $815,000 less than the alleged fair market value. So construed, the petition fails to state a cause of action against the appellee, since it shows that the proximate cause of the alleged loss of the plaintiff’s equity was the grantee-bank’s failure to conduct its foreclosure proceedings in accordance with the duty required of it under the law hereinabove stated, rather than any act or omission of the appelleedefendant.
Accordingly, the court did not err in its judgment sustaining the renewed general demurrer to the petition as amended.
Judgment affirmed.