It is contended by the appellant that since the tort on which this action is based was committed in Illinois, and that since, by the law of Illinois, the marriage
It is not seriously in dispute thаt the law governing the creation and extent of tort liability is that of the place where the tort was committed. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 188; Bain v. Northern Pac. R. Co.
“The fundamental principle upon which the line of cases just referred to rests is the principle that any sovereign state may regulate the conduct of its own residents within its limits; that marriage is a status, and that the parties to that status, so far as their ability to сontract is concerned, are subject to the regulations and disabilities imposed upon them by the laws of the state of their domicilе.”
In Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 275, it is stated:
“In cases where the question concerns other property interests than ‘immovables,’ generally equivalent to interests*251 in land, there must bе considered separately the interests which spouses acquire in each other’s movable property owned at the time of the marriage, and that subsequently acquired. The rule here is that upon marriage each spouse gets such interest in the movable prоperty then owned by the other as the law of the matrimonial domicile provides, no matter where the property is located аt the time. The place where the marriage occurs is not material.”
It is also clear that the law of the forum governs all matters rеlating to the remedy, the conduct of the trial, and the rules of evidence. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co.
Plaintiff was unmarried at the time of the accident upon which this аction is based. At the time of the accident she acquired a cause of action against the defendant, and was entitled, if she could properly serve him, to prosecute her action in Wisconsin. Pending the trial of the action she married the defendant. According tо the law of Illinois, if it is to govern, the cause of action is extinguished for the reason that the husband and his wife are at law but one person. In Hoker v. Boggs,
“Blаckstone says: ‘By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection, and cover shе performs everything, and is therefore called in our law French, a feme covert.’ Hence, the man can make no grant directly to his wife; can entеr into no contract or covenant with her — for such acts presuppose her separate existence. As they are one person, the man cannot be placed in the absurd position of covenanting with himself.”
To the same effect are the holdings in Merrill v. Marshall,
It is plaintiff’s contention that the extinguishment of her cause of action in this case could only occur as a result of her loss of legal identity through marriage. From this it is contended that since, under the Wisconsin law, she did not lose her legal identity by marriage, and since the law of Wisconsin governs with respect to the legal consеquences of marriage in this respect, the cause of action was- not extinguished. This position involves the further contention that there is a valid distinction between the situation presented here and that presented by a statute or rule of law-in the state where the tort was committed, specifically and intentionally directed to the extinguishment of causes of action. We have concluded that plаintiff’s contention is not sound. If, as seems clear, the law of Illinois is to govern, both as to the creation and extent of defendant’s liability, and if the liability so created is subject to discharge or modification by the law of Illinois, we see no escape from the conclusion that plaintiff’s cause of action has been wholly extinguished by her marriage.
The rule that the law of the situs governs with respect to rights in immovables is grounded upon the principle that the sovereign who controls the thing must generally have jurisdiction over the right. 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, p. 179. In our judgment the same reasoning applies to the situation presented here, and requires the conclusion that the effect of plaintiff’s marriage upon her cause of action is to be determined by principles of conflict of laws applicable to interеsts in real property, rather than by those applicable to
In Slater v. Mexican National R. Co.
“It seems to us unjust to allow a plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the défendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that .law would impose.”
This case does not present, as did Phillips v. Eyre, supra, the situation of a law enacted subsequent to the tort by the state in which the tort was committed, and operating to discharge or extinguish the liability. Hence it would seem not to present any of the questions of constitutional law which might be present were we confronted by such a situation.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment must be reversed.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.