Buсk WILCOXON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 5156.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Feb. 20, 1956.
Rehearing Denied March 8, 1956.
Writ of Certiorari Denied May 21, 1956. See 76 S.Ct. 834.
Murrah, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Paul F. Larrazolo, U. S. Atty., Albuquerque, N. M. (Melvin L. Robins, Asst. U. S. Atty., Albuquerque, N. M., was with them on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRATTON, Chief Judge, and HUXMAN and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Chief Judge.
The indictment in this case containing two counts laid charges under
The judgment is challenged for want of substantial evidence to sustain the conviction. The evidence presented sharp conflicts. But in the trial of the conventional criminal case it is the province and function of the jury to observe the witnesses, to appraise their credibility, to weigh their testimony, to drаw reasonable inferences from established facts, to resolve conflicts, and to determine the ultimate question whether the guilt of the accused has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. And on appeal from a conviction, the scope of review is limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. Carlson v. United States, 10 Cir., 187 F.2d 366, certiorari denied 341 U.S. 940, 71 S.Ct. 1000, 95 L.Ed. 1367; Kelling v. United States, 10 Cir., 193 F.2d 299; Lunsford v. United States, 10 Cir., 200 F.2d 237. Viewed in the light of that frequently reiterated general rule, we think it is clear that the evidence adequately sustains the conviction.
The judgment is сhallenged on the further ground that the court erred in requiring appellant to disclose the substance of certain confidential communications between himself and his attorney. During his cross examination, appellant was asked whether in the coursе of the preliminary hearing upon the charges later embodied in the indictment in this case, he directed his attorney to propound certain questions to a witness for the Government. Appellant admitted that he directed his attorney
Error is predicated upon asserted improper limitation of the cross examination of a certain witness for the Government. Cross examination is a right, not a mere privilege granted or withheld at the will of the court. But the extent of cross examination of a witness in respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry rests largely in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. The disсretion is to be exercised with due regard for the particular facts and circumstances. And the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was clearly abused. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Rose v. United States, 10 Cir., 128 F.2d 622, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 651, 63 S.Ct. 47, 87 L.Ed. 524; Dickson v. United States, 10 Cir., 182 F.2d 131. Without recapitulating the proceedings which give rise to the contention, it suffices to say that a painstaking examination of the record convinces us that no abuse of discretion occurred in connection with the cross examination of the witness and therefore thе contention is without sustainable basis.
The remaining contention for consideration is that the action of the court in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground that two witnesses for the Government testified without the oath having been interpreted to them in Spanish cоnstituted reversible error. The contention is argued on the assumed premise that the situation was tantamount in law to the witnesses giving testimony without the oath being administered to them in any form; and, without so deciding, the contention may be considered in that manner. Prior tо the introduction of any evidence, the witnesses for the Government and those for appellant were called. Upon being called, they came forward and the clerk administered the oath to them all together. Inocente Ortiz and Herminio Pоrras were among those to whom the oath was administered in that manner. The oath was not interpreted into the Spanish language.
It is to be observed that the motion for new trial for failure to interpret into Spanish the oath to the two witnesses was not predicated upon knowledge obtained after completion of the trial. Appellant knew the two witnesses prior to the time the oath was administered to them. He and his attorneys knew that the witnesses did not speak English sufficiently to carry on a conversation or testify in that language. He and his attorneys were presеnt when the oath was administered to the witnesses. The failure to interpret the oath into Spanish to the two witnesses in question occurred in the presence of appellant and his attorneys. But the attention of the court was not called to it. Neither was the attention of the court directed to the omission by objection or otherwise at the time the two witnesses were placed on the stand and gave their evidence. Appellant and his attorneys remained silent in respect to it. And the witnessеs were subjected to extended cross examination covering a wide range. But it is argued that after completion of the trial, one of the attorneys realized for the first time that the oath was not interpreted to such witnesses. In other words, it is said in substance that due to an awakened mental realization the attorney realized for the first time after completion of the trial that the oath had not been interpreted to the two witnesses. Being present, it was the duty of appellant and his attornеys to take notice of the several steps in the proceeding. People v. Krotz, 341 Ill. 214, 172 N.E. 135; Smith v. State, 81 Ga. 479, 8 S.E. 187. And that duty included notice of the manner in which the oath was administered to the witnesses. Appellant and his attorneys could not stand by quiescently and urge later that after completion of the trial they realized for the first time that the witnesses testified without the oath having been interpreted to them. Appellant waited too long to complain that the oath was not interpreted to such witnesses. By failing to bring the matter to the attention of the trial court in some manner until after completion of the trial, he effectively waived the right to seek a new trial on that ground. Beausoliel v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 111, 107 F.2d 292; State v. Hope, 100 Mo. 347, 13 S.W. 490, 8 L.R.A. 608; Goldsmith v. State, 32 Tex.Cr.R. 112, 22 S.W. 405; Moore v. State, 96 Tenn. 209, 33 S.W. 1046; Barnes v. State, 61 Tex.Cr.R. 37, 133 S.W. 887; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad Co. v. Hairston, 125 Ark. 314, 188 S.W. 838; Messer v. State, 57 Okl.Cr. 38, 47 P.2d 218; Murphy Mortgage Co. v. Epp, 99 Kan. 706, 162 P. 1170; In re Da Roza‘s Estate, 82 Cal.App.2d 550, 186 P.2d 725; State v. Doud, 190 Or. 218, 225 P.2d 400; State v. Whiting, 173 Kan. 711, 252 P 2d 884; Brenton State Bank v. Heckmann, 233 Iowa 682, 7 N.W.2d 813; Pooley v. State, 116 Ind.App. 199, 62 N.E.2d 484;
The judgment is affirmed.
MURRAH, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
As this case comes to us, the defendant stands сonvicted and condemned on the testimony of two witnesses testifying through an interpreter after having taken an oath, the obligation of which they did not comprehend because they did not understand the language in which it was administered.
No one would gainsay the fundamental right of an accused to be convicted only on the oath or affirmation of his accusers. And, “In order that the ceremony of swearing the witness may be effective at all, it is certainly necessary that he understand something of the meaning оf it. If he has no such understanding whatever, the form is idle; under such circumstances the witness is not sworn at all in any reasonable sense, or in contemplation of law. If he merely holds up his hand and nods his head in response to the formula propounded him, not understanding that in doing so he has assumed any additional obligation to tell the truth, or risk of punishment should he fail to do so, he has no more bound himself than if he were of unsound mind. The assent he yields, to be effective, must be an intelligent assent, and it cannot be intelligent if he has no idеa of the meaning of what he is doing.” Lee v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 67 Kan. 402, 73 P. 110, 112, 63 L.R.A. 271.
It is assumed for the purposes of this case that an oath without understanding is no oath at all, but the conviction is affirmed on the ground of waiver for failure to timely object or bring the matter to the аttention of the court. The cited authorities support this view but they take no account of the salutary rule of federal criminal procedure to the effect that plain errors or defects in the trial of a case affecting substantial rights of the defendant, are noticeable although they are not brought to the attention of the court.
To be sure, the right or privilege, like any other right, may be intelligently waived, but I do not believe that it was deliberately and intelligently waived in this case. These witnesses were sworn en masse with other witnesses, and admittedly, it did not occur to the court or counsel that they had not been sworn until the third day after the trial of the case. If, through inadvertence or mistake, the witnesses were permitted to testify without an understanding of the sanctity of their oath, it is never too late to correct the error and I should not hesitate to so order it.
This indecorous situation demonstrates the propriety of having the oath administered to each witness after he has taken his place in the witness box. If the oath is to be more than an empty gesture; if it is a pledgе to tell the truth with the help of God under penalty of vengeance of the law of God and man, it ought to be done at a time and place and in a manner which befits the sanctity and solemnity of the ceremony. It ought certainly to be done in a manner to bring home to the witness the solemn obligation it imposes. It obviously was not done in this case and I would reverse for a new trial.