JOHN BUCHER ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS, v. POWELL COUNTY ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. ROBERT JOHNSON, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. ROSEBUD COUNTY ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
Nos. 14150, 14130
Supreme Court of Montana
Submitted Oct. 12, 1978. Decided Jan. 19, 1979.
589 P.2d 660
MR. JUSTICE SHEA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State Department of Revenue appeals from a judgment of the Powell County District Court declaring the sprinkler systems of the rancher-taxpayеrs were exempt from personal property taxes by virtue of
A summary of the proceedings in District Court follows.
Plaintiff-taxpayers are farmers or ranchers living in Powell, Madison or Deer Lodge cоunties. A controversy arose between these taxpayers and the county assessors and the State Department of Revenue, with regard to the taxability of an individual‘s ranch irrigation system. The county assessors had not adopted a uniform taxing policy; some assessors were taxing individual farm sprinkler systems, some were not.
In 1975, pеrsonal property taxes were assessed against the sprinkler systems utilized by plaintiffs in their farm and ranch operations. All of the plaintiffs, with the exception of three, paid their 1975 property taxes under protest and then instituted this action in District Court to recover the taxes paid. The three taxpayers who did not pay thеir taxes under protest, as required by
Plaintiffs named the assessors of Powell, Deer Lodge and Madison counties and the Department of Revenue, as defendants. All рarties stipulated that the actions could be consolidated and tried in Powell County and that counsel for the Department of Revenue would assume the defense for all named defendants.
At the conclusion of pretrial discovery, and after submission of
The statute under which the exemptions were granted provides as follows:
“Irrigation and drainage facilities taxable. All irrigation and drainage facilities including bonds, rights of way, ditches, flumes, pipelines, dams, water rights, reservoirs and other property of like character shall be taxed as like facilities of the federal and state government; in cases where property taxes apply, and where an increase in land value results, such facilities shall be taxed as such land is improved, and such land shall be classified for tax purposes as the tax classification law provides.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 84-206 .
In arguing for oppositе results, both parties rely on the traditional method of interpreting statutes. Each argues that the statute is clear on its face and needs no interpretation. In thе same breath however, each party sets forth the rules of construction that favor their respective positions in the event this Court finds the statute to be ambiguоus. We cannot determine from the face of the statute that it grants an exemption such as was allowed in this case. It is undoubtedly ambiguous.
We determine, however, that at the time
“The property of the United States, the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal сorporations and public libraries shall be exempt from taxation; and such other property as may be used exclusively for the agricultural and horticultural societies, for educational purposes, places for actual religious worship, hospitals and places of burial not used or held for private оr corporate profit, institutions of purely public charity and evidences of debt secured by mortgages of record upon real or personal property in the state of Montana, may be exempt from taxation.” (Emphasis added.)
In Cruse v. Fischl (1918), 55 Mont. 258, 263, 175 P. 878, 880, we construed this provision to mean that property not mentioned in
“While the lаnguage is permissive in form, it is prohibitory in effect. The Legislature may extend the exemption to the property enumerated, but it cannot go further or include any other.”
It is clear the taxpayers property could not be exempt under either the mandatory exemption clause or the permissive exemption clause of
It is true that the constitutionality of
Under the new constitution,
Under thesе provisions it could be argued, of course, that subsequent events after the passage of
As stated in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 45, page 141:
“... an act of a legislature not authorized by the constitution at the time of its passage is absolutely void, and, if not reenacted, is not validated by a subsequent amendment to the constitution or by the adoption of a new constitution which merely permits the passage of such an act; . . .”
This Court followed this rule in State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court, supra, wherein we held that the new constitution did not validаte an amendment to a gambling statute which had been previously declared unconstitutional under the old constitution. See also; Fellows v. Shultz (1970), 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141, 146; Matthews v. Quinton (Alaska 1961), 362 P.2d 932; Banaz v. Smith (1901), 133 Cal. 102, 65 P. 309, 310.
Here the Legislature did not reenact
The judgment of the District Court is, accordingly, reversed. The court is instructed to enter an order disallowing the claimed exemptions, and to take any necessary further action in a manner consistent with this opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HASWELL and JUSTICES DALY and SHEEHY concur.
MR. JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
I dissent. We here decide a case on a basis not raised on the appeal. The trial court should have had the benefit of the authority developed by this opinion, and in my opinion the cause should have been remanded to the trial court for further hearings.