*1
Co
Boiler
Simmons
BOILER &
BUCHAUv SIMMONS
MACHINE CO
op
the Court
Compensation
Statutes—Controlling
1. Workmen’s
—
Law —Per-
Disability
Injury.
of
manent
—Arm—Date
compensation
rights
parties in
of
workmen’s
are
cases
nor-
mally
injury;
the law in effect at
determined
the date of the
however,
Chrysler Corp,
Clark v
M. S. Compensation Injury 7. Workmen’s —Second Fund —Arm. Plaintiff should be awarded workmen’s from the v Simmons Boiler Co injured Ipjury arm where his Second Fund in 1930 industrially useful until 1961 but it remained and in 1955 his permanently industrially rendered left arm was useless. Compensation Disability Leg—Arm—
8. Workmen’s
—Permanent
—
Injuries
Single
—
Accident.
—Successive
Any disability regarded
as total
under a section
Act,
Compensation
provided "[tjotal
permanent disability, compensation
for which is
* * *
[pjermanent
section
means
loss
industrial
legs
arm;
use of both
or both hands
both arms or 1
and 1
purpose
permanency
for the
of this subsection
to be
days
expiration
than
determined not less
before the
injury”,
weeks from the date of
must result from one
injuries;
applied
and not
that section
successive
should
to a
(MCLA
disability resulting
single
from a
work-related accident
412.10[b][7j).
9. Workmen’s
provided
industrial use of both
section
*3
Disability
and 1
ency
412.10[cj).
of successive
tion of500
"[tjotal
Legislature,
arm;
be
of
in section means
—
determined not less than 30
the Workmen’s
weeks
for the
Leg—Arm.
permanent disability, compensation
injuries,
by
speciñcally providing
from
9,
purpose
indicated that such are not covered
legs
—Successive
the date of
or
Compensation
of this subsection
* *
[*]
both
[pjermanent
hands
injury”
Injuries
payment
days
or
Act which
(MCLA
both arms or
before the
—Permanent
for the results
such
for which is
412.10[b]
total loss
provided
perman-
expira-
[7],
leg
a
Compensation
Disability
10. Workmen’s
—Permanent
—Arm—Foot
—Leg—Eye—Hand—Successive
Injuries.
Legislature clearly
intended a section of the Workmen’s
Act,
Compensation
provided
ijf
employee
which
an
has
permanent
injury
at
disability
the time of
in the form of the
leg
eye
a
loss of hand or arm or foot or
at
or
the time of
injury
permanent disability
incurs further
in the form of
leg
the loss of a
or
eye,
hand
arm or foot or
or
he shall be
totally
permanently
deemed to be
disabled and
be
shall
paid,
provided
section, compensation
from the funds
in this
permanent disability
subtracting
total and
after
the amount of
compensation
employee
received
such losses”
"[tjhe payment
compensation
and that
under this section
Charfoos & P. (Vincent McAuliffe, E. Miley counsel), John F. Simmons Boiler & Machine Com- for defendants Liability Company. Mutual Employers pany General, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney Robert A. General, Derengoski, Solicitor and A. C. Stoddard Zielesch, and Eileen D. Assistants Attorney Gen- eral, for defendant Second Injury Fund. Kavanagh,
T. M.
C. J. This case is on appeal by
granted
leave
from a decision of the Workmen’s
Board,
Compensation Appeal
after denial of leave
appeal
to
the Court of
Appeals. Leave was
(1969).
granted
originally
in
which is "(7) Permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs arm; or arms or 1 1 both hands (7) purpose permanency the be determined not less tion of 500 weeks from the date of of this subsection such to days than 30 expira- before the
injury.” below, ruling
In
on this case
the Workmen’s
Compensation Appeal
correctly
Board
interpreted
9a, supra, when it stated:
"It
requirements
will be noted that two basic
must be
liability
imposed upon
met before
Injury
the Second
1)
i.e.,
quoted proviso,
Fund
must
the above
the
permanent
meet the definition of
and total disabil
2)
ity as such term is defined in either Sec. 8a or 10b.
employee
must show that on or after June
1955, he
payments
is entitled to receive
of Workmen’s
per
under the Act in amounts
week of
less than was then
in the Act for
disability.
and total
In
the instant case
weekly compensation
entitled to
result of
provided
employer
from his
as a
the 1955
in amounts less than was then
for total and
disability.
rights
His
to such
flowed from the fact that he had
suffered the loss of use of the left arm and continued to
disabled. It can therefore be said
hqs
that he
requirements
met one of the
qualify
which would
him
for additional benefits from the
Second
Fund.
However, plaintiff must also show that his condition
meets
the definition of
as such
10b,
term is defined in either Sec. 8a or
Verb
erg2 supra. We noted above that the facts of this case
do not fall
specific
within the
requirements
2
Compensation Appeal
referring
to Ver
Board is
berg
Simplicity
Pattern
357 Mich
the Court to this referred found in and held as follows: " 'The second clause subsection added to section reads, purpose 1956 amendment "for the (of (7) permanency this subsection loss of indus- use) trial not 30 days be determined than before less expiration weeks of 500 from the date of injury.” language, applicable only That to subsection and not subsections, the other effectively to cation six appli- limits its injuries only future those *7 days which before the occurred within less than 500 weeks act, date effective thus precluding resurrection of ancient claims.’ days "30 less than 500 weeks before the effective date 195, 31, of Act PA was January 1947. The facts presented in the instant case do not fall within the 10b(7) interpretation placed upon above Supreme by Sec. the plaintiff Court. The by suffered at Ford many years prior Motor Co 31, occurred to January 1947, had not suffered the industrial loss prior of use of his arm to the effective date of Act 1956, prior 4, of #195 nor to the March 1955 injury of which was the cause the first loss which occurred.” Clark, supra, In the issue presented to this 10(b)(7) Court was whether or not was to have § effect any injuries on prior August 1, sustained to 1956, which prior to that not date did fall within the strict statutory definition of disability. total Mr. Buchau’s 1955 injury is one of many which, such claims at actual time of Boiler Co v Simmons Opinion op the Court the strict statutory not fall within
injury, does In disability. of definition who fell within the deciding parties that 10(b)(7) 1, of August as statutory definition § thereafter, 1956, or because of industrial any time 1, 1956, August to enti- suffered were date, benefits as of that permanent-total tled date, they on which met any subsequent re- section, of that this Court was then quirements the amount of asked to determine retroactivity section, we did. In so doing, that which it was for this Court to decide unnecessary what effect 10(b)(7) language was to have on claims § related upon injuries based work which occurred August 1956 as that issue after was not then before us. As all industrial suffered by the place prior claimant in this case took Compensation Act, amendment to the Workmen’s Court, issue is still not before this and this opinion apply should not be so construed as to post-1956 injuries. industrial disputed perma-
It is not that Mr. Buchau is as that nently disabled term is defined 10(b)(7). He has lost the industrial use of disputed arms. It is also not that as of June 1955, Mr. Buchau currently receiving total Simmons, employer, benefits from his injury, a result of his 1955 or that his employer Simmons did not him the maximum pay statutory weeks benefits. Compensation Ap-
As noted the Workmen’s Board, peal parties agreement are that Mr. Buchau satisfies one-half of the set forth tests *8 However, appellee would have us read the §9a. 10(b)(7) as follows: part the latter of § purpose permanency "for the of this subsection industrial than 30 be determined not less [of use] 392 Court of 500 weeks days expiration from the date before injury” the Workmen’s requiring, as as did one, Board, not but both Appeal that in cases of this fall within confines of our type holding. Clark determine,
This Court must now within the decision, confines of our Clark to what date or phrase "date of injury”, dates as 10(b)(7), refers. contained § 9a, language quoted supra, is very clear. § There is no doubt that which 9a refers § is the for which the workman is cur- rently receiving workmen’s after 25, 1955, although June the actual injury date was 25,1955. June Section states: "Total disability, hereof, which is in section 9 means:” 10(b)(7) Section then continues and uses the same words used "date of injury”. For § this Court to hold that 9 and 10 deal with § different "dates of injury” would strain the statu- tory It quite construction. evident from the language of the statutes that they refer to the same "date of This injury”. injury date is the one for which the injured workman is receiv- currently ing workmen’s compensation benefits.
In Whitt v Ford Motor supra, held Court for an injured workman to be entitled to workmen’s
and total disability, the "second injury” must arise out of during the course of his employment. parties in disagreement are in this case as to which is the true "second would like injury”. They the answer to this question to not be determined *9 Buchau v Simmons Boiler Co Coleman, Opinion by M. S. J. injury, upon the actual date of but the date
which the from that first made case, however, itself known. In this the answer to question is irrelevant. Both in this were case work related. The mandate of Whitt, supra, is satisfied. holding hereby provide
Our Clark modified to accident, the date of for which an receiving workman is or is entitled to receive workmen’s after June 1955, must have occurred either on or after Janu- ary 31, 1947. Mr. Buchau’s falls within span qualified this time permanent and he is otherwise
and total workmen’s paid by benefits. These benefits are to be Injury Second Fund. Compensation Appeal
The Workmen’s Board is reversed, and the case is remanded to that Board for'entry of an award not inconsistent with this opinion. JJ., Williams,
Swainson concurred with T. M. C. J. Kavanagh, (concurring).
M. Coleman, S. J. I would reverse Compensation Ap- the decision of the peal plaintiff compensation Board and award from (I Injury the Second this decision on not, Fund. however, do base provisions upon by relied majority.) Although agreement there is with the opinion result of the Justice, the Chief there is disagreement reasoning. as to
FACTS adequately opinion The facts are detailed in the Kavanagh. spe- Chief Justice T. M. However, I 392 Opinion M. S. portion Appeal cifically note this Board’s opinion citing certain Second Fund and "concessions of the holdings the Referee which were left
factual tested that uncon- only finding on now can be one review there *10 plaintiffs right arm is that is loss traceable out in the an arose of and course to employment which of his Ford Motor Co. in 1930. with Ford Motor provisions subject was Co. in effect in which 1930.” Statute were accept finding for purposes I such a this opinion only. 17.160(b) 412.10(b);
MCLA MSA Plaintiff under provi- seeks 17.159(a). 412.9(a); sions MCLA MSA applica- As provided ble that section that determinations disability were made accordance with definitions contained in MCLA 17.158(1) 412.8a; MSA 412.10(b); and MCLA MSA 17.160(b). provision
The latter part: reads in "Total disability, for which in section means: "(7) Permanent total loss of industrial use of both legs or arm; hands both arms or 1 for purpose of this subsection permanency be determined not less than 30 days expira- before the tion of 500 from the injury.” weeks date of present
Plaintiffs condition results from the effects of two separate injuries. right His arm was injured in it 1930 but remained industrially useful until 1961. plaintiffs In 1955 arm left and rendered permanently industrially useless. Boiler Co Simmons Opinion M. S. law, plaintiffs applicable
Under extended 500 weeks. At the 1955 filed an application he period end of that claiming he was permanently further plaintiffs The referee found that totally disabled. industrially April 15, arm useless on became attributed solely 1961. Such result was to the 1930 injury. colleague opinion my assumes that a depends upon matter the interpre-
decision in this 412.10(b)(7). I tation of MCLA do not believe that applicable. section is
It is my any disability regarded contention 10(b)(7) as total and under must re- § sult from one and not injuries. successive part upon Section which relies in the definition 10(b)(7) speaks of the worker’s "injury” 10(b)(7) "the date of Section injury”. speaks of "the date of injury”. 10(b)(7)
A review of cases demonstrates
that §
*11
should
applied
to a disability resulting from a
single work-related accident. See our recent deci-
Co,
sions in DeGeer v DeGeer
Equipment
Farm
(1974) (effects
96;
391 Mich
In Clark v Chrysler Corp, 140; 377 Mich 139 (1966), 714 plaintiff NW2d suffered an industrial resulting accident in the amputation of his left thumb, hand and the index and fingers middle right his hand. He received compensation for the specific loss of each hand. This Court that said 141 392 Mich 154 Opinion M. S.
subsequent specific losses, for the payments to the being perma- entitled plaintiff was nently disabled. Also see totally Goss v Top Co, 34 O'Michigan Rural Electric Mich App 454; (1971). 191 491 NW2d v plaintiff Muskegon
The
in Paulson
Heights
(1963)
Co,
312; 123
Tile
371 Mich
NW2d 715
was
injured in
automobile accident
an
which occurred
employment.
in the course of his
An ultimate
experienced
result was that
the worker
substantial
pain
up
internal
whenever he stood
or walked.
rejected
employer’s
The Court
argument
that
10(b)(7) required a direct
injury
legs
plaintiff’s
said
"disability
fairly
would seem
within
scope
statute”. Also see Lockwood v
Corp
Fund,
Continental Motors
Second
(1970).
597;
Mich App
27
183
807
NW2d
in Springer
Court
v
Foundry
Reed
& Ma
Co,
11;
chine
346 Mich
NW2d
noted
question
that no
plaintiff
raised "but
that
permanently
totally disabled due
an
sustained on December
1943”.
re
inhaling
gas.
sulted from
result,
coke
As a
he
became insane. Also see Edwards v Michigan Light
(1956).
Corp,
169;
346 Mich
Alloys
He injury to the previous from loss resulted This found This an order which affirmed Court eye. left Com- totally disabled. permanently the worker in Hilton v dissent my cases discussed pare Corp, Motors of General Division Oldsmobile 43; 210 NW2d 10(b)(7) is concerned indicate § These cases which results total and with incident. single a work-related from interpretation for support textual Further 412.10(c); MSA 10(b)(7) in MCLA found is of § 17.160(c) which reads: subject are all in this clause specified "The amounts minimum maximum and as to limitations
to the same of 1 member while of the loss In case above stated. of another being paid for the loss compensation is of the paid for the loss member, be compensation shall provided, pay- period herein member second payments for begin at the conclusion ments the first member.” 10(a) paid specifies amounts
Only § 10(c) provides limitations. Section prescribes is lost one member compensation when payment loss of for a being paid while provid- by specifically Legislature, a member. injuries, of successive for the ing payment results 10(b)(7). not covered that such are indicated 17.158(1) 412.8a; MSA MCLA rendered worker not mean that a This does successive disabled permanently 412.8a; MSA In MCLA remedy. is without 17.158(1) provided: Legislature the time of employee
"If has at an *13 392 Coleman, Opinion by S. J. M. of loss of a disability in the form the hand or arm or of leg eye at the time such injury foot or or and incurs permanent in disability the form of further the loss of a eye, or arm he shall hand or foot or be deemed to totally permanently paid, disabled and shall be be from the funds section, this permanent subtracting total and after for amount the n employee of received the payment both such losses. The of under begin this section at the shall conclusion of the pay- permanent disability. ments made for the second payment Such upon the depart- shall be made order the ment.” 10(c) language
This dovetails with the § payment for the total disability do begin not until "the conclusion of the payments made for the second disability.” The Appeal Board did not believe that the re- quirements of 8a were satisfied. Such a decision §
does not under the particular facts case coincide with spirit either the or intent of the law.
Mr. Buchau has been twice while in the course of employment. his One injury resulted in the loss of the right use his arm. The other resulted in the loss the use of his left arm. The sum of these results equals total and disability under I8a. believe that Legislature the § clearly intended that section to encompass cases plaintiff’s. such as It logically inconsistent deny him benefits because the arthritic condition resulting from the prior broken bone did com- not pletely disable the arm until 1961 and after the second injury. language broad used in 8a and subse-
quently the even broader language used in the 1969 Workmen’s Compensation Act specifi- cally in provisions Second Fund now appearing 17.237(521) 418.521; as MCLA MSA Simmons Boiler Co Opinion M.S. provision interpret light me to lead plaintiff. most favorable to intent towas for successive compensate workmen which permanently them leave disabled. To does not qualify hold that because the not permanently disabling first until promote inflexibility after the second would *14 legislative intent. deny 2.20 on
In of his treatise Workmen’s Compen- Law, says Larson sation social philosophy behind such laws providing, efficient, "is desirability in the most dignified, form, most and most certain financial and enlightened medical which an community obliged provide feel any
would to case some less form, satisfactory allocating the burden of these payments appropriate to the most source.” Awkerman, See 235; Whetro v 174 783 NW2d Doehler-Jarvis, Wilson v Divi- sion of National Lead 358 510; Mich 100 NW2d Ballou, 226 Crilly Mich NW2d 493
I believe Mr. Buchau is entitled to for his total disability under provisions of 8a and 9a. I would remand to §§ Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board for entry of the appropriate award. (3):
The 1969 act also provides in subsection person "Any who July has been receiving or is entitled to receive benefits from the pursuant second fund any prior provisions the workmen’s law shall continue receive be entitled to receive such benefits from such * * * fund .” Plaintiff was entitled to receive compensation S. M. Fund. Under the facts of from the Second solely be made from case, should payments fund. remand to Workmen’s Com- I would reverse of an not entry award Board pensation Appeal opinion. with this inconsistent Levin, Fitzgerald, Kavanagh, and J. W. G.T. case. JJ., not sit in this did
