Lead Opinion
OPINION
Petitioner George J. Buchanan (the claimant) appeals an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (the Board) dated March 29, 1990, which affirmed a referee’s decision denying the claimant’s request for unemployment compensation benefits.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The claimant was employed by Fracalossi Volkswagen as an assistant finance manager from February 10, 1989 until June 21, 1989, when his employment was terminated for reasons which did not disqualify him from the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits. Subsequently, the claimant, in late August of 1989, bought spools of gold chain to make necklaces and bracelets for sale at a weekly flea market. The referee’s decision indicates that the claimant had invested $2,038.00 in tools and supplies with the intent of making a profit.
The claimant filed an application for unemployment compensation benefits with the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation Benefits and Allowances (the Bureau) and was denied benefits on January 18, 1990, because he was self-employed under Section 402(h) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (the Law), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(h). The claimant filed a timely appeal from that determination and an evidentiary hearing was held before the referee who affirmed the Bureau’s decision. The claimant filed an appeal from the referee’s determination to the Board, which, in turn, issued an order which affirmed the referee and denyed benefits. It is from this final order that the claimant has appealed to this Court.
Thus, the issue before us is whether the referee erred in determining that the petitioner/claimant was engaged in self-employment and is ineligible for benefits. Our scope of review in an unemployment compensation case where the party with the burden of proof has prevailed before the Board is to determine whether an error of law has been committed or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Watson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 88 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 566,
Section 402(h), upon which the referee relied in denying the claimant benefits, provides in relevant part:
*571 An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week in which he is engaged in self-employment: Provided, however, That an employe who is able and available for full-time work shall be deemed not engaged in self-employment by reason of continued participation without substantial change during a period of unemployment in any activity ... undertaken while customarily employed by an employer in full-time work whether or not such work is in “employment” as defined in this act and continued subsequent to separation from such work when such activity is not engaged in as a primary source of livelihood____
The term “self-employment” is not statutorily defined. However, Section 4(l) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 753(/)(1) defines employment as:
(2)(B) Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the department that (a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services both under his contract of service and in fact; and (b) as to such services such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.
This Court has consistently held, and the claimant in this case points out, that before a claimant will be declared to be self-employed, the employer bears the burden of proving both elements of Section (Z)(2)(B). Kardon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 40 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 20,
This Court well recognizes the purpose and thrust behind the enactment of the Law, which is to compensate
This Court has previously held that a claimant becomes ineligible for benefits once he has taken a positive step toward establishing an independent business. Roberts v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 55 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 52,
We believe the situation before us warrants a close examination of the cases in which this Court has held an activity engaged in after separation from full-time employment has been considered self-employment. In Leary v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 14 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 409,
In addition, the Court in Balmer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 28 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 568,
The court again found a claimant to be ineligible for benefits in Alick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 194 Pa.Superior Ct. 28,
Moreover, we held that the claimants in Kirk v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 57 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 92,
Although the cases discussed above are not all inclusive, they indeed are representative and provide us with a framework in which to analyze the case at bar.
The claimant in this case did not form a corporation for the purpose of selling jewelry. He did not advertise, list a
In light of the above discussion, we hold that the referee’s conclusion, which was affirmed by the Board, that the claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits due to self-employment is in error as a matter of law. We, therefore, reverse the Board’s order.
ORDER
NOW, October 24, 1990 the Decision and Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated March 29, 1990, at No. B-281076, is hereby reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The majority correctly sets forth the relevant law but in my view commits error in applying the facts of this case. The narrow question we must decide is whether the activities Claimant engaged in constituted customary engagement in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business. First, I must disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the purchasing of tools and spools of chain and the renting of space one day a week at a flea market did not constitute a positive step toward the establishment of an independent business. It is undisputed that Claimant spent over $2,000.00 buying the equipment for his business, went through the trouble of leasing space,
Second, the majority bases its decision upon the facts that Claimant did not form a corporation, did not advertise or list a telephone number for his business, did not obtain insurance, and did not intend to sell jewelry on a permanent basis. While all of this may be true, those negative facts alone are not dispositive. The law does not require that Claimant conduct any of the above-listed activities in order to engage in an independent business. It requires only that he take a “positive step” towards conducting the business. Because I would conclude that he had taken such a step, and indeed had done far more than that, I would affirm the Board’s order.
