Buchanan v. StateBuchanan v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Beck
Sam Buchanan, alias Son Bailey‘, was tried upon an indictment charging him with the murder of Charlie Walker. The jury trying the case returned a verdict of guilty‘, without a recommendation; and the accused was sentenced to be hanged. He made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.
\V. C. Bowan, another eye-witness to the killing, testified: “ T am a street-car conductor and motorman, and was on the 11th day of March, 1921. I remember the occasion when Charlie Walker was shot on upper Broad Street, in the City of Borne. That was about 11:20 at night. I was at Eighth Avenue, on -the west side of Broad Street, going up. I was about Eighth Avenue. It started right at the corner of the sidewalk about Eighth Avenue. . . I saw the difficulty. As I came down I noticed three negroes: a negro boy and a negro girl, and then Son Bailey, this defendant, coming down behind them. They were going towards town, ■coming down the street all-of them. Of course, I did not pay any attention to them as I got in there; and as I stepped out of the car to throw my switch to go in and turned my trolley, I heard somebody holler, and I looked around, and it was this negro girl, and Son Bailey had drawed his gun, and just about the time I looked around Walker was going on him, his hand like this [witness indicating], trying to catch the gun or hit him, going on him with his hands up something like this [indicating], and Bailey shot; and about that time Walker got the gun, and they kept scuffling over the gun down about even with’ their breasts, and they kept scuffling until the third shot was fired, and both still had hold of it, but it was lower down.” And witness Slaughter McCain testified: “I saw this difficulty as I was going along home that night. I saw what happened right then and there. I was going home between 11 and 12 o’clock, and walking along smoking, and I got up beyond where Mr. Printup lives, the old Featlierston place on the corner of Eighth Avenue and Broad, and just before I got to the small mail-box I saw two men all hugged up with their arms around each other’s necks. I did not know they were fighting; couldn’t hear them say a word, and both had their heads down that way [indicating], clinched, and I still kept walking, and 1 was in about ten feet of them.”
The testimony of the witness Bell Cates, narrating the circum*869stances immediately, preceding the homicide, was in effect, that, while she and the deceased were together, the accused. Son Bailey, was seen across the street, and the decedent commenced cursing the accused; the accused then came across the street to or near where the witness and the decedent were, and the latter, with an open knife in his hand, proceeded to walk up to the accused, cursing him as he approached, tnreatening to kill him, and that the decedent kept on walking up to the accused, although the latter said to him, “ Leave me alone; I am not going to bother you,” and that then the accused shot him. This evidence might authorize the jury to find, under proper instructions of the court, that the defendant, acting under the fears of a reasonable man that his life was in danger or that a felony was about to be perpetrated upon him, shot in self-defense. But when we consider the evidence as to what transpired at the house of Son Bailey‘s sister earlier in the night, when the decedent attacked the woman, Bell Cates, and that Son Bailey when near the place of the homicide was seen and met by the decedent and the woman; that he was armed with a pistol; that when he was cursed by the decedent he crossed over the street to tiie side on which the decedent and the woman were standing, and that then he was approached by the decedent with an open knife, cursing as he approached,— the jury would have been authorized to find that there was a mutual intention to fight. Though, according to the witness who narrated these facts, the defendant said, “ I arn not going to bother you,” it was for the jury to decide with what intention the accused crossed the street, armed as he was, and approached the man who was cursing him, and with whom he had had an altercation earlier in the evening. They could have inferred a mutual intention to fight; and there is evidence tending to show that they did fight. With these facts and evidence it was for the jury to say, under proper instructions on the subject of voluntary manslaughter based on the theory of mutual combat, whether or not there was actually a mutual combat or mutual intent to fight, and whether or not the accused was guilty of voluntary manslaughter because of the commission of the homicide under those circumstances. Voluntary manslaughter as based on mutual intention to fight being involved in the ease, under the facts set forth above, a failure to charge upon that subject was error. In the case of Waller v. State, 100 Ga. 320 (28 S. E. 77), this court *870said: “There being, on the trial of an indictment for murder, evidence which, if credible, would have warranted a finding that the slayer and the deceased, upon a sudden quarrel, each being armed with a deadly weapon, mutually engaged in a mortal combat, each using his weapon and intending to kill the other therewith, it was the duty of the judge, with or without a request, to give in charge to the jury the law of voluntary manslaughter as related to the doctrine of ‘ mutual combat/ and the omission to do so is cause for new trial, where the accused was convicted of murder.” In Findlay v. State, 125 Ga. 579 (54 S. E. 106), it was said: “ The evidence in this case involved the question of whether or not there was such a mutual combat the time of the homicide as to reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter. The court omitted entirely any reference to that subject, though charging generally on the subject of manslaughter. In Ray v. State, 15 Ga. 223, it was said: ‘ Our law requires that there should be some assault, by the person killed, upon the person killing; but evidence of such assault may be found’ in a mutual intention to fight, and in the fact of an approach by the decedent to the prisoner, in furtherance of this design, when it was not necessary for him to do so in self-defense/ Mutual blows are not always necessary to make mutual combat. Tate v. State, 46 Ga. 148, 157; Gresham v. Equitable Ins. Co., 87 Ga. 497. See also McMillan, v. State, 35 Ga. 60; Trice v. State, 89 Ga. 742; Gann v. State, 30 Ga. 67; 7 Michie’s Dig. Ga. Rep. 76-77; 2 Roscoe’s Cr. Ev. *724. Where the law of mutual combat is essentially for consideration in the case, the charge should submit it to the jury. Waller v. State, 100 Ga. 320.” The doctrine here stated has- been applied in later cases.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur.