BUCHANAN v. NASH et al.
18836
Supreme Court of Georgia
FEBRUARY 14, 1955
ARGUED JANUARY 12, 13, 1955
211 Ga. 343
Returned to the Court of Appeals. All the Justices concur.
C. W. Buchanan, for plaintiff in error.
Weekes & Candler, contra.
The defendants in error contend that the case is controlled by
The controlling question in this case is whether or not the judgment of the court below setting aside the verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon was error. So long as the verdict and judgment stand, the case is at an end, and no default may be opened and no defensive pleadings filed, amendment or no amendment.
While it is the law that a trial judge has a broad discretion as to whether or not a judgment shall be set aside within the term at which it was rendered, this rule does not apply when the judgment sought to be set aside is based upon a jury verdict. Dabney v. Benteen, 35 Ga. App. 203 (132 S. E. 916). “There is no provision in law for setting aside a verdict except upon a motion for a new trial, or a motion equivalent to a motion for a new trial, except as provided in the Code of 1933, § 6-804.” New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cook, 182 Ga. 409 (185 S. E. 711); Lucas v. Lucas, 179 Ga. 821 (177 S. E. 684); Lovelace v. Lovelace, 179 Ga. 822 (177 S. E. 685), and cases cited. “A motion to set aside a verdict, based on matters not appearing on the face of the record, is not an available remedy to avoid the verdict, unless the motion is of such form and content as to be in substance a motion for a new trial and complies with the rules governing such motion.” Dollar v. Fred W. Amend Co., 186 Ga. 717 (198 S. E. 753), and cases cited.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the court below setting aside the judgment and verdict previously rendered was error.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. Candler, J., concurs in the judgment only.
CANDLER, Justice, concurring specially. I concur in the judgment of reversal, but for a reason different from the one stated in the opinion. The movants did not allege that they had a meritorious defense; this being so, the amended motion was fatally defective and the general demurrer which the plaintiff interposed thereto should have been sustained by the trial judge. A court will not do the vain and useless act of vacating a verdict and setting aside a judgment when the same result will in all probability be reached on another trial. Phillips v. Taber, 83 Ga. 565 (10 S. E. 270); Johnson v. Driver, 108 Ga. 595 (34 S. E. 158); Roberts v. Moore, 113 Ga. 170 (38 S. E. 402); Jewell v. Martin, 121 Ga. 325 (48 S. E. 529); Dorsey v. Griffin, 173 Ga. 802 (161 S. E. 601). Since the amended motion was demurrable and should have been dismissed on general demurrer, all subsequent proceedings taken in the case are nugatory.
