Bubbins v. BubbinsBubbins v. Bubbins
—In a matrimonial action, the defendant father appeals from (1) so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Beisheim, J.), dated March 13, 1985, as limited his visitation rights with the parties’ daughter, and (2) so much of a second order of the same court, also dated March 13, 1985, as suspended his visitation rights with the parties’ daughter and eldest son for an indefinite period, ordered him to pay support for the daughter and eldest son, and denied the motion to have the Justice presiding аt Special Term disqualify himself.
Appeal from so much of the first order dated March 13, 1985 as limited the father’s visitation with the daughter dismissed, without costs or disbursements. That provision of the first order dated March 13, 1985 was superseded by the provision in the secоnd order dated March 13, 1985 which indefinitely suspended visitation with the daughter.
Second order dated March 13, 1985 modified by deleting the second decretal paragraph thereof, which suspended the father’s visitation with his daughter and eldest son for an indеfinite period. As so modified, second order dated March 13, 1985 affirmed, insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings in accordancе herewith. In the interim, visitation of the father with his daughter and eldest son shall continue to be suspended.
After an in camera interview with Harry Jr., in early 1984, Justice George Beisheim found that the plaintiff was in no way responsible fоr the boy’s reluctance to visit his father. On the other hand, the court found no valid reason why the elder son should not visit his father. Thereupon, the court, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, modified the visitation arrangement solely with regard tо Harry, Jr., for a limited interval of three months after which the situation would be reviewed in order to effectuate a return to the visitation schedule set forth in the judgment of divorce. An order dated May 10, 1984, encompassing said provision, was thereаfter entered with the Westchester County Clerk.
Notwithstanding the May 10, 1984 order, Harry Jr., persisted in refusing to visit his father. Accordingly, defendant moved for an order compelling plaintiff to provide him with visitation with their elder son. After an off-the-record conferеnce with the parties, the court made an oral ruling on July 30, 1984 limiting defendant’s visitation rights with respect to both Harry Jr. and the partiеs’ daughter Adrienne. The limitation was intended to reduce the length of the visitation period, apparently to make it mоre palatable to those children, who had refused to visit with their father, and was to be effective until December 21, 1984. The court noted its intention to continue jurisdiction with regard to the subject matter. That oral ruling was not reduced to writing until March 13, 1985, аnd it comprises the first of the orders of that date sought to be reviewed on the instant appeals. Defendant purрortedly appeals therefrom to the extent that his visitation with his daughter was curtailed thereby.
On December 21, 1984, the pаrties once again convened before Justice Beisheim to resolve the problem of the children’s noncоmpliance with the terms of the prior visitation orders. At that point, the parties’ youngest child had been residing with the defendаnt full time for some five months and had been attending school in Yonkers. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court curtailеd all visitation rights of defendant with respect to the two eldest children, based upon its finding that defendant had "brainwashed” the youngest
The father contends that Justice Beisheim was influenced by a personal bias against him. This claim is wholly without merit. The court’s findings were supported by the evidence and a review of the record indicates that Justice Beisheim made every effort to be fair in a very difficult situation. At no time did Justice Beisheim demonstrate a personal bias against the father.
However, the court did err in its determination to completely suspend the father’s visitation with his daughter and his еldest son. The denial of visitation rights to a natural parent is such a drastic remedy that it should only be considered when therе is substantial evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the welfare of the child (see, Janousek v Janousek,
We have considered the father’s contention that the court erred by ordering him to pay child support for his eldest son and daughter and find it to be without merit. Lazer, J. P., O’Connor, Weinstein and Niehoff, JJ., concur.