5 Wash. 564 | Wash. | 1893
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Appellants brought this action to have the defendants declared to hold the title to certain property described in the complaint as their trustees, and to have the title decreed to and quieted in them. The court below, after hearing, dismissed the action, and plaintiffs have appealed.
The respondents’ first contention is, that the complaint is insufficient to support the case made by the proofs, if one is made. It is no doubt true that the complaint is not as full in some respects as it should have been, but, after a somewhat careful examination of all the pleadings and of the proofs, we are satisfied that the respondents were not misled to their prejudice in the presentation of their case, or in meeting that of the plaintiffs, by any errors or omissions in the complaint; and, such being the fact, and this being a suit in equity, we shall disregard any technical errors in the pleadings, and proceed to determine the rights of the parties upon the proofs.
Plaintiffs claim under a university selection, made by the Territory of Washington under the act of July 17, 1854, and by virtue of the provisions of the act of March 14, 1864; and the first question to be determined is as to whether or not they have any standing in court by virtue of such selection. If they have not, of course they must fail in their action, however erroneous may have been the action of the laud department in issuing the patent to the respondents. A stranger could not interfere to protect the rights of the United States or any other person. Do
The first question above suggested having been determined in favor of the plaintiffs, we must enter upon an examination of the rights of the respondents, and see whether or not they are superior to those of the appellants. Re
It is further objected upon the part of the respondents that neither the plaintiffs nor any one else made any objection to the taking of such final proofs on the part of the respondents. But, in view of what we have just said, the allowing of such proofs to be taken pending the appeal to the secretary of the interior was clearly irregular, and for that reason no one could lose rights which they already had by virtue of their contest in the land department, on account of a failure to appear and contest the making of such final proofs. These considerations show that, in our opinion, the contention of the respondents that nothing that was done in the land department after the issuance of the patent could be of any avail to plaintiffs, is untenable. It is true that after such issuance the land department could not interfere with the title to the land, but, if such title passed from the government pending the decision of a question necessarily involved in such issuance, such land department must be held to have jurisdiction to continue
This is sufficient to decide the case, but another very important question is presented by the record. It is conceded that the homestead entry of Lemuel J. Holgate was duly canceled in 1871. The university selection was made in 1861. No adverse interest in the land was asserted by any one until 1879. Thus, even if we assume that the relinquishment by said Holgate in 1861 was not in this case, or was not effectual, the fact would still exist that from 1871 until 1879 this land was vacant public land, except as affected by said university selection. Such being the case under the proof shown by this record, we think the selection, even though ineffectual before, became fully effectual upon the cancellation of the said homestead entry
In the case above cited it is held that an assertion of rights under a selection at a time when the land was subject to such selection will have force, even although at the time the original selection was made there were existing adverse claims to the land, which made it incapable of selection; and under the facts shown in this record we think that it must be held that the territory was asserting its rights under said selection, and seeking to have it certified under the act above cited at all times from the date of such selection up to the time that the land department of the United States lost jurisdiction of the land. It is perhaps true that the territory was not actively importuning the land department all or any of the time, but it had sold the land, and, under the provisions of the act of congress above cited, a bona fide grantee became the owner thereof as against everybody, even the United States. The only thing necessary for him to do to make his title perfect was, to establish the fact that he 'was a purchaser of the territory in good faith. If he was such purchaser, then his equitable title to the land was perfect, and the certification by the secretary of the interior upon proof of such facts was only necessary to pass to him the legal title. Under these circumstances, whenever the grantee of the territory asserted any right to the
There is still left the question as to what equity demands in the disposition of the case. In our opinion, the lights of all will be best subserved by a reversal of the decree dismissing the bill, and a remittance of the cause to the court below, with instructions to take proofs —First, As to what the land would now be worth if no improvements had been made thereon by the respondents; second, as to the cash value of all the improvements made by the respondents; and, third, as to the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the land by the respondents. That upon such proofs the court shall find the facts in relation to each of these questions, and thereafter decree to plaintiffs, at there option, a sum' equal to the value of the land so found, and make such decree a lien enforceable against the land by sale thereof,
Rehearing
ON PETITION EOR RE-HEARING.
In due time after the decision of this cause a petition for re-hearing was filed by the respondents. More than a month thereafter they filed a petition, supported by affidavits, to be allowed to introduce further proofs upon the merits of the controversy covered by the decision of the cause. Such petition states nothing to show why it was not filed before or at the time of the filing of the petition for re-hearing. Without some reason being given for the delay, it is not entitled to be considered. If, without any explanation of the reasons for such a course, motions or petitions in causes before this or any other court are filed out of their proper time, it will tend greatly to embarrass the administration of justice, and such a practice cannot with propriety be allowed. Especially is this true where the petition, like the one at bar, seeks to take advantage of a purely legal defense which does not very largely appeal to the conscience of a court of equity. The petition to be allowed to introduce further proofs must be denied.
The petition for re-hearing does not seriously attack the conclusions of this court in deciding the cause, so far as they determine that the appellants were in equity the owners of the property. The principal contention in such petition is as to the proper rule by which to determine the equities of the parties in adjusting the rights growing out
Under these circumstances, the improvements made by the occupant cannot be said to have been made in good faith, and without knowledge of the adverse claim, and the rule contended for by the respondents cannot be invoked in the adjustment of the equities of the parties. In fact it is very doubtful whether or not under a strict construction bf the rights of the respondents they would be entitled to any relief at all on account of the improvements made by them upon the premises. But in view of the hardship of the case if they were allowed nothing for such improvements, we made the direction which we did in deciding the case, and we feel now as we did then, that it was as favorable to the respondents as the facts would warrant.
The petition for re-hearing must be denied.