177 U.S. 649 | SCOTUS | 1900
BRYAR
v.
CAMPBELL.
Supreme Court of United States.
*651 Mr. Edward Campbell and Mr. Lowrie C. Barton for appellants.
Mr. W.B. Rodgers for appellee.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiffs ask for a reversal of this decree upon the grounds, first, that the appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court in bankruptcy was not claimed and notice given to the clerk of the District Court within the time prescribed by the rules; and, second, because it affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court upon its merits.
1. If there be anything in the defence that the appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court in the bankruptcy proceedings was not taken within the time prescribed by law, it comes too late. It is true that Rev. Stat. sec. 4981, declares that "no appeal shall be allowed in any case from the District to the Circuit Court, unless it is claimed, and notice given thereof to the clerk of the District Court, to be entered with the record of the proceedings, and also to the assignee or creditor, as the case may be, or to the defeated party in equity, within ten days after the entry of the decree or decision appealed *652 from." It appears that the decree of the District Court was entered June 26, 1879, and that a petition for an appeal was addressed to the judge of the Circuit Court, the jurat to which was dated June 28, and on June 30 a bond for costs on appeal was filed. The appeal, however, to the Circuit Court was not allowed and filed until July 16, twenty days after the decree of the District Court, and it does not appear that any notice was given to the clerk of the District Court, or to the defeated party, as required by section 4981; but it further appears that the petition for appeal, the allowance thereof, a copy of the docket entries and a bond for costs were filed in the Circuit Court, August 30, 1879. Here the matter rested until December 20, 1895, when Mrs. Bryar, the prevailing party, moved the Circuit Court, not to dismiss the appeal for the reason that it was not taken in time, but, stating that it had been "duly allowed," to obtain an order declaring it deserted, for the reason that the appellants had failed to bring up the record from the District Court, pay the entry costs or prosecute their appeal. This was apparently treated as a motion to dismiss, and was denied. After a lapse of sixteen years it is now too late to ask this court to hold that the appeal should have been dismissed for a reason which does not seem to have been called to the attention of the Circuit Court, when the original motion was made to declare the appeal deserted. If the plaintiffs in that case had intended to insist upon their rights under the decree, they should either have moved to dismiss the appeal within a reasonable time, or pressed it to a hearing in the Circuit Court, instead of abandoning it and bringing a new suit upon the same cause of action in the state court.
2. The case upon the merits depends upon the effect to be given to the judgment in favor of Campbell in the ejectment suit brought by Mrs. Bryar in the state court. Mrs. Bryar appears, for some unexplained reason, to have abandoned her original suit in the District Court, notwithstanding the decree in her favor, and to have elected to begin an action in ejectment in the state court. To this action Campbell appears to have set up a new defence, which had accrued since the decree in the District Court, arising upon two mortgages executed in *653 1874 by James Bryar, namely, one to Thomas McClintock for $3000, the other to E.R. James for $2000, which mortgages were, in 1878, foreclosed and judgment entered. In the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State it is stated that William R. Rodgers, one of the defendants in the ejectment action, as the attorney for Campbell, purchased the judgments obtained upon the mortgages, issued execution, sold the seven acres at sheriff's sale, and bought the same for $50. A deed was made by the sheriff to Rodgers, who gave a memorandum to Campbell, stating that he would convey to any one Campbell might wish, when requested so to do. It was not disputed that Rodgers bought and held in trust for Campbell whatever title he obtained by the sheriff's deed.
Upon this state of facts the court held that the mortgages were valid liens, and the fact that the mortgagees were entirely unaffected by any notice of the secret equity of Mrs. Bryar being undisputed, it necessarily followed that, whether Campbell had notice or not, he stood in their shoes when he purchased the title derived from them. "It is contended, however, that Campbell having bought at the assignee's sale, subject to these mortgages, was bound to pay them off, and when he did so they were extinguished. But unless he expressly or by necessary implication agreed to pay them, he was not bound to do so, and had an undoubted right to secure his own title by purchasing them and proceeding to perfect his title under them." It will be seen from this that Campbell did not rely upon his purchase at the assignee's sale, as to which the District Court seems to have held that he had notice of Mrs. Bryar's equity in the premises, but upon the purchase of the rights of the mortgagees, who appear to have taken the mortgages, supposing the property to belong to James Bryar, in whose name it stood upon the record.
We are advised of no substantial reason why the judgment of the state court does not operate as res judicata in this case. The original suit in the District Court was begun by Mrs. Bryar, one of the original plaintiffs in the ejectment suit, for the purpose of compelling the defendant Thomas Campbell to convey to her as the equitable owner thereof the premises now in dispute. *654 The ejectment suit was begun by her and her husband, in her right, upon the same title against three defendants, one of whom was Campbell, to obtain possession of the same property. The action was brought by Mrs. Bryar upon her equitable title, a procedure allowable in the courts of Pennsylvania, where an equitable ejectment is the full equivalent of and substitute for a bill in equity. Peterman v. Huling, 31 Penn. St. 432; Winpenny v. Winpenny, 92 Penn. St. 440. Such procedure, though not authorized by the practice of the Federal courts, will be respected when the question arises upon the effect to be given the judgment. Miles v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 36; Faber v. Hovey, 117 Mass. 107. While it appears from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State that the decree of the District Court was called to its attention, it was not set up as a bar to the ejectment in the state court for the obvious reason that Mrs. Bryar had abandoned it by bringing suit in the state court, and there was no object in pleading it, while Campbell did not plead it because it was adverse to him. It would seem, too, that under the practice in Pennsylvania a decree cannot be used as res judicata pending an appeal to a higher court. Souter v. Baymore, 7 Penn. St. 415. He could not even plead the pendency of the former suit. Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Penn. St. 326; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 554.
It is now contended that the existence of this prior decree ousted the jurisdiction of the state court. Indeed the only object of Mrs. Bryar in endeavoring to have the appeal dismissed seems to have been to reinstate the original decree in her favor more effectually, and to insist that it was a final disposition of the matters in controversy between herself and Campbell. The question is whether, having abandoned the original decree for a new action in the state court in which she was defeated, her heirs can now claim that the original decree in the District Court, though not set up as a bar by either party, and notwithstanding the appeal, can be resuscitated after a lapse of sixteen years for the purpose of defeating the action of the state court. To state this proposition is to answer it. The state court was at liberty to proceed to dispose of the case upon *655 the issues made by the parties, and as neither party saw fit to set up the former decree as a bar to the action, the state court was not bound to notice it. It did not affect in any way the jurisdiction of that court. In addition to this, however, Campbell relied upon a wholly different defence from that set up by him in the former suit, and one which had accrued to him after the decree in that court was rendered. Whether the decree, if properly pleaded, would have operated as a bar it is unnecessary to determine. As the same issues are presented here as were presented in the state court, it is entirely clear that they cannot be relitigated.
The judgment of the state court was conclusive upon these issues, and the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals to that effect was correct, and it is
Affirmed.
