REPRESENTATIVE BRYANT W. CLARK AND SENATOR JOHN HORHN v. GOVERNOR PHIL BRYANT, STATE FISCAL OFFICER LAURA JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND STATE TREASURER LYNN FITCH
NO. 2017-CA-00750-SCT
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
09/13/2018
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/02/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PATRICIA D. WISE TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: WILLIAM B. BARDWELL, LYDIA WRIGHT, KRISSY C. NOBILE, JUSTIN L. MATHENY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: WILLIAM B. BARDWELL, CHRISTINE C. BISCHOFF, JODY E. OWENS, II ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KRISSY C. NOBILE, JUSTIN L. MATHENY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/13/2018
EN BANC.
¶1. During Fisсal Year 2017, Governor Phil Bryant directed State Fiscal Officer Laura Jackson to reduce the budgets of various state agencies. In response, State Representative Bryant W. Clark and State Senator John Horhn brought a declaratory-judgment action against the Governor in Hinds County Chancery Court. They sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus ordering the Governоr to reverse the reductions, and a declaration that
¶2. Under our Constitution, the executive has the core power to control the budget of state аgencies. Here, the Legislators’ arguments that
¶3. Pursuant to
¶4. On May 17, 2017, State Representative Bryant W. Clark and State Senator John Horhn (collectively, the “Legislators“) sued Governor Bryant, Jackson, the Mississippi Department of Education and State Treasurer Lynn Fitch (collectively, the “Executive“). The Legislators sought a declaration that
¶5. The chancellor held a hearing on the merits of the motion for a preliminary injunction on May 31, 2017. The Legislators and the Executive both argued the merits of the motion. At the close of their arguments, the chancellor convened a conference in chambers. After the conference, the Legislators made an ore tenus motion pursuant to
¶6. In its written order, filed on June 2, 2017, the chancellor denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. It then granted the Legislators’ motion to consolidate the hearing on the preliminary injunction with the trial on the merits. Next, the trial court denied the Legislators’ request for permanent injunctive relief and dismissed the complaint.
¶7. The Legislators now appeal. For the Legislators, the issue on appeal is whether a statute allowing the Executive Branch to make appropriations decisions violates the separatiоn-of-powers doctrine under the Mississippi Constitution. The Executive maintains that
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8. “When addressing a statute‘s constitutionality, we apply a de novo standard of review, bearing in mind (1) the strong presumption of constitutionality; (2) the challenging party‘s burden to prove the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) all doubts are resolved in favor of a statute‘s validity.” Johnson v. Sysco Food Servs., 86 So. 3d 242, 243-44 (Miss. 2012) (citations omitted). “The statutes must be shown to be in direct conflict with ‘the clear language of the constitution.‘” 5K Farms, Inc. v. Miss. Dep‘t of Revenue, 94 So. 3d 221, 227 (Miss. 2012) (quoting PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Miss. 2004)). “[T]he courts are without the right to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and policy of the act and must enforce it, unless it appears beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Pathfinder Coach Div. of Superior Coach Corp. v. Cottrell, 62 So. 2d 383, 385 (Miss. 1953)). “‘When a party invokes our power of judicial review, it behooves us to recall that the challenged act hаs been passed by legislators and approved by a governor sworn to uphold the selfsame constitution as are we.‘” Id. (quoting State v. Roderick, 704 So. 2d 49, 52 (Miss. 1997)).
¶9. “This Court ‘will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless . . . the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an erroneous legal standard.‘” Sec‘y of State v. Gunn, 75 So. 3d 1015, 1020 (Miss. 2011) (quoting A-1 Pallet Co. v. City of Jackson, 40 So. 3d 563, 567 (Miss. 2010)). Further, we review questions of law de novo. Smith v. Wilson, 90 So. 3d 51, 56 (Miss. 2012).
ANALYSIS
¶10. The Legislators claim that
¶11. We begin our analysis of this issue discussing the language of the statutory provisions implicated in this appeal. The challenged statute,
(2) The Department of Revenue and University Research Center, utilizing all available revenue forecast data, shall annually develop a general fund revenue estimate to be adopted by the Jоint Legislative Budget Committee as of the date of sine die adjournment. If, at the end of October, or at the end of any month thereafter of any fiscal year, the revenues received for the fiscal year fall below ninety-eight percent (98%) of the general fund revenue estimate adopted by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee at the date of sine die adjournment, the State Fiscal Officer shall reduce allocations of general funds and state-source special funds to general fund and special fund agencies and to the “administration and other expenses” budget of the Mississippi Department of Transportation, in an amount necessary
to keep expenditures within the sum of actual general fund receipts, including any transfers to the General Fund from the Working Cash-Stabilization Reserve Fund for the fiscal year.
¶12. Another statutory provision implicated in this appeal is the requirement found in
¶13. Also at issue in this appeal, the Legislature passed the education appropriation bill for the 2017 fiscal year. The first section of that bill explicitly provided: “The following sums, or so much of those sums as may be necessary, are appropriated out of any money in the State General Fund not otherwise appropriated. . . .” H.B. 1643, 131st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016).
¶14. We begin our constitutional analysis of
¶15. Turning to our Constitution, the doctrinе of separation of powers is enumerated in Sections 1 and 2 of Article 1 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890:
Section 1. The powers of the government of the State of Mississippi shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to-wit: those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to another.
Section 2. No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others. The acceptance of an office in either of said departments shall, of itself, and at once, vacate any and all offices held by the person so accepting in either of the other departments.
¶16. ““Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws. . . .“” Alexander, 441 So. 2d at 1338 (quoting Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202, 48 S. Ct. 480, 482, 72 L. Ed. 845 (1927)). “Legislatures are the voice of the people, charged with the responsibility of enacting statutes for the inhabitants of our State.” W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Greenville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 433 So. 2d 954, 957–58 (Miss. 1983). “[E]xecutive power [i]s the power to administer and enforce the laws as enacted by the legislature and as interpreted by the courts.” Alexander, 441 So. 2d at 1338 (first citing Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161, 75 S. Ct. 668, 672, 99 L. Ed. 964, 971 (1954); and then citing Mabray v. Sch. Bd. of Carroll Cty., 137 So. 105, 106 (Miss. 1931)). “Execution is at the core of executive power.” Id. In Alexander, the Court clarified the realms of these two branches of government. Id. Central to its holding, Alexander discussed two separate constitutional powers that continue to shape Mississippi‘s budgeting process today: (1) the budget-making power and (2) the budget-control process. Id.
¶17. First, the Alexander Court described the budget-making power:
Constitutionally, budget-making is a legislative prerogative and responsibility in Mississippi. The legislature has the power and prerogative to provide for the collection of revenues through taxation and other means and to appropriate or direct the expenditure of monies so raised. Though subject to gubernatorial veto, the primary budget-making responsibility vests in the legislature.
This premise has been unequivocally stated in Colbert v. State, 86 Miss. 769, 39 So. 65 (1905), as follows:
Under all constitutional gоvernments recognizing three distinct and independent magistracies, the control of the purse strings of government is a legislative function. . . . The right of the Legislature to control the public treasury, to determine the sources from which the public revenue shall be derived and the objects upon which they shall be expended, to dictate the time, the manner, and the means both of their collection and disbursement, is firmly and inexpugnably established in our political system. . . . The American commonwealths have fallen heirs to this great principle, and the prerogative in question passes to their Legislatures without restriction or diminution, except as provided by their Constitutions, by the simple grant of the legislative power.
Alexander, 441 So. 2d at 1339.
¶18. Second, Alexander found that the budget-control process “presents a different issue in that it is an executive function.” Id. at 1341. While the Court framed the budget-control process as a “process” and a “function,” it did recognize that budget control is an “executive power.” Id. at 1341 n.4 (emphasis added). The Court explained budget control:
Once taxes have been levied and appropriations made, the legislative prerogative ends, and executive responsibility begins to administer the appropriation and to accomplish its purpose, subject, of course, to any limitations constitutionally imposed by the legislature. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983). We have held above that the constitution does not permit the legislature to directly or indirectly invade the powers and prеrogatives of the executive branch of government. The legislature thus may not administer an appropriation once it has been lawfully made and is prohibited from imposing new limitations, restrictions or conditions on
the expenditure of such funds, short of full legislative approval.
Id. at 1341.
¶19. Here, as thе Executive‘s budget reductions were an exercise of the Executive‘s constitutional power to control the budget, the Legislators have failed to meet their burden to overcome the presumption that
¶20. This distinction finds support in
¶21. The text of the appropriation bill at issue supports this conclusion as well. It provides that “[t]he following sums, or so much of those sums as may be necessary, are appropriated . . . .” H.B. 1643, 131st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016). Given the wording of the appropriations bill, the Legislature understood that it wаs granting the Executive some discretion in the amount of money it actually spent.
¶22. The Governor (as the head of the executive branch) must faithfully execute all laws passed by the Legislature. The Constitution charges the Governor to “see that the laws are faithfully executed.”
¶23. Further,
¶24. The Governor‘s reference to appropriations when he instructed Jackson to reduce the variоus budgets is insufficient to overcome the strong presumption that
reductions of the state agencies’ budgets, no evidence was offered that the Executive believed that it was reducing the actual appropriations to the agencies. The statement by the Governor must be read in the context of the full letter to Jackson. The Governor carefully laid out his authority for the budget reductions in the full letter. In addition, no evidence was offered to demonstrate that the Governor intended to engage in budget making as opposed to budget control. Thus, the Governor‘s mention of “reductions to FY 2017 appropriations” as opposed to the reductions of the state agencies’ budgets does not overcome the strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of
¶25. The Legislаtors have failed to overcome the strong presumption that
CONCLUSION
¶26. The Executive‘s budget reductions were a constitutional exercise of the Executive‘s power to control the budget. The Legislators failed tо overcome the strong presumption that
¶27. AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING, MAXWELL, BEAM AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY ISHEE, J.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT:
¶28. My disagreement with the majority seems small, but I think it reaches one of the most fundamental principles embodied in our State‘s Constitution. In short, the plain language of
¶29. Section 2 reads as follows:
No person or сollection of persons, being one or belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others. The acceptance of an office in either of said departments shall, of itself, and at once, vacate any and all offices held by the person so accepting in either of the other departments.
¶30. Accordingly, I concur with the majority excеpt to the extent that its use of the word “core” understates the stark demarcation of powers as described by the use of the phrase “any power” in the text of our State‘s Constitution.
ISHEE, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.