At сommon law, larceny is considsidered as committed in every county or jurisdiction into which the goods may be carried by the thief. ‘ ‘The legal possession of them still remains-in the true owner, and every moment’s continuance of the trespass and felony amounts to a new сaption and asportation.” — 2 Russsell on Crimes, 283. Consequently, it has been held in this State, that when goods are stolen in one county and cаrried by the thief into another county, or he causes them to be so carried, and he there exercises dominion over them, this constitutes larceny in the lat
The indictment in this case, following form 51 of the Criminal Code of 1886, charges the larceny as having оccurred in Baldwin county. It was not lacldng in any necessary averment of a larceny' in that county. It then charges defendant, with having brought the property stolen into the county of Mobile. The indictment might have charged the larceny as having been committed in Mobile, omitting аll reference to the commission of the crime in Baldwin, and on proof of the facts averred in this indictment, the defendant might have bеen convicted in Mobile, where, as alleged, she carried 'the property. There was no error in overruling the demurrer to the indiсtment. — Rapalje on Larceny, §124; Jones v. The State,
The evidence tended to show that the defendant stole the ring, its diamonds and setting in Baldwin county, as chаrged, and carried the same into Mobile county; that defendant was found in possession of a ring in the latter county which was brass, but with a gold sеtting, from which the central gem had been removed, and a piece of glass been substituted therefor, with five diamonds arranged around it so as to form a cluster, with one of the diamonds in the setting missing ; that the ring stolen had seven gems, a central and larger one than the six others that surrounded it, and that the brass portion of the ring so found in her possession was not the property of Mrs. Cirlot, — the party from whom it was alleged the ring had been stolen,— but that the setting in said ring and the diamonds were her property. The solicitor, after the evidence for the Statе had closed, offered in evidence the ring that had been found in possession of defendant in Mobile, and which she delivered up, and it was admitted against a general objection of the defendant. In this there was no error. The facts made it evidence of crime, thе weight of which was for the jury. — Thornton v. The State,
The testimony of defendant tended to show that about three weeks before her arrest, one Robert Singletоn,who had since died, loaned her the ring which she had on- at the time she was arrested ; that she-'did not deny having the ring when arrested, and it was taken from her, but that she turned it over to Mr. Cirlot and told him at the time that it was not her ring, but one that Robert Singleton had loaned her, and she made the sаme statement to the officers having her in charge when they were taking her to the guard house.' ' The chief of police testified tо this statement. The evidence further tended to show that Robert Singleton had loaned defendant the ring one day when he met her on the street; that he told her that it was his wife’s ring; that she had known him all her life, and he had never visited her at her house, and had never been to see her in Baldwin county. The defendant proved by Benny Robinson that he had seen defendant about three Aveeks before her arrest with a ring that looked like the one offered in evidence on the trial, and proposed to prove by said witness what, at the time, the defendаnt said she was doing with the' ring and wrhere she got it, — whose property she said it Avas, and if she did not say to the witness, that the ring was loaned to her by a mаn named Robert Singleton. On objections raised by the solicitor, the court refused to allow the witness to answer either of the questions propounded to elicit this evidence. In this the court erred. It is inferable that the ring inquired about, as to which defendant’s declarations wеre made to the witness, was the ring she Was found in possession of, and for which she was indicted for stealing; and these declarations, madе while in the possession of the property, at the time and under the circumstances shoAvn, Avere admissible, as explanatory of her possession. — Smith v. The State,
The indictment, as will be obsei-ved, in its three counts, containing the necessary averments for larceny, charges, (1) , th'at fthe defendant stоle in Baldwin county and carried into Mobile, a diamond ling of the value of $75; (2) , that she stole in Bahhvin a gold ring with a diamond setting, and brought such diamond setting, of the value, of $50, into the county of Mobileand (3), that she
The 14th charge asked by defendant and refused, assorts a correct legal principle, -and should have been given. — Prater v. The State,
^ The 16th charge requested by defendant is a copy of a charge we approved in Newsom v. The State,
Charge 18 appears to be free from error. — Newsom’s Case, supra.
Charge 17 was condemned in Horn v. The State,
Charge 19 is an extract from the opinion of Stone, C. J., in Johnson v. The State,
Charge 20 was properly refused. Thе unexplained possession of property does not raise the presumption that the property was stolen. There must be other evidence of the corpus delicti; and when this has been shown, the actual unexplained possession of the recently stolen goods, is a fact from which the jury may infer the guilt of defendant. The declarations of a defendant when found in possession of the stolen property, explanatory of his possession, are for the consideration of the jury together with all the other evidence in determining the
The other refused charges not considered were prop-. erly refused.
Reversed and remanded.