Defendant was indicted in four counts for the offense of rape (two counts) and child molestation (two counts) involving two females allegedly under the age of 14 years. Defendant was convicted of criminal attempt to commit rape only as to each female. He was sentenced to serve 10 years as to each count to run concurrently. A motion for new trial as later amended was filed and denied, and defendant appeals. Held:
1. During the trial the defendant did not testify in his behalf, and the only testimony offered by the defense was that of the medical doctor who testified that from his physical examination of one of the females he did not find any evidence of sexual intercourse. Thereafter, after the closing argument of the assistant district attorney the defendant moved for a mistrial because of improper comments made as to the failure of the defendant to testify. This motion was denied. The exact language of
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this argument after discussing the testimony of other witnesses was that, "[njo other witness appeared here and told you that it didn’t happen — no witness — no evidence.” The defendant argues that under Code Ann. § 38-415 (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 133, 134; 1973, pp. 292, 294) this argument was tantamount to a violation of this statute which clearly states that no presumption shall be created against him by his failure to testify and "no comment shall be made because of such failure.” Of course, direct reference to a defendant’s failure to testify is prohibited.
Mitchell v. State,
2. Defendant’s next contention is that the assistant district attorney in his argument improperly commented on the fact that there were no blacks on the jury and that "certainly the prosecution would like to have had [on the jury] a few people who lived in the neighborhood, a few people who may have associated before, who operate under some of these handicaps” of the two victims, being two young black girls. But a prosecutor is entitled to argue to the jury his version of what took place at the trial. See
Holley v. State,
3. The complaint that the assistant district attorney had made a "highly personalized” argument and thereby denied defendant his right to a fair trial is not meritorious. Considerable latitude is allowed in the argument of a case to a jury.
Hightower v. State,
4. Defendant’s next complaint is that the trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for mistrial because the prosecution had elicited from a state witness that the defendant had been bound over by a committing court thereby denying defendant a fair trial. Objection was made that this testimony as to the defendant being "bound over” was irrelevant, and it was sustained by the court; but no request was made for curative instructions when this testimony was offered in answer to a question. Thereafter, a motion for mistrial was made as to this statement. Compare
Bailey v. State,
5. The trial court in its discretion may allow counsel to put leading questions to a witness of tender years. See
Johnson v. State,
6. There is no merit in the contention that the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel’s right to a thorough and sifting cross examination of the alleged victims wherein one of the witnesses had been asked if she knew what a certain term meant, or ever used the term; to which she replied in the negative that no one had ever used it to her. Therefore, the question as to what it means was irrelevant. The discretion of the trial court in such matters will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse.
Hodge v. State,
7. This court does not pass on the weight of the evidence but only upon its sufficiency, and if there is any evidence to support the verdict it will be upheld.
Proctor v. State,
Judgment affirmed.