Bryant v. Delbar Products, Inc.Bryant v. Delbar Products, Inc.
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court are the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment; the defendant’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment; the defendants’ motion to deny the plaintiffs jury demand; motions to strike by both the plaintiff and the defendants; and the plaintiffs motion for oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby (1) GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment and DENIES the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (2) DENIES the defendants’ motion to deny the plaintiffs jury demand, (3) DENIES both the plaintiffs and the defendants’ motions to strike, and (4) DENIES the plaintiffs motion for oral argument.
I. Relevant Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Martha Bryant, filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA),
II. Relevant Factual Background
Martha Bryant worked on the assembly line for Delbar Products, Inc. from December 12,1983 until April 8,1996, when she was discharged for excessive absenteeism. Del-bar manufactures automotive rear view mirrors. See Amended Complaint, ¶ 3; Answer to Amended Complaint, ¶ 3. Defendant Bill Caruthers is the manufacturing manager for Delbar in Tennessee. Dep. of Bill Caruthers, p. 6. Delbar’s absenteeism policy is based on an “occurrence” system. In general, employees are assessed one point for each day that they are absent from work for an unexcused reason. They are assessed one-half point if they arrive late or leave early but work at least four hours in a day. At the six occurrence level, an employee is placed on probation. When occurrences accumulate to eight within a one-year period, the employee is fired for excessive absenteeism. If the employee has fewer than six occurrences at the end of'the calendar year, however, he or she can start the next year with a “clean slate” of zero occurrences. See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 7.
On March 26, 1995, Ms. Bryant’s son, Howard Bryant, was hospitalized with advanced kidney failure. 1 Aff. of Martha Bryant, ¶ 6; see Decl. of Lee Ray Crowe, M.D., ¶ 4. He remained in the hospital until March 29, 1995. Aff. of Martha Bryant, ¶ 6; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 15. On March 27, 1995, Ms. Bryant requested part of the day off from someone at Delbar. Dep. of Martha Bryant, p. 20. Specifically, Ms. Bryant stated, “My son is in the hospital and I’ve got to work things out.” Id. at 21. Ms. Bryant was denied time off and assessed a one-half point penalty for missing work to go to the hospital. Aff. of Martha Bryant, ¶ 9. Ms. Bryant was also penalized one-half point for missing part of the day on April 4, 1995 because she had to drive her son to a doctor’s appointment in Cookeville. Id. ¶ 9. In addition, Ms. Bryant used vacation days on March 29 and April 11,19, and 25 in order to help her son without incurring more penalties. Id. ¶ 10.
From May 30, 1995 until August 7, 1995, Ms. Bryant was on disability leave due to a slipped disc. Id. ¶ 12. She returned to work on August 8,1995; however, Ms.-Bryant was one hour late to work on August 9, 1995 because her back pain had returned. Id. ¶ 14. As a result, she was assessed a one-half point penalty. Id. Finally, Ms. Bryant missed a doctor’s appointment scheduled for October 2, 1995 because Delbar would not excuse her from work. Id. ¶ 15.
By the end of 1995, Ms. Bryant had been penalized with six occurrences and was placed on probation. See id. ¶ 9; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 9. Because Ms. Bryant was on probation at the end of 1995, her six occurrences carried over into 1996 and she was not allowed a clean slate of zero occurrences. Aff. of Martha Bryant, ¶ 9; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 9. By April 8, 1996, Ms. Bryant had incurred two more occurrences— for a total of eight — and she was fired. Id. ¶ 8; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 8.
Ms. Bryant claims that Delbar should have excused her absences on March 27, April 4, and August 9 under the FMLA. Importantly, if any one of these absences had been excused under the FMLA, Ms. Bryant would have incurred only five and one-half occurrence points by the end of 1995 and she would not have been placed on probation. As a result, Ms. Bryant would have begun 1996 with a clean slate of zero occurrences and she would have been penalized with only two occurrence points by April 8, 1996.
De
III. Legal Analysis — Liability Under the FMLA
A. Eligibility Under the FMLA
The FMLA establishes, among other things, the right of an eligible employee to receive up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year to care for a son or daughter who has a “serious health condition” or because of a “serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions” of his or her job.
To be eligible for leave under the FMLA, an employee must have been employed by the employer from whom leave is requested for (1) at least twelve months and (2) at least 1250 hours of service during the previous twelve-month period.
The defendants contend, however, that the time off requested by Ms. Bryant in March, April, and August of 1995 should not have qualified as FMLA leave. The defendants further contend that even if Ms. Bryant’s absences were excused under the FMLA, she did not give them adequate notice of her need for leave as required by the FMLA. As noted above, if any one of Ms. Bryant’s absences on March 27, April 4, or August 9 had been excused under the FMLA, Ms. Bryant would not have been fired on April 8, 1996. Thus, it is appropriate to examine each of these absences to determine if any of them should have been excused under the FMLA. If any one of them should have been excused, the Court’s inquiry is at an end and summary judgment must be granted for Ms. Bryant on the issue of the defendants’ liability.
B. The Definitions of “Serious Health Condition” and “Son” Under the FMLA
On March 27, 1995, Ms. Bryant was penalized one-half point for missing part of the day to go to the hospital where her son was hospitalized with advanced kidney failure. Delbar was required to allow Ms. Bryant to take unpaid leave to care for Howard Bryant if he had a “serious health condition” and qualified as her “son” under the FMLA.
1. The Definition of Serious Health Condition
The first issue is whether Howard Bryant had a “serious health condition” under the FMLA. “Serious health condition” is defined as “an illness ... that involves ... inpatient care in a hospital.”
2. The Definition of “Son”
The second issue is whether Howard Bryant met the definition of “son” under the FMLA on March 27, 1995. The FMLA defines “son” to include those who are
“18
years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.”
Second, the regulations state that “incapable of self-care”
means that the individual requires active assistance or supervision to provide daily self-care in three or more of the “activities of daily living (ADLs) or “instrumental activities of daily living” (IADLs). Activities of daily living include adaptive activities such as earing appropriately for one’s grooming and hygiene, bathing, dressing and eating. Instrumental activities of daily living include cooking, cleaning, shopping, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, using telephones and directories, using a post office, etc.
First, it is only logical to conclude that Howard Bryant could not cook, clean, shop or take public transportation (more than three IADLs) while he was in the hospital. In his deposition, the defendants’ attorney questioned Howard Bryant about his activities just before his hospitalization and while he was in the hospital. Howard Bryant stated that he became dizzy and was passing out, so he drove himself to the emergency room. Dep. of Howard Bryant, at 19. He was checked into the hospital and given fluid pills to bring his blood pressure down. Id. at 22. He was not given any medication intravenously and he was able to feed himself. Id. at 23. However, he was unable to move around his hospital room very much and he stayed in bed most of the time. Id. at 23. Thus, even assuming that Howard Bryant could engage in ADLs — caring appropriately for his grooming and hygiene, bathing, dressing, and eating — he was in the hospital and almost certainly could not engage in IADLs.
Second, after Howard Bryant was released from the hospital “through at least the end of April 1995, he was extremely weak and tremulous and required the assistance of his mother for transportation, administration of medication and also for coordination of [his] therapeutic plan.” Decl. of Lee Ray Crowe, M.D., ¶ 10 (Howard Bryant’s post-hospitalization physician); see also Dr. Crowe’s office progress notes (dated April 4 through May 22, 1995) attached to his declaration. After he was released from the hospital, Howard Bryant also required Ms. Bryant’s help with cooking and cleaning. Aff. of Martha Bryant, ¶ 5; Dep. of Martha Bryant, pp. 31-32, 36-38. The defendants do not dispute Ms. Bryant’s testimony on this point. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 11. Because Howard Bryant required assistance with at least three IADLs — cooking, cleaning, and transportation 2 — after he was released from the hospital, he almost certainly required assistance with them while he was hospitalized.
Although this Court has found very few eases that discuss the definition of “incapable of self-care,” in
Sakellarion v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd.,
In addition to being over eighteen and incapable of self-care, Howard Bryant had to be “suffering from a ... physical disability” on March 27, 1995 to qualify as Ms. Bryant’s “son” under the FMLA. The regulations provide that a physical disability means a “physical ... impairment” that “substantially limits” one or more of the “major life activities” of an individual as each of these terms is defined by the regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
First, the ADA regulations define “physical impairment” as “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition ... affecting ... [the] geni-to-urinary [system].”
Second, “major life activities” under the ADA include the ability to work.
In sum, on March 27, 1995 when Ms. Bryant left work early to see Howard Bryant in the hospital, he had a serious health condition and qualified as Ms. Bryant’s son under the FMLA. Therefore, if Ms. Bryant gave the defendants adequate notice of her need for leave on March 27, her absence should have been excused under the FMLA and she should not have been assessed one-half point for absenteeism.
Although the FMLA requires employees to notify their employers of the need for foreseeable leave,
[t]he employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA, but may only state that leave is needed. The' employer will be expected to obtain any additional required information through informal means. The employee ... will be expected to provide more information when it can readily be accomplished as a practical matter, taking into consideration the exigencies of the situation.
In
Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp.,
Similarly, in
Brannon v. OshKosh B’Gosh, Inc.,
Unlike the
Price, Brannon,
and
Stubl
courts, the courts in
Satterfield v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
The court held that “no rational trier of fact could conclude that the meager information Satterfield imparted to Wal-Mart ... was sufficient to require Wal-Mart to seek additional information about her condition,
Similarly, in
Reich,
the plaintiff did not “communicate sufficient information to inform [her employer] of her condition [ (chicken pox) ] with sufficient detail to make it evident to [her employer] that her leave was as the result of a ‘serious health condition’....”
Reich,
In the case at bar, Martha Bryant’s son was hospitalized on March 26, 1995. On March 27, 1995, Martha Bryant missed part of a work day to go to the hospital. She told her employer, “My son is in the hospital and I’ve got to work things out.” Dep. of Martha Bryant, p. 21. She later provided Delbar with a doctor’s excuse which indicated that her son was hospitalized from March 27 through March 29 and would not be able to work for two weeks. Aff. of Martha Bryant, ¶ 8; Ex. A to Aff. of Martha Bryant; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 15. Delbar did not excuse her leave of absence and she was assessed one-half of a penalty point under Delbar’s absenteeism policy.
Like the plaintiffs whose notice of need to take unforeseeable leave was found to be adequate in Price and Brannon, Martha Bryant imparted information to Delbar that was sufficient to reasonably apprise Delbar of her request to take time off due to her son’s serious health condition. Like the plaintiff in Price, Ms. Bryant informed Del-bar that she needed to take leave for a medical reason (her son’s hospitalization) and she provided Delbar with a doctor’s excuse which indicated that her son had, in fact, been hospitalized. Furthermore, just as the plaintiff in Brannon informed her employer that her daughter was sick, Ms. Bryant informed Delbar that her son was sick by telling Delbar that he had been hospitalized. In contrast to the plaintiff in Satterfield, Ms. Bryant communicated directly with Delbar on the day she needed time off, rather than waiting twelve days, and provided Delbar with concrete, not “meager,” information as to why she needed time off. In addition, unlike the plaintiff in Reich, Ms. Bryant made it clear to Delbar that her son was receiving inpatient care and gave Delbar notice the day after her son was hospitalized.
Thus, Martha Bryant provided Delbar with adequate notice that she was requesting unforeseeable leave in a potentially FMLA-qualifying situation. At that time, the burden shifted to Delbar to “obtain any additional required information through informal means.”
D. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23,
In the case at bar, both parties have moved for summary judgment on the issue of defendant Delbar’s liability under the FMLA. As established above, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Howard Bryant had a “serious
Thus, Delbar violated the FMLA by assessing Ms. Bryant a one-half point penalty for leaving work early on March 27, 1995. Ms. Bryant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the issue of Delbar’s liability under the FMLA. 5
IV. Legal Analysis — Individual Liability Under the FMLA
A. Individual Liability Exists Under the FMLA
The defendants contend that the FMLA does not provide for individual liability. The Sixth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue; however, the majority of courts that have reached this issue have held that individual liability does exist under the FMLA,
See, e.g., Eldridge v. Porelon/Micropore, Inc.,
No. 2:97-0053, slip op. at 17 (M.D.Tenn. June 9,
1998); Rupnow v. TRC, Inc.,
Unlike the
Frizzell
court, most courts have found that the definition of “employer” under the FMLA more closely tracks the definition of “employer” found in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), than the definition of “employer” found in Title VII.
See, e.g., Stubl,
Because the definitions of “employer” under the FMLA and the FLSA are so similar and because individual liability exists under the FLSA, the
Stubl
court held that individual liability for corporate officers, managers, and supervisors for violations of the FMLA is within the FMLA’s definition of employer.
Stubl,
B. Bill Caruthers’ Liability Under the FMLA
The defendants contend that even if individual liability exists under the FMLA, Bill Caruthers is not liable because he “did nothing to interfere with Plaintiffs FMLA leave and did not have the authority to grant FMLA leave.” Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 20. Thus, the defendants are seeking summary judgment on the issue of Mr. Caruthers’ liability under the FMLA.
Bill Caruthers’ deposition reveals the following facts. When Ms. Bryant was employed by Delbar, Mr. Caruthers “had all the personnel responsibilities in the plant.”
Dep.
Mr. Caruthers was not Ms. Bryant’s immediate supervisor, see id. at 26, but when she needed to leave work early she could have asked him for permission, id. at 26-27. Mr. Caruthers recalls discussions with Ms. Bryant about taking some leave for which she was given no occurrences. Id. at 34. He met with Ms. Bryant one week before she was fired and explained to her that her next occurrence point would result in dismissal because she had already incurred seven-and-a-half occurrence points. Id. at 56; Id. Ex. 2. Mr. Caruthers also had a couple of other conversations with Ms. Bryant and warned her about her absenteeism problems. See id. at 57. When Ms. Bryant incurred another half point, her personnel record was faxed to Pennsylvania. Id. at 61. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Caruthers had a conference call with Sandy Ashman, the Pennsylvania head of personnel, and Alan Wiseburg, then president of Delbar Products, to make a decision about whether to terminate Ms. Bryant. See id. at 61. The decision to fire Ms. Bryant was approved by corporate personnel and Mr. Caruthers terminated her. Id. at 59-60.
Under the FMLA, the definition of “employer” includes “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer” to any of the employer’s employees.
In
Freemon,
two of the individual defendants were not directors or officers of the defendant hospital.
Id.
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that because (1) they recommended that the plaintiff be terminated due to absenteeism, (2) they were directed to suspend the plaintiff, and (3) one of them actually terminated the plaintiff, they were individually liable under the FMLA.
Id.
The court concluded that “the FMLA extends to all those who controlled ‘in whole or in part’ [the plaintiffs] ability to take a leave of absence and return to her position.”
Id.; see also Johnson v. A.P. Products, Ltd.,
In the instant case, several factors cause this Court to conclude that defendant Ca-ruthers was an “employer” under the FMLA. First, Mr. Caruthers stated in his deposition that he had all “personnel responsibilities” in Delbar’s plant. Thus, if the FMLA’s definition of employer is given its plain meaning, Mr. Caruthers was acting “directly or indirectly” in Delbar’s interest. Second, Mr. Caruthers had the power to grant personal leave and excused Ms. Bryant from work on occasion, indicating that he controlled, at least in part, her ability to take a leave of absence and return to her job.
Third, it is unclear from Mr. Caruthers deposition whether he, like the individual defendants in
Freemon,
recommended that corporate personnel fire Ms. Bryant. Nevertheless, Mr. Caruthers discussed Ms. Bryant’s absenteeism problems with her more than once and warned her about taking
Y. The Plaintiffs Retaliation Claim
Ms. Bryant claims that she was fired in retaliation for her use of FMLA leave.
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
p. 26. The FMLA provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge ... any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA. To determine whether a prima facie FMLA retaliation' claim has been established, various courts, including courts within the Sixth Circuit, have applied the prima facie requirements of other workplace retaliation statutes, such as Title VII.
See, e.g., Eldridge v. Porelon/Micropore, Inc.,
No. 2:97-0053, slip op. at 20-21 (M.D.Tenn. June 9, 1998);
Stubl v. T.A. Systems, Inc.,
Accordingly, to establish a prima facie retaliation claim under the FMLA, Ms. Bryant must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in an activity protected by the FMLA, (2) her exercise of her rights under the FMLA was known to the defendants, (3) the defendants thereafter took an employment action adverse to her, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Eldridge,
slip op. at 21;
Stubl, 984
F.Supp. at 1090 (citing
Canitia v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.,
Because this Court has already found that Ms. Bryant is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the defendants’ liability under the FMLA, she has established the first three elements of her prima facie case: Ms. Bryant took FMLA leave, the defendants had adequate notice that her leave was protected, and she was fired in April of 1996.
Furthermore, Ms. Bryant has established the fourth element of her prima facie case because the defendants have offered no reasons, other than absenteeism, for her termination. Indeed, Mr. Caruthers stated in his deposition that the sole reason for firing Ms. Bryant was her absenteeism. Dep. of Bill Caruthers, p. 19. The defendants should have excused Ms. Bryant’s absence on March 27, 1995 under the FMLA. As a direct result of their failure to do so, Ms. Bryant was fired. Thus, Ms. Bryant has established a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA.
Once Ms. Bryant has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.
Stubl,
VI. Jury Trial
The defendants have moved to deny the plaintiffs demand for a jury trial. First, they contend that Ms. Bryant is seeking essentially equitable remedies and Sixth Circuit law makes it clear that when a plaintiff seeks only equitable relief, she is not entitled to a jury trial. Second, the defendants argue that both the FMLA and its regulations are devoid of any reference to the right to a jury trial. Third, the defendants maintain that the FMLA and its regulations consistently refer to an award or judgment being made by the court. The plaintiff contends that she is seeking both legal and equitable remedies.
In a very brief opinion, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that thei’e is no right to a jury trial under the FMLA.
Hicks v. Maytag Corp.,
The
Helmly
court reasoned that the FMLA is a closer companion to the FLSA than to Title VII.
Helmly,
In the ease at bar, Ms. Bryant has requested the following: (1) a declaration that the defendants’ conduct violates the FMLA, (2) an injunction enjoining the defendants from any conduct that violates her rights under the FMLA, (3) damages equal to the amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to her due to her termination, plus interest, (4) liquidated damages equal to the sum of # 3 plus interest, (5) other appropriate equitable relief, including employment, reinstatement, promotion, or front pay in lieu of reinstatement, and (6) costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and reasonable expert witness fees. Given the lack of precedent in this area and the similarities between, the FLSA and the FMLA, this Court adopts the reasoning of the Helmly court and finds that the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial under the FMLA. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to deny the plaintiffs jury demand is denied. This case will proceed to a jury trial on the issues of back pay and liquidated damages, and this Court will decide the remaining equitable issues, such as reinstatement and front pay.
VII. Motions to Strike
A. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Plaintiff has moved to strike defendants’ response to plaintiffs statement of
B. Defendants’ Motion to Strike
The defendants’ have moved to strike two documents submitted to the Court by Ms. Bryant: a favorable decision for Ms. Bryant from the Tennessee Department of Employment Security (DES) and a document submitted to the DES Board of Review by Del-bar in Ms. Bryant’s appeal hearing. Ms. Bryant relies on these documents in her affidavit, statement of material facts, and motion for summary judgment. The defendants contend that these documents must be stricken from the record because they are absolutely privileged for all purposes except the processing of an unemployment benefits claim under
First, under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (TAPA), agencies must make agency decisions “available for inspection and copying.”
Second, as the plaintiffs claim, Tenn.Code. Ann.
VIII. Motion for Oral Argument
Given this Court’s rulings on the pending motions before the Court, the plaintiffs motion for oral argument is denied.
IX. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment and DENIES the defendants’ motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment. The Court finds that defendant Delbar Products, Inc. is liable under the FMLA. Furthermore, the Court finds that individual liability exists under the FMLA and that defendant Caruthers is liable under the FMLA. In addition, the Court finds that the plaintiff was fired in retaliation for taking leave under the FMLA. Moreover, the Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial under the FMLA and denies the defendants’ motion to deny the plaintiffs jury demand. This case will proceed to trial on the issue of damages. Finally, this Court denies both the plaintiffs and the defendants’ motions to strike and denies the plaintiffs request for oral argument.
An appropriate order will enter.
ORDER
Before the Court are the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment; the defendant’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment; the defendants’ motion to deny the plaintiffs
The Court finds as follows. First, defendant Delbar Products, Inc. is liable to the plaintiff under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). Second, individual liability exists under the FMLA and the individual defendant, Mr. Bill Caruthers, is liable to the plaintiff under the FMLA. Third, the plaintiff was fired in retaliation for her use of FMLA leave. Fourth, the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial under the FMLA.
It is so ORDERED.
Notes
. Howard Bryant also worked for Delbar Products until he became ill. See Dep. of (Howard) Lester Bryant, pp. 9, 15-16.
. The defendants have pointed out that Ms. Bryant drove her son, but did not assist him with taking public transportation. Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 2. Ms. Bryant has countered that the list of IADLs provided in the regulations is not comprehensive and furthermore, there is no public transportation in the rural community where she and her son live.
. Howard Bryant received a kidney transplant in August of 1997 and stopped dialysis treatments at that time. He plans to return to work in August of 1998. Affidavit of Howard Bryant, ¶ 2.
. It is important to note that
Manuel
was decided under the interim regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor. The interim regulations contained very little instruction regarding unforeseeable leave; however,
Manuel
discusses the final regulations and the outcome in
Manuel
would have been the same under the final regulations.
Manuel,
. If Ms. Bryant had not been assessed a one-half occurrence point on March 27, 1995, she would have incurred only five and one-half occurrence points by the end of 1995, instead of six and she would have started 1996 with a clean slate of zero occurrences. If this had happened, Ms. Bryant would have incurred only two occurrence points as April 8, 1996 and she would not have been fired. Consequently, there is no need to address whether the Ms. Bryant's other absences should have been excused under the FMLA.
. An employer who violates the FMLA is liable for (1) "any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to [an] employee by reason of the violation,” and (2) interest on the amount described in #1. 29 U.S.C,