Bryant v. BurnettBryant v. Burnett
On this appeal, defendant claims that the evidence did not support the permanent restraining order entered against him on this domestic violence complaint. Plаintiff filed a sworn complaint under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (Act),
The Millville Municipal Court judge issued a temporary restraining order on January 7, 1992 and set a final hearing date for January 15. Defendant was required to pay for the emergency
The record reveals that at the time of the January 7 altercation, plaintiff had been living with defendant for three months. Plaintiff tеstified that, “[h]e asked me to ... come stay with him.” She kept her possessions at defendant‘s address, and had lived there continuously for three months until the January 7 incident.
Defendant said that plaintiff had no place to stay and he offered her the opportunity to stay at his place as a favor. He did not intend any agreement to live togethеr on any ongoing or permanent basis. He said, “She was supposed to get her own place,” apparently after she found a job.
By the time of the March 18 final heаring, plaintiff, though then in jail, had obtained her own residence. She no longer had any possessions at defendant‘s residence. The judge‘s final, permanent order exceрts defendant‘s residence from the scope of the restraint. Defendant was otherwise restrained from any contact with plaintiff after she was released from jail. Defendant claims that even though he and plaintiff had lived together for three months, their intent at that time that the arrangement was “temporary” deprived plaintiff of standing to bring a complaint under the Act, since she was not a member of his “household.”
The Act states that “it is the responsibility of the courts to protect victims of violence that oсcurs in a family or family-like setting.”
[A] person protected under this act ... shall include any person who is 18 years of age or older .. . who has been subjected to domestic violence by a spouse, former
spouse, or any other person who is a present or former household member, or a person with whom the victim has a child in commоn. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) .]
The former domestic violence statute,
[T]he Legislature ... encourages the broad application of the remedies available under this act in the civil and criminal courts of this State. It is further intended that the official response to domestic viоlence shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior will not be excused or tolerated, and shall make clear the fact that the existing criminal laws and сivil remedies created under this act will be enforced
without regard to the fact that the violence grows out of a domestic situation. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18 .]
Our courts have applied the Act to non-marital situations where the parties had no children. Torres v. Lancellotti, 257 N.J. Super. 126, 607 A.2d 1375 (Ch.Div. 1992) (defendant was plaintiff‘s live-in male friend of eight years). Most recently, the Act was applied to a situatiоn in which a young man and woman were “de facto” household members but maintained separate legal residences. Desiato, supra, 261 N.J. Super. at 34, 617 A.2d 678. The parties were constant companions, stayed overnight together frequently, and shared certain property. Id. at 34-35, 617 A.2d 678.
We find that Judge Forester correctly applied the Domestic Violence Act of 1991 in this casе. The parties were members of the same household at the time of the domestic violence charged. Intent as to the permanency of the relationship and the circumstances of the invitation or agreement to live together were irrelevant in this case where plaintiff had lived in defendant‘s household for three months. No precise period of residence is specified by the statute to make one a household member. This case certainly involved more than assaultive conduct between casual friends or relative strangers and qualifies as “domestic violence.”
The defendant also claims that the judge‘s decision was not based on sufficient credible evidence in the record. We disagree. A trial judge‘s ruling on the facts should not be disturbed unless “so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.” Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84, 323 A.2d 495 (1974). “Our task is not to reweigh the evidence but to determine if sufficient evidence exists.” Roe v. Roe, 253 N.J. Super. 418, 431, 601 A.2d 1201 (App.Div. 1992).
We find that the record contains adequate proof, by the requisite preponderance of the еvidence standard,
At thе March 18 final hearing everyone operated on the assumption that the acts of violence were not contested. Indeed, an inference arises from defendant‘s failure to challenge the finding at the trial level that he could not have effectively done so. Nonetheless, the better practice requires the trial judgе to elicit basic jurisdictional facts from the plaintiff by sworn testimony on the record, including any acts of violence, rather than simply relying on allegations in the sworn comрlaint. Specific findings of jurisdictional facts should be made on the record,
Affirmed.