Bryan Richard NEI; Alvin King; Paul Leo Amundson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Robert DOOLEY, Warden, Mike Durfee State Prison, Springfield, SD; Lisa McFletcher, Unit Manager, Mike Durfee State Prison; Sally Boyd, Head of Special Security at Mike Durfee State Prison, all in their individual capacities and not their official capacities; Defendants-Appellants, Paul Soyars, Defendant.
No. 03-3261.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
June 25, 2004.
1005
Submitted: June 18, 2004.
Counsel who represented the appellee was David M. Hosmer of Yankton, South Dakota.
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Bryan Richard Nei, Alvin King, and Paul Leo Amundson, current or former inmates at the Mike Durfee State Prison in Springfield, South Dakota, brought this civil rights action against the warden, Robert Dooley, and other prison officials, Unit Manager Lisa McFletcher and Special Security Head Sally Boyd. The inmates claimed the prison officials violated their Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect them from an HIV-positive inmate, Paul Soyars, who assaulted and threatened to infect his fellow inmates. The inmates also asserted McFletcher and Boyd retaliated against Nei and King for bringing the lawsuit by placing them in segregation, and against Nei, King, and Amundson by denying them access to the prison law library. The district court* denied the prison officials’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The prison officials appeal.
We explain the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the inmates, who opposed the officials’ motion for summary judgment. Pagels v. Morrison, 335 F.3d 736, 738 (8th Cir.2003). While incarcerated at the Mike Durfee State Prison, Soyars admitted to inmates and prison staff that he was infected with AIDS. He often threatened inmates that he would infect them with the virus. While cleaning the prison restrooms, Soyars urinated on the floor, spit in the sinks and water fountains, and smeared fecal matter on the floor. In early April of 2000, King approached McFletcher to report he disapproved of the way Soyars “cleaned” the bathroom,
Qualified immunity protects government officials from lawsuits for their performance of discretionary functions unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 739-40. The
In this case, the district court concluded the inmates had articulated facts that would establish they were incarcerated under conditions posing a substan-
The officials argue none of the prison officials had subjective knowledge that Soyars posed a substantial risk of harm to each inmate. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the inmates, we disagree. There was evidence that Soyars fought with King, Nei, and Amundson, and the fights involved fluid exchange, threats of infection, or both. Besides, “[w]e must accept the summary judgment facts as described by the district court because evidentiary determinations are not presently appealable.” Moran v. Clark, 359 F.3d 1058, 1060 (8th Cir.2004). The officials also contend they acted reasonably as a matter of law and thus did not violate the inmates’
As for the inmates’ claim that they were retaliated against for filing their lawsuit by being denied access to the prison law library, the officials contend the district court should have construed the claim as one of denied access to the courts, requiring proof of actual injury, rather than one of retaliation. We disagree. “Conduct that retaliates against the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable, even if the conduct would have been proper if motivated by a different reason.” Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 770-71 (8th Cir.2001). To be actionable, the retaliatory conduct itself need not be unconstitutional because the constitutional violation lies in the intent to impede access to the courts. Id. The district court applied the proper standard to the inmates’ retaliation claim based on denial of access to the law library.
Regarding the inmates’ claim that the officials retaliated against the inmates for filing their lawsuit by placing them in segregation, the officials argue they merely transferred the inmates, and did so to investigate whether they were soliciting signatures in violation of prison rules, rather than in retaliation for filing their lawsuit. Because the inmates’ allegations create a genuine issue of material fact about whether the officials retaliated against them, the district court properly denied summary judgment on this claim. Id. We reject the officials’ argument that the issue of fact triggers application of the retaliatory transfer standard rather than the retaliatory discipline standard. See Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 736-39 (8th Cir.1993) (comparing claims of retaliatory
Having carefully considered all of the officials’ assertions, we affirm the district court‘s denial of qualified immunity.
