85 Me. 532 | Me. | 1893
The question is whether a gas company, which possesses and exercises the right to lay its pipes in the public streets, can sell, lease, or assign its corporate rights and privileges to another gas company, without the consent of the legislature.
We think the question must be answered in the negative. Corporations possessing and exercising the right of eminent domain, owe duties to the public from the performance of which they are not allowed to escape by a sale or lease of their franchises, without first obtaining the consent of the legislature. The franchise of a corporation having the right to receive tolls may be levied on to satisfy an execution against the corporation, and in this way it may be deprived of its corporate powers and privileges. And they may be lost by the foreclosure of a legally executed mortgage. And they may also be lost by laches in reclaiming them when they have been illegally sold, leased, or assigned. But subject to these well-defined exceptions, it is now settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that public or quasi public corporations, which possess and exercise the right of eminent domain, or its equivalent, owe duties to the public, as well as to their stockholders; and that they can not sell or lease their corporate powers and privileges, and thereby disable themselves from performing their public duties, without legislative authority. It is the duty of gas companies, water companies, electric light companies, telegraph and telephone companies, street railway companies, and all similar corporations, which have obtained the right to use the public streets for the erection or extension of their works, to serve the public faithfully and impartially, and at reasonable rates. And this is a duty the performance of which may be enforced by the courts. And one reason why these corporations are not allowed to sell or lease their corporate powers and franchises, without legislative authority, is that if they were able to do so, they might thereby disable themselves from the performance of their
But a still more serious objection to the traffic in corporate franchises is the ease with which such a power could' be used to create monopolies. By its exercise, a' single corporation could easily become possessed of the corporate powers and privileges of all its rivals, and thereby annihilate competition and obtain a complete control of the markets. Such combinations are usually hurtful, and sound public policy requires that they be kept under legislative supervision and restraint.
To the argument that similar combinations may be made by individuals, it has been aptly replied that men are mortal, and their combinations short-lived, but corporations are immortal, and their combinations and acquisitions may go on forever; that they may add field to field, wealth to wealth, and power to power, till they become too strong for the government itself; that all experience shows that such accumulations of wealth and power are dangerous to the public welfare; and that while society can endure the accumulations and combinations- of mortals, which must end at the grave, it can not endure similar accumulations and combinations of power by corporations, which may continue forever.
In a case in New Jersey, decided in August, 1892, it is said that corporations which engage in a quasi public occupation, such as railway, water, gas, telegraph, and similar corporations, are created upon the hypothesis that they will be a public benefit ; that they usually possess the right of eminent domain, and not unfrequently the use of the public highways is accorded to them; and that while the state confers upon them these special and extraordinary privileges, it at the same time exacts from them the performance of public duties ; that such corporations hold their franchises not merely in trust for the pecuniary profit of their stockholders, but also in trust for the public; and that such corporations can not lease or otherwise ■ dispose of their franchises needful in the performance of their public duties, without legislative consent. Stockton v. Central Railroad, 24 Atl. Rep. 964.
In another case, decided in 1889, a corporation for the manufacture and sale of gas, having a capital of $25,000,000, had obtained by purchase a controlling interest in four other gas companies, having an aggregate capital of nearly $17,000,000 ; and in the vigorous language of the court, was thus able to destroy the energies of all other corporations of the same kind, and suck the life-blood out of them ; and the court held that such a combination could not be tolerated ; that the business of manufacturing and distributing illuminating gas by means of pipes laid in the public streets of a city, is a business of a public character; that it is the exercise of a franchise belonging to the State ; that the services to be rendered for such a grant are of a public nature; and that any unreasonable restraint upon the performance of such duties is prejudicial to the public interests, and in contravention of public policy, and could not be allowed. People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co. 130 Illinois, 286; 17 Am. St. Rep. 319.
Equally vigorous is the language of the New York Court of Appeals. In a case relating to the combination known as the Sugar Trust, — a trust that included the Forest City Sugar Refining Company of this State, and so successfully sucked its life-blood out of it that its machinery has since remained as silent as a city of the dead, — the court said that corporate grants are always assumed to have been made for the public benefit, and that any conduct which destroys their normal functions, and maims and cripples their separate activity, must affect unfavorably the public interest; and that this is so to a much greater extent when a combination includes and dominates an entire industry, and puts upon the market a capital stock proudly defiant of actual values, and capable of an unlimited expansion ; that it is not a sufficient answer to say that similar results may
The law does not assume that all combinations of corporate powers and franchises are necessarily hurtful. It recognizes the fact that they are sometimes beneficial, and provides á way by which they may be lawfully made. But as such combinations are liable to be made for improper purposes and with conditions annexed to them which are inadmissible, sound public policy requires that they be made under legislative supervision and restraint.
In the present case, the Brunswick Gas Light Company undertook to lease all its property, and all its corporate rights and privileges, to the United Gas, Fuel, and Light Company, for twenty-five years. The latter company took possession of the works and held them for seventeen and a half months, making improvements upon them and paying a portion of the agreed rent. It then abandoned the works, and possession was resumed by the lessors.
This is a suit by the lessors against the lessees for a breach of the covenants contained in the lease. It was contended in defense that the lease was illegal and void and that no recovery could be had upon it. The presiding justice ruled, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff company and the defendant company had power to execute the lease, and that a recovery could be had for a breach of the covenants contained in it. We think the ruling was erroneous. No legislative authoi’ity for making the lease was shown, and, without such authority, we think the lease must be regarded as ultra vires and void. The authorities bearing upon the question are not in
Exceptions sustained,
