69 Wis. 442 | Wis. | 1887
We will first consider the appeal from the order sustaining the demurrer of the defendants Rees. As
In Edwards v. N. Y. & H. R. Co. 98 N. Y. 245, 249, a case which goes as far as any case to be found in the books, in relieving the landlord from injuries resulting from the improper use of tenements in the possession of his tenants, still in that case the court lays down the rule that “if the-landlord be guilty of negligence or other delictum which.
In Albert v. State, 66 Md. 325, the court say: “ We think it may be held as well settled in this state that where the owner of a wharf leases or rents it out, and, at the time of such renting, the wharf was in an unsafe condition for the use the lessor knew it was to be put to, and the owner knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known, of its condition, and that one w7ho was lawfully on the wharf, and was injured in consequence of its condition, that the owner is liable.”
In House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 631, 640, the court use this language: “The defendant contends that the mill being at the time of the accident in the exclusive occupation of his tenant, and he having no rightful control over it during the continuance of the tenancy, he was for that reason exonerated from all liability for injuries occasioned by its use. But every one who aids, abets, instigates, authorizes, or commands, as well as every one who activety participates in the commission of a tort is himself a principal tort-feasor, and liable as such. And the facts claimed by the defendant, and found by the jury, that at the time of the accident
In a case lately decided in the supreme court of Ehode Island (Joyce v. Martin, reported in 36 Alb. Law J. 272; 10 Atl. Rep. 620), the learned court, after citing and comment* ing upon the cases bearing upon the question, say “ that some of the cases cited are cases in which the lessors were held liable to respond in damages, because the premises from which the injuries were received were in such a state as to be • nuisances, public or private, when let; but others are cases in which the lessors who were held to respond because the premises let by them for rent or profit, were let to be used for purposes for which they were not fit or safe to be used, and because the lessors knew when they let them the purposes for which they were to be used, and also knew, or ought to have known, that they were not fit or safe to be’’ so used,” and the court cited Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. St. 387, which case was reaffirmed in Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. St. 111. These were well considered cases, and the argu ment of the learned court seems to us conclusive. The defendant was the landlord; he had himself built the warehouses, and let them to the United States for the storage of heavy goods. They proved of insufficient strength to sustain the weight placed in them by the tenant, the United States, and, while occupied and used by the tenant, they fell and injured the plaintiff, who brought the action. After a very able review of the cases bearing upon the question involved in the case, the court say: “ Had it [the building] fallen before it was used at all,— had the superstructure been so defective as to be unable to sustain itself, — - it would have been indictable as a common nuisance, and
The cases above cited, we think, state the law correctly. No one, we think, would question the right o'f the plaintiff against the landlord in this case, if he had been himself in the actual occupation of the premises, and caused it to break down by overloading it, especially if it were shown that he knew that he was placing a greater load upon it than it could be reasonably expected to bear. Can it make any difference with his liability to third persons that he has not overloaded it himself, but has let it to another, and at the same time authorized him to overload it, and so caused the injury? We think not. Under the allegations of the complaint in the case at bar, the landlord is more culpable than the tenants. If the allegations of the complaint are true,— and for the purposes of this case they are admitted to be true,— the tenants were clearly induced to overload the upper floors of the building in question, by reason of the declaration and assurance of the landlords, at the time
That the learned county court rightly held that the complaint stated a good cause of action against the defendants Lindemann, the tenants, hardly admits of a doubt. The law compels every man to so use his own as to cause no unnecessary injury to his neighbor. They did so use these rooms as to destroy the plaintiffs’ property. The charge in the complaint is that the floor fell because overloaded by the Lindemanns. They had no right to load the floors beyond their capacity, and doing so is a wrong, and, if the damage occurs by reason of such wrong, they are responsible. If it were necessary to allege the negligence of the tenants in overloading the upper floor, it is sufficiently alleged in the complaint. See Young v. Lynch, 66 Wis. 514.
It is no objection to a recovery against the tenant that a recovery may be had for the same wrong against the landlord. This is fully sustained by the authorities above cited.
By the Court.— The order sustaining the demurrer of the respondents Bees is reversed; and the order overruling the demurrer of the appellants Limdemann is affirmed; and the cause is remanded for further proceedings according to law.