MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court are two related matters. Beacon Sales Acquisition, Inc. (“BSAI”)
I.
Mr. Bruno was the president and a director of Certified Home Rebuilders, Inc. (“Certified”), a home remodeling business based in Carnegie, Pennsylvania. On February 14, 2015, Certified filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
Cassady Pierce, a trade name of BSAI, was listed on Certified’s bankruptcy schedules as having a trade claim of $19,550.
Certified’s bankruptcy case progressed uneventfully. After conducting a meeting of creditors, the chapter 7 trustee for Certified’s bankruptcy estate filed a report of no distribution and the case was closed upon the issuance of a final decree on September 16,2015.
The collapse of Certified’s business seemingly caused the Brunos to commence their own bankruptcy case. On June 24, 2015, they filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Brunos disclosed interests, in two parcels of real property on their bankruptcy schedules. The first is their marital residence in Pittsburgh (the “Residential Property”), which is held by Mr. and Mrs. Bruno as tenants by the entireties.
Among their debts, the Brunos identified over $128,000 in unsecured non-priority claims, consisting of approximately $20,000 in joint debt with the remaining portion attributable either to Mr. Bruno ($98,000) or Mrs. Brund ($10,000) individually.
BSAI filed a proof of claim against the Brunos which alleges that, between September 14, 2014 and February 6, 2015, Certified purchased approximately $20,000 in building materials from BSAI, ostensibly for work to be performed on residential or commercial projects. BSAI alleges that it was never paid for those materials and contends that Mr. Bruno is obligated to repay under an undefined theory of “officer/director/shareholder liability.”
BSAI timely objected to the exemptions claimed in the Residential and Commercial Properties on the basis that the Brunos may not assert a homestead exemption in those assets. BSAI also objected to various exemptions in personal property on the grounds that they exceeded the maximum allowance under Pennsylvania exemption law.
The Brunos also filed an objection to BSAI’s claim and maintain that it lacks standing in this case. The Brunos contend that they owe no money to BSAI because the alleged debt was incurred by Certified and they did not provide a personal guaranty to BSAI. The Brunos also argue that the debt is not jointly assertable against both debtors because Mrs. Bruno was never a director, officer, or shareholder of Certified.
After hearing arguments on both objections, the Court found no basis to deny the exemption in the Residential Property or in- certain joint bank accounts, but it sustained the objection as to a checking account held exclusively by Mrs. Bruno because it was not shown to be entireties property.
As the parties submitted their briefs, BSAI filed a motion seeking reconsideration of this Court’s Order upholding the exemption of the Residential Property un
The dispute is now ripe for adjudication. The Court has jurisdiction over these matters under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 157(b). This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (B).
II.
BSAI claims to have supplied Certified with materials worth approximately $20,000 for which it has not been paid. Since it did not receive a distribution in Certified’s bankruptcy case, BSAI now asserts a claim against Mr. Bruno directly for the unpaid sums.
Pennsylvania has yet to formally recognize a cause of action for deepening insolvency, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit predicted that, if confronted with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find it to be a cognizable injury.
The Brunos alternatively argue that BSAI fails to allege the elements necessary to establish a deepening insolvency claim. To prevail on such a claim, the claimant must demonstrate that the director’s actions proximately caused injury
The elements of a deepening insolvency claim are indeed important, but the Bru-nos’ focus misses the fundamental nature of a deepening insolvency cause of action. Namely, the claim aims to redress injuries sustained by the corporate debtor and thereby inherently belongs to the corporate entity. As explained by the Third Circuit, “ ‘deepening insolvency’ in Pennsylvania is ‘an injury to [a debtor’s] corporate property from the fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life.”
The question presently confronting the Court is whether a creditor may bring a deepening insolvency claim, for its own benefit. In the absence of a direct pronouncement from the appellate courts in Pennsylvania, this Court finds that it cannot. Creditors lack the capacity to pursue a direct cause of action for deepening insolvency because the “injury to the .corporate body is legally distinct from an injury to another person.”
Although the definition provided in Laf-ferty would seem, by itself, to preclude a direct claim by creditors, the Court will also look to analogous state law for guidance.
Under Pennsylvania law, corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.
Through this context, standing to bring a direct claim against a director exists only if the claimant sustained a personal injury which is independent of any injury suffered by the corporation.
The action is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stock or property without any severance or distribution among individual holders, or if it seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent dissipation of its assets ... if damages to a shareholder result indirectly, as the result of an injury to the corporation, and not directly, the shareholder cannot sue as an individual.37
It is not enough to establish that a recovery will yield a benefit to the creditor. To the contrary, a direct claim requires proof that the creditor’s injury is unique and unrelated to any damage sustained by the corporation or other creditors. In a liquidation, the mere fact that a successful outcome may increase the amount available for distribution to creditors does not transform a claim that otherwise belongs to the corporation into one that can be separately maintained by each creditor.
In sum, BSAI has failed to establish a viable claim against the Brunos. It admittedly did not have a contractual relationship with the Brunos that might personally obligate them for the goods supplied to Certified. BSAI also did not advance any other legal theory of recovery aside from its deepening insolvency claim. Because a deepening insolvency claim may only be pursued by the injured corporation or derivatively. on its behalf, and since BSAI does not otherwise hold a direct claim against the Brunos, the BSAI claim is not sustainable and must be denied as a matter of law.
III.
The Brunos contend that upon denial of BSAI’s claim, it no longer possesses standing to contest their claimed exemptions. Standing is a prerequisite for subject-matter jurisdiction, and requires a party to allege an actual case or controversy.
(1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is
(a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and
(8) is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 42
The denial of BSAI’s claim deprives it of standing in this bankruptcy case. Aside from the standing that would arise from a valid claim, BSAI asserts no other basis by which it would have standing to be heard in these matters.
Simply stated, there is no case or controversy here between the Brunos and BSAI. To the extent that there might have been a controversy at some point, it was limited to the dispute between Certified and BSAI. Certified is not now before this Court, and the Court cannot presently redress any injury to BSAI allegedly caused by Certified.
IV.
Based on the foregoing, the objection to BSAI’s claim is SUSTAINED. As BSAI lacks standing to challenge the Brunos’ claimed exemptions, its objection to the exemptions and its Reconsideration Motion are not well taken and are hereby DENIED.
An appropriate order will issue.
Notes
. For the purposes of this Opinion, the Court will utilize the term "BSAI” as it was defined
. Case No. 15-20464, Dkt. No. 9 (Schedule F).
. Case No. 15-20464, Dkt. No. 11.
. Case No. 15-20464, Dkt. Nos. 27-29. .
. Dkt. No. 18 (Schedule A).
. Id. The other
. Id. (Schedtde C). The exemption on the Residential Property was valued at $252,629 based on a stated value of $400,000 and secured claims totaling $147,371. As to the Commercial Property, the Brunos claim an exemption of $8,313.55. They value their 'k interest at $130,000 and identify $243,372.91 in secured claims against the property,
. Id. (Schedule F).
. Id. Each claim allegedly attributable to Certified was listed as "contingent,” "unliquidat-ed,” and "disputed,” and was not included in the final tally of unsecured claims.
. Id.'
. Claim 15-1.
. Dkt. No. 38. BSAI also objected to confirmation of the Brunos’ chapter 13 plan on the same grounds. Dkt. No. 34.
.Dkt. No, 46.
. Dkt. No. 48.
. See Hr’g Tr. 7:24 — 8:1 (Nov. 18, 2015), Dkt. No.63.
. See Dkt. Nos. 54, 63.
. See Dkt. No. 60.
. Id.) see also Dkt. No. 63.
. Dkt. 68.
. Although BSAI’s proof of claim was ostensibly filed against both debtors, BSAI's counsel acknowledged that it had no claim against Mrs. Bruno. See note 15, infra.
. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc.,
. It is not within this Court's province to predict the future, but it appears that at least four circuit judges believe the “deepening insolvency” doctrine may not survive another en banc appellate review:
[Mjuch has changed in the acceptance of deepening insolvency since Lafferty. What had appeared to our Court then to be a .plausible argument gaining increasing acceptance has since been widely repudiated. * * *
[W]hile the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not weighed in on the topic, there is reason to believe that our prediction in Laf-ferty about the acceptance of deepening insolvency as a cause of action under Pennsylvania law has been undermined and ought to be reconsidered.
Lemington Home for the Aged v. Baldwin,
. In re Lemington Home for the Aged,
. Lemington I,
. Lemington I,
. CitX Corp.,
. Lemington II, 777 F.3d at 630 (citing Lafferty,
.Lafferty,
. Id.
. A bankruptcy trustee similarly has standing to assert deepening insolvency claims belonging to its bankrupt debtor as of the date the bankruptcy was commenced. Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Finance Corp.),
. A determination as to whether claims belong to the debtor or its individual creditors is one that turns on state law. Lafferty,
. 15 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 512(a), 1712(a); Lemington I,
. Id.
. In re Forman Enters., Inc.,
. Id. As noted above, a bankruptcy trustee does not fall within this exclusion when the claim is brought on behalf of the corporate debtor. See note 30, infra,
. Hill v. Ofalt,
. Id., 85 A,3d at 549 (citing 12B Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5911 (2013)).
. See Lafferty,
. This conclusion is consistent with the prevailing law in other jurisdictions. As claims for deepening insolvency assert a generalized injury not specific to individual creditors, some courts have held that such claims properly belong to the corporation, or more commonly, the trustee appointed in the corporation’s bankruptcy case. Cohain v. Klimley,
When novel issues arise under Pennsylvania corporate law, the corporate law of Delaware is often consulted for guidance. Under Delaware corporate law, creditors of an insolvent corporation are precluded from asserting direct claims against the corporate directors for a breach of their fiduciary duties. Instead, creditors may pursue derivative claims on behalf of the insolvent corporation or they may assert any nonfidu-ciary claims. North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Ghee-walla,930 A.2d 92 , 103 (Del.2007). In reaching this result, the Delaware Supreme Court sought to avoid the uncertainty that might exist if directors were forced to balance the competing fiduciary duties owed to the corporation, the creditor body as a whole, and the'specific demands of individual creditors. Id,
. O'Shea v. Littleton,
. Crawford v. Hertzberg (In re Hertzberg),
. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization,
.Even if the Court were to examine the Reconsideration Motion on the merits, it is clearly an attempt at a second bite of the apple. BSAI provided no new arguments, no new evidence, no change in prevailing law, no argument based on manifest injustice, but simply repeated the arguments the Court had previously considered and rejected. In light of these considerations, BSAI certainly did not establish the "extraordinary circumstances” required for review under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).