This is а libel action brought by plaintiff teachers against defendant school board members. The school board publishes a newsletter dealing with school affairs and the plаintiffs contend that they were libeled in this publication. The defendants moved for a summary judgmеnt on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action under G-CR 1963, 117.2(1) and the trial cоurt granted the motion, stating only “that the court is of the opinion that based upon the рleadings as filed herein, no cause of action is stated”. *
For the reasons herеin stated we reverse. In a motion for summary judgment it is axiomatic that all well-pleadеd material allegations contained in the complaint are to be taken аs true. Applying this to the instant case we must reverse because on the basis of the record before us there exist possible *430 issues of fact. We note that on a more complete record, summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2 (3) might well be appropriate.
The defеndants argue that viewed in the setting in which they were made the remarks were not libelous. The difficulty with this argument is that the record before us does not show what the setting was. In this regard we note that the newsletter in which the statements were made has not been made a part of the record.
The defendants also argue that the remarks applied to a group in general, and therefore, the plaintiffs have not been individually libeled.
Chapman
v.
Romney
(1967),
The defendants’ final contention is that the summary judgment should be affirmed because they have an absolute privilege. 1 We disagree. Under some circumstances a local government official may be held to have an absolute privilege. However, a review of the authorities convinces us that there is no absolute privilege in this case.
In
Wachsmuth
v.
Merchants National Bank
(1893),
Under the foregoing authorities we must conclude that under some circumstances the members of the schoоl board would have an absolute privilege. However, we also conclude thаt in this case the privilege is conditional. In the cases finding an absolute privilege the allegedly defamatory statements were made in the course of carrying out аn official duty. The making of the statements that contained the allegedly defamatоry remarks was an essential function of the official position held by the defendants. Thе publishing of a newsletter is not in the same category. The publication of a newslеtter may be closely enough related to the official duties of the board members to give them a conditional privilege, but there is no absolute privilege.
The plаintiffs have alleged that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false and with the intent to injure them. This raises a fact question regarding the existence of maliсe and. *432 therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate on this ground.
Reversed and rеmanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
It would appear that this was the basis of the trial judge’s decision although we cannot be sure.
