84 Iowa 698 | Iowa | 1892
I. The issue is as to the genuineness; of the signature to the note. The plaintiff gave
II. One Miss Reed was a witness for the plaintiff and gave testimony as to a conversation with the
III. The testimony of the appellee shows that the note in suit was signed by the appellant in his (appellant’s) store on the fifteenth of May, 1888. The signature to the note -is with black ink. The appellant testified that he had only blue ink in his store May 15, 1888. He also stated: “Used blue ink in my store May 15,1888. Book shown me is my ledger. Had no
IY. The court gave the following instruction:
“4. Witnesses have testified as to their opinion respecting the genuineness of the signature to the note3. Testimony of experts: weight as evidence: instruction to jury. in suit, based upon their acquaintance with and knowledge of defendant’s genu-me signature. You will carefully consider the same, and give it the weight and value .it is justly entitled to, taking into account the experience and knowledge of the witnesses about the matter concerning which the opinion is given. Such evidence, however, is regarded as unsatisfactory. It is, in fact, the result of a comparison of the signature in question with the genuine signature of .the defendant, as the same is remembered and impressed upon the mind of the witness whose opinion is so given. Such evidence ought not to overthrow positive and direct testimony of a credible witness tvho testifies from personal knowledge. It should not be disregarded in any case without good and sufficient reasons, such as would entitle you to disregard other evidence. In case of a conflict*702 between the evidence of witnesses about the matter on which the opinion is given, it is important as corroborative evidence.”
“Special objection” . is made to. the italicized portion of the instruction, and it is said in argument: “What application has the first sentence' of the language objected to to any evidence introduced in the case? Bruner had testified that he saw Wade sign the note in his (Wade’s) store. Wade had testified that he never signed it.” We think, as does the appellant in argument, that one of them has wilfully testified falsely. In view of the record there is no ■opportunity for their being mistaken, and it is in view of this situation of the case that the language is used. It is as applicable to one party as to the other, and affords no ground for complaint by either, and'we fail to see how it is misleading.
Of the clause of the instruction immediately following the one júst commented upon it is said: ‘ ‘ Just what the court meant by this language it is difficult to determine.” It is then urged that by it the same rule is to 'be applied to the witnesses, Moore and Bowen, to .determine the weight and credibility of their evidence, as should be applied to that of Bruner and Wade. Moore and Bowen gave testimony as to matters of which they admit they might be mistaken. It does not appear to us that such was even the probable effect of the instruction. The difficulty lies in not giving weight to all the court said, but in selecting a single ■clause for criticism. The thought of the two clauses of the instruction is to guard the jury against, on the one hand, giving to such .testimony too much weight, and, on the other, against disregarding it for insufficient reasons. No error is apparent on the face of the instruction in the particulars of which complaint is made, and, if a more specific statement was desired, it should have been asked.
These are all the questions important to be considered, and the judgment is aeeiemed.