At some time prior to the tenth-day of September, 1888, James Stebbins, R. H. Stebbins, Sam Stebbins and George Freeland were engaged in business as copartners under the firm-name-of Stebbins Bros. On the date named the plaintiffs commenced this action against Stebbins Bros, as a firm, the members not being named, and as grounds for attachment stated “that defendants [Stebbins Bros.] are about to remove their property out of the state without leaving sufficient for the payment of their debts; that defendants [Stebbins Bros.] are about to remove permanently out of the county, and have property therein not exempt from execution; and that they refuse to pay or secure plaintiffs.” An attachment bond was filed, which was made payable to Stebbins Bros, as a firm, and a writ was issued against the property of the firm, but not against the individual property of its members. On the day after the action.
The plaintiffs insist that their judgment should be first paid. The question we are required to determine is whether the notice of garnishment issued in this action, and served on Nystrom, was effectual to hold the money in his hands for the payment of the claims of the plaintiffs. If it was, the decree of the district court was erroneous so far as it made the right of the plaintiffs junior to the claims of the creditors of the firm of Sam Stebbins & Co. A partnership is a distinct legal entity, capable of transacting business, making contracts, and of suing and being sued as such in the partnership name. Code, sec. 2553; Richard v. Allen, 117 Pa. St. 199; 11 Atl. Rep. 552. In Mason v. Rice, 66 Iowa, 174, a ground for attachment against all the defendants was stated in the petition, and a writ of attachment against their property was asked, but the condition of the attachment bond was that the plaintiff would pay such damages as the firm of which the defendants were members should sustain by reason of
It is said that the appellees ought not to be permitted to question the sufficiency of the' attachment, for the reason that no motion was made in the district court to discharge it. Since the service of the notice of garnishment was not effectual to hold the money,, nor to create any liability on account of it, there was no attachment to discharge. Moreover, the validity of' the alleged attachment was denied, and a release of the money asked by its owners in their petition of intervention, and it cannot be said that they have in any manner assented to or recognized it as of any legal force.
We find no error in the decree, and it is, therefore, affirmed.