254 Pa. 215 | Pa. | 1916
Opinion by
The plaintiff is the owner of a farm situated in Penn Township, Huntingdon County, upon the north side of the Raystown Branch of the Jnniata river, which is a public stream.
The defendant company was incorporated March 30, 1906, under the Corporation Act of April 29, 1874, P. L. 73, and its supplements “for the purpose of the supply, storage and transportation of water and water power for commercial and manufacturing purposes, in the Township of Juniata, County of Huntingdon, and State of Pennsylvania.” It erected a dam across the stream, several miles below plaintiff’s land, and in connection with the dam erected machinery for the purpose of generating electricity. The dam caused the water to back up and overflow a portion of plaintiff’s land. He then brought an action of trespass against defendant, and the latter then filed a petition for the appointment of viewers to assess the damages caused by the construction of the dam, and taking of plaintiff’s land. In September, 1911, the directors of the corporation passed resolutions taking and appropriating plaintiff’s land under its power of eminent domain. The court ordered a bond to be filed in the sum of $3,500. An appeal taken by plaintiff from this order was quashed by this court: (Raystown Water Power Co. v. Brumbaugh, 246 Pa. 225).
Plaintiff then filed the present bill, averring that defendant had no power under its charter, or under the law, to take his property by right of eminent domain, and praying that defendant be required to abate the nuisance caused by the overflowing of plaintiff’s land, and be enjoined from continuing the alleged trespass. After hearing in the court below, the bill was dismissed, and plaintiff has appealed.
In the Act of May 16, 1889, P. L. 226, Section 1, amending the Act of April 29,1874, P. L. 73, Section 2, provision is made for the incorporation of companies for the purpose of “the supply of water to the public, or the
After careful consideration of the Act of April 13, 1905, we are of the opinion that its provisions cannot properly be.so construed as to prevent the defendant company from exercising its right of eminent domain, as to the land lying outside the bed of the stream, which is reasonably necessary to enable the company to discharge effectively its corporate functions. There was no proof that appellee had used or intended to make use of the waters of this stream outside of its district. This is admitted by appellant in his bill, where it is averred that the defendant company is manufacturing electricity and selling the same to persons outside the district.
In the Act of July 2, 1895, P. L. 425, Section 1, the right is given to water companies to distribute electric power and current “to any place or places.” There is no limitation in this respect, such as applied to the distribution of water under the Acts of 1874 and 1889, by
Two of the assignments of error relate to the exclusion of offers to show damage to appellant’s property, caused by the act of the defendant company in backing water upon it. This damage is not denied, and it is admitted that compensation must be made therefor as aAvarded by a jury of view. For that reason, the offers Avere properly excluded in the present case.
Another assignment of error complains of the exclusion of testimony as to an electric light company doing-business in Huntingdon. Offer of proof, as to this, was entirely irrelevant, and it was properly excluded.
The assignments of error are all overruled, the decree of the court below is affirmed, and this appeal is dismissed at the cost of appellant.